Blockholder scarcity, takeovers, and ownership structures

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 937-974

  Gorton, Gary ^a   Kahl, Matthias ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62149110015     PISSN: 00221090     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S002210900001440X     Document Type: Article

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