Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game

Public Choice

Volumn 100, Issue 3-4, 1999, Pages 271-288

  Farmer, Amy ^a   Pecorino, Paul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033412506     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018368124943     Document Type: Article

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