Institutionalized pollution havens

Ecological Economics

Volumn 68, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1239-1256

  Cole, Matthew A ^a   Fredriksson, Per G ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE   (United States)

Author keywords

FDI; Political economy; Political institutions; Pollution Haven Hypothesis; Veto players

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT; INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT; PANEL DATA; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 58749087342     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.08.011     Document Type: Article

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