Blood and ink! the common-interest-game between terrorists and the media

Public Choice

Volumn 133, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 129-145

  Rohner, Dominic ^a   Frey, Bruno S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Common interest game; Conflict; Coordination; Media; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548575793     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9182-9     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Azam, J.-P. (2005). Suicide-bombing as inter-generational investment. Public Choice, 122, 177-198.
2. Baker, M., & Bulte, E. (2006). Kings and vikings: On the dynamics of competitive agglomeration. Mimeo, United States Naval Academy and Tilburg University.
3. Carlsson, H., & van Damme, E. (1993). Global games and equilibrium, selection. Econometrica, 61, 989-1018.
4. Crelinsten, R. (1997). Television and terrorism: Implications for crisis management and policy-making. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9, 8-32.
5. Delli Caipini, M., & Williams, B. (1987). Television and terrorism.: Patterns of presentation and occurrence, 1969-1980. Western Political Quarterly, 40, 45-64.
6. Ferrero, M. (2005). Radicalization as a reaction to failure: An economic model of Islamic extremism. Public Choice, 122, 199-220.
7. Frankel, D., Morris, S., & Pauzner, A. (2003). Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic comple-mentarities. Journal of Economic Theory, 108, 1-44.
8. Frey, B. S. (1988). Fighting political terrorism by refusing recognition. Journal of Public Policy, 7, 179-188.
9. Frey, B. S. (2004). Dealing with terrorism - Stick or carrot? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
10. Frey, B. S., & Lüchinger, S. (2003). How to fight terrorism: alternatives to deterrence. Defence and Peace Economics, 14, 237-249.
11. Frey, B. S., & Lüchinger, S. (2004). Decentralization as a disincentive for terror. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 509-515.
12. Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. (2004). Media, education and anti-Americanism in the Muslim, world. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 117-133.
13. Harsanyi, J., & Selten, R. (1988). A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Cambridge: MIT.
14. Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.
15. Kim, K.-H., & Meyer, P. (2005). Survey yields factors of newspaper quality. Newspaper Research Journal, 26, 6-15.
16. McKnight, G. (1974). The mind of the terrorist. London: Michael Joseph.
17. Merrill, J. (1999). The global elite: World's best newspapers reflect political changes. IPI Report 1999, 13-15.
18. Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2003). Global games: theory and applications. In M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, & S. Turnovski (Eds.), Advances in economics and econometrics (pp. 56-114). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19. Myatt, D., Shin, H. S., & Wallace, C. (2002). The assessment: games and coordination. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18, 397-417.
20. Nelson, P., & Scott, J. (1992). Terrorism and the media: An empirical analysis. Defence Economics, 3, 329-339.
21. Rathbone, A., & Rowley, C. (2002). Terrorism. Public Choice, 112, 215-224.
22. Sandler, T., Tschirhart, J., & Cauley, J. (1983). A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism. American Political Science. Review, 77, 36-54.
23. Schbley, A. (2004). Religious terrorism, the media, and international islamization terrorism: Justifying the unjustifiable. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27, 207-233.
24. Scott, J. (2001). Media congestion limits media terrorism. Defence and Peace Economics, 12, 215-227.
25. Shughart, W. (2002). September 11, 2001. Public Choice, 112, 225-232.
26. Slone, M. (2000). Responses to media coverage of terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, 508-522.
27. Vega-Redondo, F. (2003). Economics and the theory of games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
28. Wilkinson, P. (2000). Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response. London: Frank Cass.