IDS models of airline security

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 201-217

  Heal, Geoffrey ^a   Kunreuther, Howard ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Cascading; Interdependence; Nash equilibrium; Security; Terrorism; Tipping

Indexed keywords

EID: 16644390753     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704272833     Document Type: Article

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