Truth-revealing mechanisms for courts

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 159, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 259-279

  Cooter, Robert ^a   Emons, Winand ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041911516     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456032974835     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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