Corporate restructuring during performance declines in Japan

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 29-65

  Kang, Jun Koo ^a   Shivdasani, Anil ^b  

^a Korea University   (South Korea)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Financial distress; Japanese corporate governance; Main bank system; Ownership structure; Restructuring

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031258980     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00024-X     Document Type: Article

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