Terrorist backlash, terrorism, mitigation, and policy delegation

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 91, Issue 9, 2007, Pages 1800-1815

  Siqueira, Kevin ^a   Sandler, Todd ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Counterterrorism; Delegation problem; Public goods; Terrorism; Three stage game

Indexed keywords

EID: 54049127070     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.02.005     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (19)

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