Convergence and divergence in post-cold war British, French, and German military reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy

Security Studies

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 725-774

  Dyson, Tom ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 57549109807     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410802507990     Document Type: Article

References (486)

1. The author disaggregates temporality according to the three categories outlined by Andreas Schedler and Javier Santiso: Temporal location (when reform takes place), sequence (in what order reform is enacted), and pace (the speed at which reform takes place).
2. See Andreas Schedler and Javier Santiso, "Democracy and Time: An Invitation," International Political Science Review 19, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 5-18.
3. See John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Policy After Unification (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 27. On "culturally bounded" foreign policy formation,
4. see Thomas Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism: National Security Cultures in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998).
5. A policy subsystem refers to a "group of people and or organizations interacting regularly over periods of a decade or more to influence policy formulation and implementation within a give policy area/ domain."Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment," in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 135. Central beliefs are "abstract beliefs and basic assumptions about the international system⋯ rarely questioned and stable"; operational beliefs relate to the "efficacy of different policy instruments and strategies"; peripheral beliefs are "more transient and concern concrete issues and objects."
6. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace-Enforcement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 13. Kerry Longhurst terms the three layers of beliefs of which strategic culture are composed "foundational elements," "security policy standpoints," and "regulatory practices."
7. Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy: 1990-2003 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 17.
8. Paul A. Sabatier also argues that advocacy coalitions are structured by three layers of beliefs: Deep core, policy core, and secondary aspects.
9. Sabatier, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework," 113.
10. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 4.
11. On international structure and clustered convergence, see Joao Resende-Santos, Neoeralism, States and the Modern Mass Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 78. On international structure and convergence, see Galia Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon: NATO Under Unipolarity," Security Studies 15, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 271-309
12. Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Multi-Polarity (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007)
13. Seth Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
14. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: Britain, France, and German Between theWars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984)
15. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979), 127.
16. Barry R. Posen classifies Britain, France, and Germany second-rank, "consequential"states of similar relative material power, which combined with their similar geographical location leads to a comparable level of "external vulnerability." Barry Posen, "The European Security and Defence Policy: Response to Uni-polarity," Security Studies 15, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 156. On external vulnerability,
17. see Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State," Security Studies 15, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 467, 479.
18. On neoclassical realism, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): 144-72
19. Sten Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decision Makers Between International Power and Domestic Interests," Security Studies 11, no. 2 (Winter 2001/02): 85-116
20. Jeffrey Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource Extractive State," Security Studies 15, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 464-95. This contrasts to Innenpolitik approaches, which attach causal weight to domestic politics in driving foreign and defense policy. See Eckart Kehr, Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany 1894-1901 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973)
21. Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: New York, 1991)
22. Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 7, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 180-81.
23. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 9.
24. Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism," 465-68.
25. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France,"116
26. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 169.
27. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France."
28. Peter Hall defines three levels of policy change: "first-order" change in which the settings of policy instruments are changed, while the overall goals and instruments of policy remain constant; "second-order" change in which both the instruments and settings of policy are altered, while the goals of policy remain unchanged; and finally "third-order" change, in which all three components (settings, instruments, and the hierarchy) of goals are transformed. See Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain," Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (Autumn, 1993): 278-9.
29. On the timely translation of power shifts, see Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 115-16.
30. It is important to note that periods of cohabitation in France can lower executive autonomy and create incentives for the temporal management of reform.
31. Although, as the analysis will also demonstrate, the opacity of systemic imperatives emerges as an important additional factor in determining the initial short-term temporal lag between systemic power shifts and military reform in states with high levels of executive autonomy. Whilst the uncertainty is an inherent feature of the international system, the problem of imperfect information is magnified following a dramatic shift in the balance of capabilities. States, as rational actors, must become acquainted with the opportunities and constraints presented by their new strategic environment.
32. See Hyde-Price, European Security in the 21st. Century, 32. On the rationality assumption and realist thought,
33. see Robert Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," in Neo-realism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 167.
34. On the temporal management of reform processes, see Tom Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint Over International Opportunity," European Security 14, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 361-86
35. Tom Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the post-Cold War Era (New York: Berghahn, 2007).
36. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 148-82. On internal balancing, see Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 90.
37. Colin Bennett, "Review Article: What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?" British Journal of Political Science 21, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 19.
38. Christopher Knill, "Introduction: Cross National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory Factors," Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 5 (Winter 2005): 768.
39. It is important to note that, despite French withdrawal from NATO 's integrated military commands, the Ailleret-Lemnitzer and Valentin-Feber Accords of 1966-97 outlined far-reaching French participation with NATO states in the context of European conflict. See Philip Gordon, A Certain Idea of France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)
40. Anand Menon, "From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO, and European Security," International Affairs 71, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 19.
41. On the core post-Cold War security threats identified by EU and NATO member states, see A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy (Brussels, 12 December 2003), 1-5
42. Riga Summit Reader's Guide (NATO: 6 July 2007), 4. Although, as is recognized later on in this article, the objectivity of these security threats is challenged by the literatures on securitization and strategic culture.
43. On securitization, see Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 171-205
44. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998)
45. Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond," European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 357-83.
46. On strategic culture and the subjective and nationally specific normative and discursive processes that determine whether issues are identified as security threats, national defense policy objectives, appropriate policy instruments, and capability investment,
47. see Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany Pacifism and Peace Enforcement; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force.
48. Timothy Edmunds, "What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in post- Cold War Europe," International Affairs 82, no. 6 (Winter 2006): 1059-75
49. Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 50
50. James Sperling, "Capabilities Gaps and Traps: Symptom or Cause of a Troubled Trans-Atlantic Relationship?" Contemporary Security Policy 25, no.3 (2004): 457-58.
51. See Max Boot, "The New American Way of War," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (2003): 43
52. Anthony King, "Towards a Transnational Europe: The Case of the Armed Forces," European Journal of Social Theory 8, no. 3 (2005): 321-40.
53. All three states, however, are dependent upon the multilateral pooling of capabilities (particularly with the United States and its command of the "global commons,"in order to deploy medium-high-intensity military power at the global level).
54. See Edmunds, "What Are Armed Forces For?" 1068.
55. See also Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Primacy," International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 5-46.
56. Soren Lungu, "Military Modernization and Political Choice: Germany and the U.S.-Promoted Military Technological Revolution During the 1990s," Defence and Security Analysis 20, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 261-72.
57. The 2006 German Defence White Paper recognizes that basic service conscripts will be unable to contribute to the reaction forces or the stabilization forces.
58. See White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006), 78-79.
59. The 2003 reform reduced the Bundeswehr to 252,000 troops, including 50,000 conscripts capable of delivering 35,000 rapid reaction troops (high intensity), a stabilization force of 70,000 (low-medium intensity), and 147,500 support/logistical forces.
60. Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps," 453-59
61. Soren Lungu, "The U.S. Military-Technological Revolution and the 'Europeanization' of the French Industrial Sector During the 1990s," RUSI Journal 149, no. 1 (Spring, 2004): 58-63.
62. Kevin P. Reynolds, "Building the Future Force: Challenges to Getting Military Transformation Right," Contemporary Security Policy 27, no. 3 (Winter 2006): 435-71.
63. On EBO
64. see Joshua Ho, "The Dimensions of Effects-Based Operations," Defence Studies 5, no. 2 Spring 2005): 169-87. On NEC and the Effects Based Approach to Operations
65. see J.S. Meiter, "Network Enabled Capabilities: A Theory Desperately in Need of Doctrine," Defence Studies 6, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 189-214.
66. Germany, however, lags behind Britain and France in the development of doctrine on EBAO and in investment in high-technology weapons systems in support of NEC. See Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps," 457
67. Lungu, "The U.S. Military-Technological Revolution."
68. The former commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulack (1995-99), argued in favor of developing the ability to deal with "three-block warfare." This encompassed the idea that U.S. forces would be most likely to encounter the rapid emergence of simultaneous humanitarian, peacekeeping/postconflict reconstruction, and high-intensity conventional warfighting operations in urban environments as small as three blocks. Krulack's ideas, though, were marginalized within the U.S. Marines until 2005.
69. See Ho, "Dimensions of Effects Based Operations," 182-83
70. Steven Metz, "America's Defense Transformation: A Conceptual and Political History," Defence Studies 6, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 7
71. Terry Terriff, "Of Romans and Dragons: Preparing the U.S. Marine Corps for Counterinsurgency," Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 143-62.
72. On escalation, as John Stone pertinently notes, Carl von Clausewtiz posited that in seeking to compel an adversary to one's will through the destruction of his military, war would escalate to its "pure" form, "an explosion of uncontrolled violence." Clausewitz, however, identified two intervening factors, political and technical, that temper escalation. Technology can impede escalation by enabling the rapid and decisive defeat of the enemy, whilst the political context of a conflict can obstruct escalation, as the level of violence in war is directly proportional to the political aims on behalf of which a conflict is fought.
73. See John Stone, "Politics, Technology and the Revolution in Military Affairs," Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004): 409-18.
74. Supported by more a modest emulation of the U.S. infantry's Future Effects System, Britain formed the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) , and France developed the Scorpion/Future Combat System. The German 'Infantryman of the Future System' is currently at an early stage of development.
75. On transformation, see Metz, "America's Defense Transformation: A Conceptual and Political History."
76. See also Kevin P. Reynolds, "Building the Future Force: Challenges to Getting Military Transformation Right," 435-71. It is important to note that the release of the U.S. Army/Marines Country Insurgency Field Manual FM-24 (December 2006) represents a notable recognition of the limitations of technology to control the process of escalation in counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare.
77. These concepts are intended to facilitate the full integration of the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational dimensions of military operations.
78. Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps," 457. However, despite the development of a Joint Reaction Force in 2003, German reforms have proposed only successive alterations to the settings of the policy instrument, due to the retention of conscription and the extent to which Germany lags behind Britain and France in its investment in high-technology weapons systems. Lungu, "Military Modernization and Political Choice," 261-72.
79. The HHG established a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) consisting of 60,000 troops deployable at sixty days notice, sustainable for up to one year in the field, capable of fulfilling not only the low-end Petersburg Tasks but also of sustaining one medium- to high-intensity operation. The Battlegroup Initiative approved at the May 2004 European Council created up to fifteen battlegroups, each consisting of 1,500 troops, deployable within fifteen days. This enhanced the EU's capacity to launch simultaneous low-high-intensity rapid response operations, attaining full operational capability in 2007.
80. NRF is a high-readiness, technically advanced, joint air, naval, and infantry force of 21,000 troops (of which only three hundred are American) able to remain in the field for up to three months.
81. CPG builds upon the 1999 Strategic Concept by identifying the core threats to NATO: International terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, failed or failing states, regional crises, misuse of technologies, and disruption of resource flows. CPG outlined the necessity of being capable of conducting operations which require the comprehensive coordination of "several authorities, institutions and nations' in the context of operations that may involve the simultaneous conduct of combat, stabilization, reconstruction, reconciliation, and humanitarian missions (termed the " Comprehensive Approach"). Riga Summit Declaration (NATO : 29 November 2006), pt. 16, h-i.
82. Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps,"457.
83. Thomas S. Mowle and David H. Sacko, "Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World," Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 3 (Winter, 2007);
84. Sten Rynning, NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Trans-Atlantic Cooperation (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 155, 172
85. Stale Ulriksen, "Requirements for Future European Military Strategies and Force Structures," International Peacekeeping 11, no. 3 (2004): 468. The EDA's Initial Long-Term Vision notes the necessity for a "more characteristically European approach" to NEC, "different in ambition and character (for example with a strong emphasis on civil-military interoperability, and on the tactical level)" and that efforts must "ensure interoperability with the leading efforts of the U.S. in this area" and be "nested within NATO conceptual frameworks and standards.
86. "Initial Long-Term Vision for European Capability and Capacity Needs Brussels: European Defence Agency, October 2006), 20-21.
87. Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "The Strategic Culture of the EU: A Progress Report," International Affairs 81, no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 814-8
88. Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 170
89. Rynning, NATO Renewed, 175
90. Richard Whitman, "NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labour?" Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 3 (2004): 430.
91. These include at a minimum of two meetings at the level of foreign ministers; three meetings at ambassadorial level per semester; two meetings at the level of Military Committee per semester; and regular and routine meetings at the committee and staff level.
92. Cornish and Edwards, "The Strategic Culture of the EU," 812.
93. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 14-15
94. Rynning, NATO Renewed, 157.
95. The civilian dimension of ESDP, launched at the June 2000 European Council, has been bolstered by the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and 2010.
96. NATO support for the AU Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur (AMIS) provides air transport for peacekeepers and training for AU officers; the NATO Training Assistance Implementation Mission in Iraq focuses on training Iraqi Security Forces.
97. A Secure Europe in a Better World, 1-5.
98. Whilst the EU's strategic radius does not yet match that of NATO, it has expanded significantly since the end of the Cold War. Jones calculates this strategic radius as extending 4,000km from Brussels. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 216. Headline Goal 2010 agreed a distance of 6,000 km from Brussels as a planning basis for military operations. White Paper 2006 on German Security, 38.
99. "The principle threats to the Alliance are international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as instability caused by failed or failing states; regional crises; misuse of new technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources." Riga Summit Reader's Guide, 4.
100. David H. Dunn, "European Security and Defence Policy in the American Security Policy Debate: Counterbalancing America or Rebalancing NATO?" Defence Studies 1, no. 1 (Spring, 2001): 153
101. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 44-45
102. Ulriksen, "Requirements for Future European Military Strategies and Force Structures," 469-71. "The UK is a strong supporter of developing EU military capability to complement NATO, rather than competing with it." UK 2003 Defence White Paper, pt. 2.19.
103. "The EU and NATO are not in competition with one another, but make complementary contributions to our security." White Paper 2006 on German Security, 40.
104. Posen, "The European Security and Defence Policy," 184.
105. The July 2002 SDR New Chapter and the December 2003 Delivering Security in a Changing World spelt out more clearly the implications of third-order change in terms of capabilities and military structures and also paved the way for new doctrinal development.
106. See The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter (Norwich: The Stationary Office, 2002)
107. Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper (Norwich: The Stationary Office, 2003).
108. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army.
109. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127.
110. Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army, 72.
111. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 77
112. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 85.
113. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 243
114. Posen, "The European Security and Defence Policy," 149-86.
115. On "clustered convergence,"
116. see Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army, 78.
117. Boot, "The New American Way of War," 41-58
118. Lungu, "Military Modernization and Political Choice," 265
119. Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 124-57. It is, however, important to note that the utility of air power in force-on-force combat is contested. In spite of the success of the United States in targeting Serbian infrastructure and economy, the contested authority of U.S. air power was demonstrated by the 1999 Kosovo conflict that illustrated how 'a well-operated, if obsolescent, integrated air defense system can defend a ground force skilled at camouflage and deception.
120. " Posen, "Command of the Commons," 28.
121. See also Galia Press-Barnathan, "The Myth of Airpower in the Persian Gulf and the Future of Warfare," International Security 26, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 5-44
122. Stephen Walt, "Taming American Power," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (Autumn 2005): 116
123. R. "Williams, "Is the West's Reliance on Technology a Panacea for Future Conflict or Its Achilles Heel? Defence Studies 1, no. 2 (2001): 48.
124. "Brains, Not Bullets," The Economist, 25 October 2007
125. David Betz, "Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Amongst the People," Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 221-43
126. Stephen Biddle, "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06): 161-76
127. Daniel L. Byman, "Building the New Iraq: The Role of Intervening Forces," Survival 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 57-71
128. Carter Malkasian, "Did the United States Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al-Anbar," Defence Studies 8, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 78-104
129. Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (Summer 2002)
130. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006).
131. Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army, 73.
132. Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, 46
133. Holger Mey, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: A German Perspective," Comparative Strategy 17, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 316;
134. Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps," 456-59.
135. On soft balancing, see Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7-45
136. Thazha Varkey Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 46-71
137. Barry R. Posen, "ESDP and the Structure of World Power," International Spectator 34, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 5-17
138. Posen, "The European Security and Defence Policy," 149-86
139. Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response toU.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005), 129.
140. "Binding" refers to the ability of smaller alliance partners to use institutional ties to restrain a larger alliance partner from pursuing unilateral policies and avoid entrapment by a more powerful ally.
141. See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 70-72.
142. On reformed bandwagoning, see Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon," 271-309
143. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," International Security, 30, no. 1 (2005): 80, 91-92
144. Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 109-39.
145. On entrapment and abandonment, see Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon," 307-08.
146. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 219
147. King, "Towards A Transnational Europe," 331
148. Posen, "The European Security and Defence Policy," 180
149. Rynning, NATO Renewed, 151, 157.
150. Hyde-Price, European Security in the 21st Century, 50.
151. "[States] may not feel immediately threatened by the power which provides them the spoils or feel that the potential threat is more distant. In the context of an existing conflict, therefore, watching a friend gain power may not be completely comforting, but the short-term priorities of security demand that you gain now against your enemy and worry about the postwar balance of power with your friend later."
152. Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 15-16.
153. As Lieber and Alexander highlight, "The United States is plausibly threatening to only a limited number of states and terrorist groups. Most other major powers share the U.S. interest in countering these regimes and groups ⋯ other major powers lack an underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United States."
154. Robert J. Art et al, "Striking the Balance," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06): 192.
155. Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps," 458.
156. On state power, see Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 152
157. Taliaferro, "State Building For Future Wars," 479-80.
158. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 90.
159. Ibid., 90-92.
160. Ibid., 104-16.
161. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 114.
162. Taliaferro, "State Building For Future Wars," 487-90.
163. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 174.
164. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 116.
165. See Peter J. Katzenstein ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)
166. Kerry Longhurst, "Why Aren't The Germans Debating the Draft? Path Dependency and the Persistence of Conscription," German Politics 12, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 147-65
167. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 319-425.
168. Theo Farrell, "Culture and Military Power," Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): 407-18
169. Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring, 1999): 49-69.
170. Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism; Duffield, World Power Forsaken, 27.
171. Frank Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 28.
172. The concept of strategic culture was initially associated with nuclear strategy. Jack, L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options (Santa Monica: RAND, 1977)
173. Colin Gray, "National Styles in Strategy: The American Example," International Security 6, no. 2 (1981): 21-47. Alistair Johnson cast the scope of strategic culture more broadly, relating it to a state's grand strategy as an integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which act to establish persuasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs and by clothing these conceptions in such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.
174. "Alistair I. Johnson, Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 46.
175. See Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism.
176. See Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism.
177. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany Pacifism and Peace Enforcement; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force.
178. Alistair Miskimmon, "Continuity in the Face of Upheaval: British Strategic Culture and the Blair Government," European Security 13, no. 3 (2004): 87-113
179. Rod Thornton, "A Welcome Revolution? The British Army and the Changes of the Strategic Defence Review," Defence Studies 3, no. 3 (2003): 38-62
180. Mark Smith, "Britain: Balancing Instinctive Atlanticism," Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 3 (2005): 447-69.
181. Longhurst, "Why Aren't the Germans Debating the Draft?"; Bastien Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations and the End of Conscription in France," Security Studies 12, no. 3 (2003): 157-87.
182. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44, no. 5 (Winter 1996): 936-57.
183. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 176.
184. Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 65-93
185. Kier, Imagining War.
186. Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," 68
187. Kier, Imagining War, 31.
188. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 10-11.
189. Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism
190. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, 261
191. Johnson, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," 34
192. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 13, 17.
193. On the structure agency debate and new institutionalism,
194. see Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, "Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism," Political Studies 44, no. 5 (Autumn 1996): 936-57. On ACF
195. see Sabatier, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework," 117-66.
196. On "multiple streams," see John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 110
197. Nicolaos Zahariadis "Ambiguity, Time and Multiple Streams," in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 73-97.
198. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 170-71.
199. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 170
200. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy, 110
201. Zahariadis, "Ambiguity, Time and Multiple Streams."
202. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 170-71.
203. Sabatier, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework," 145.
204. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 170.
205. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 22
206. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace-Enforcement.
207. On the political-military elite, see Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 21. On political/norm entrepreneurs, see Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace-Enforcement, 11, 20. On strategic culture agents,
208. see Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 22.
209. See Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 12
210. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
211. As Dalgaard-Nielsen, Longhurst and Sabatier demonstrate that it is highly difficult for policy actors to directly challenge "central" (Ibid., 13),
212. "foundational" (Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 17) or "deep-core"(Sabatier, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework," 133) beliefs. However, they can, over time, alter what Sabatier terms "secondary" and "operational" aspects - which Longhurst terms "security policy standpoints" and "regulatory practices" and Dalgaard-Nielsen terms "operational" and "peripheral" beliefs - contributing over the longer-term, to change to central, foundational, or deep-core beliefs.
213. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 12-13
214. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 22
215. Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, 30-31
216. John Glenn, Darryl Howlett, and Stuart Poore, "Conclusion," in Neorealism versus Strategic Culture, ed. John Glenn et al. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 233.
217. Securitizing actors include political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups, though in democracies, governments tend to enjoy an advantage, stemming from their legitimacy. Buzan, et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 40.
218. "Part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations." Ibid., 23.
219. Referent objects include "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (the state, national sovereignty, ideology, national economies, collective identities, and habitats).
220. Ibid.
221. Buzan et al. define "securitization" as "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game."
222. Ibid.
223. Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization," 171-201
224. Stritzel, "Towards A Theory of Securitization," 357-83.
225. Stritzel, "Towards A Theory of Securitization," 365.
226. Ibid., 370.
227. Ibid., 367.
228. Kier, Imagining War, 141.
229. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 17.
230. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 218
231. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 188
232. Christoph Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 11.
233. Cornish and Edwards, "The Strategic Culture of the EU"
234. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 188
235. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 218
236. Christoph Meyer, "Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture," European Journal of International Relations 11, no.4 (Winter, 2005): 536
237. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture.
238. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 191.
239. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, 11.
240. On contestation within the concept of strategic culture
241. see Johnson, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," 36-43
242. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 8-16.
243. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 12-13
244. Colin Grey, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 49-69
245. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 176.
246. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 18.
247. Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism, 16-21.
248. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 11-13
249. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 20-22
250. Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization," 257-83.
251. Kier, Imagining War, 141.
252. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 157-87.
253. Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, May 2000).
254. "Wir Müssen die Landesverteidigung neu Definieren," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 February 2004.
255. In "Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal," Scharping increased the number of crisis reaction forces to 80,000.
256. See Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 102, 109
257. Elinor C. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO (Kingston, ON; Montreal: McGill Queens Press, 2002), 74.
258. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 123-24.
259. King, "Towards a Transnational Europe," 327.
260. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 134
261. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 101.
262. The White Paper outlines in bold terms how the reformed Bundeswehr would allow Germany to "actively shape its environment" and "take preventative action against risks and threats to German security." White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006).
263. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 126
264. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 111
265. Lungu, "Military Modernization and Political Choice," 261-72
266. Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps," 457.
267. Kerry Longhurst and Alistair Miskimmon, "Same Challenges, Diverging Responses: Germany, the UK and European Security," German Politics 16, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 91.
268. Longhurst, "Why Aren't the Germans Debating the Draft?" 147-65
269. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 150.
270. Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism
271. Hanns W. Maull, "Germany's Foreign Policy post-Kosovo: Still a Civilian Power?" Survival 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 91-10.
272. Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization," 365.
273. See Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 144
274. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 147. Post-Cold War unity amongst both catch-all parties, the SPD and CDU/CSU, on the "citizen in uniform" as a key element of Innere Führung makes it difficult to apply Kier's analytical framework; for despite this civilian unity, international threats and opportunities appear to play a lesser role in shaping military doctrine than in France and the United Kingdom.
275. See Sameera Dalvi, "Germany," in Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, ed. John Glenn et al. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 204-24
276. Longhurst, "Why Aren't The Germans Debating the Draft?" 147-65
277. Kier, Imagining War, 4.
278. Klaus Armingeon, "The Effects of Negotiation Democracy: A Comparative Analysis," European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 90
279. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 365.
280. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 62-66.
281. Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization," 362.
282. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 94-101.
283. Article 65a, 115b, German Basic Law; Renate Mayntz, "Executive Leadership in Germany," in Presidents and Prime Ministers, ed. Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleimann (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Studies, 1980), 142-43.
284. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 362
285. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 94-101.
286. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 90.
287. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 62-66.
288. Ibid., 66-68.
289. Ibid., 112.
290. Ibid., 62-68;
291. Lungu, "Military Modernization and Political Choice," 264.
292. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 123
293. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 364
294. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 104.
295. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 369
296. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 101-112.
297. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 377-80
298. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 113-15.
299. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 371
300. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 136-40.
301. Edmunds, "What Are Armed Forces For?" 1069
302. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 124.
303. "Ende mit Schrecken," Spiegel, 17 March 2003, A50.
304. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 85-116.
305. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 372-73
306. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 188-92.
307. Both Rühe and Scharping were also keen to avoid alienating powerful regional figures within their parties due to their personal political ambition of the chancellorship. This further circumscribed their willingness to push through radical base closures and contributed to the careful spatial targeting of base closures and avoidance of large-scale closures in Länder with forthcoming elections. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 104, 108, 173.
308. The sensitivity of the politics of base closures and the abolition of conscription made the Defense Ministry something of a political graveyard and an unattractive ministerial position, gaining a reputation as a Schleudersitz (ejector seat) (ibid., 229). On Rühe and constitutional constraints
309. see ibid., 59-61. On Rühe, the Bundestag, and the deployment of troops,
310. see ibid., 61.
311. On Struck and negotiating constitutional constraints, see Dyson "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 376-77.
312. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 361-86
313. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 80-81; 189-92.
314. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace-Enforcement, 126
315. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 377-85
316. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 133.
317. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 120-22.
318. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 375
319. Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000): 205-07.
320. On the bifurcation within the German Federal Executive
321. see Klaus H. Goetz, "The Federal Executive: Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation," in Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint, ed. Kenneth H.F. Dyson and Klaus H. Goetz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 55-72.
322. See also Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffrey, and William Paterson, Germany's European Diplomacy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 25.
323. Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order, 205-09
324. Alistair Miskimmon and William Paterson, "The Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation," in Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint 325-45.
325. Lothar Gutjahr, German Foreign and Defence Policy After Reunification (London: Pinter, 1994), 135-46
326. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 374-75.
327. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 173-74
328. Wolfgang Wagner, "From Vanguard to Laggard: Germany in European Security and Defence Policy," German Politics 14, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 455-69.
329. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 173-74.
330. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 365-69.
331. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 175-77.
332. Ibid., 68-71; 95.
333. Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon," 304
334. Michael Brenner, "The CFSP Factor: A Comparison of United States and French Strategies," Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 192.
335. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 39-40
336. Rynning, NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Trans-Atlantic Cooperation, 158-59.
337. Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon," 307-08.
338. Struck legitimated the 2003 reform to policy objectives by stating, "Germany will be defended on the Hindukush." Peter Struck, quoted in "Wir müssen die Landesverteidigung neu definieren," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 February 2004.
339. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 152
340. See also White Paper on German Security Policy, 6. In addition, Germany was fearful of the implications of the pursuit of a core Europe on ESDP due to the fear of the implications of a potentially bifurcated Europe for German regional influence amongst East Central European states. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 376.
341. Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. Mey, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives," McNair Papers, 60 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studie, April 1999), 53-54
342. Justin J. McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future: Domestic Politics and the End of Conscription in France," West European Politics 20, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 125-45.
343. George A. Bloch, "French Military Reform: Lessons for America's Army?" Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly 30, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 36
344. Bastien Irondelle, "Europeanisation without the European Union? French Military Reforms 1991-96," Journal of European Public Policy 10, no. 2 (2003a): 208-26
345. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 157-87.
346. Patrick Bratton, "France and the Revolution in Military Affairs," Contemporary Security Policy 23, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 110; Bloch, "French Military Reform," 43
347. Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 49-50
348. Ronald Tiersky, "French Military Reform and Restructuring," Joint Force Quarterly 1 (Spring 1997): 95-112.
349. Bloch, "French Military Reform,"33-45
350. Menon, "From Independence to Cooperation," 19-34.
351. Bloch, "French Military Reform," 38
352. Laird and Mey, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives," 51.
353. King, "Towards A Transnational Europe," 326.
354. Bloch, "French Military Reform," 35.
355. McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future," 135-36
356. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 157-87.
357. Bloch, "French Military Reform," 33-45.
358. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 157-87.
359. Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization," 357-83.
360. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France
361. McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future," 138
362. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 108.
363. McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future," 138.
364. Kier, Imagining War.
365. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, 12-13
366. Irondelle, "Europeanisation without the European Union?" 208-26
367. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 157-87.
368. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 179-80.
369. Sabatier distinguishes between "nascent" and "mature advocacy coalitions." Mature coalitions have a "line up of allies and opponents that are rather stable over a period of a decade or so," sharing common "policy core" beliefs. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework," 136.
370. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 96, 106.
371. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 180
372. McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future," 138.
373. Bloch, "French Military Reform," 36.
374. Ibid., 35.
375. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 180.
376. McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future," 135.
377. Laird and Mey, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives," 53-55
378. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, 68. During the 1990-91 Gulf War, the French could mobilize only 12,000 troops for participation in the conflict from a combat-ready army of 280,000, whilst the British mobilized over 30,000 troops from a combat-ready force of 160,000.
379. See McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future," 134.
380. Tiersky, "French Military Reform and Restructuring," 3.
381. Bloch, "French Military Reform," 36.
382. Irondelle, "Europeanisation without the European Union?" 219-20.
383. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 177-78.
384. Ibid., 178.
385. Ibid., 182.
386. Bloch, "French Military Reform," 36.
387. Bloch, "French Military Reform," 36
388. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 110.
389. Irondelle, "Europeanisation without the European Union?" 220.
390. Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations," 183
391. Laird and Mey, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives," 53.
392. Bloch, "French Military Reform," 36-39.
393. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, 63-65.
394. Bloch, "French Military Reform," 36.
395. McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future," 136.
396. Irondelle, "Europeanisation without the European Union?" 208-26
397. Pernille Riecker, "From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy?" Security Dialogue 37, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 525.
398. Irondelle, "Europeanisation without the European Union?" 222.
399. Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Marin, Hand Joachim Knopf, and Klaus Roscher "Constructing Europe: The Evolution of British, French and German Nation-State Identities," Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 619-22.
400. Geoffrey Edwards, "Is There a Security Culture in an Enlarged European Union?" The International Spectator 41, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 12.
401. Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon,"304
402. Brenner, "The CFSP Factor," 198-99
403. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 214
404. Posen, "The European Security and Defence Policy," 167.
405. As Howorth highlights, France has not only sought to embed its defense policy within ESDP but has also been a key contributor to NATO missions during the post-Cold War period. France also took a lead role in developing the NRF in order to ensure that NATO and ESDP are "mutually reinforcing." Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 45.
406. See "Balladur Sets Kohl Meeting and Orders Cabinet Frugality," International Herald Tribune, 1 April 1994.
407. See also Brenner, "The CFSP Factor,"198
408. Menon, "From Independence to Cooperation," 22.
409. Jolyon Howorth, "French Defence Reforms: National Tactics for a European Strategy?"in Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1998 (London: Brassey's, 1998), 130-51
410. Menon, "From Independence to Cooperation," 27.
411. This includes the promotion of Galileo as a European alternative to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), ensuring that France is not reliant on GPS for mid-course guidance updates of its Scalp cruise missile system; the development of Stealth technology systems with Germany and Sweden; and the Helios I and II satellite systems. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, 71.
412. See also Lungu, "The U.S. Military-Technological Revolution," 58-63
413. Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps," 457
414. Rachel Utley, The French Defence Debate: Consensus and Continuity in the Mitterrand Era (London: Macmillan, 2000), 185.
415. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 113.
416. Mary Kaldor, "Rethinking British Defence Policy and Its Economic Implications," Sussex European Institute Working Paper (1995 : 48-49.
417. The 1993 Statement on Defense Estimates prioritized territorial and alliance defense as the core objective of the armed forces. Out-of-area crisis-reaction/prevention and humanitarian missions in support of the UN were afforded the lowest priority. Andrew Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium: The Evolution of British Defence Policy in the post-Cold War Era," Defence Analysis 17, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 192.
418. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, 58.
419. Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, 50-51.
420. Thornton, "A Welcome Revolution?" 39.
421. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, 61.
422. This included a joint helicopter command, joint army/air-force ground-based air defense organization, and a chief of defense logistics. King, "Towards a Transnational Europe," 325
423. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, 60.
424. Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps," 257
425. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, 57.
426. The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter; Delivering Security in a Changing World.
427. Thornton, A "Welcome Revolution?" 38-62.
428. Ibid., 21-46.
429. Colin McInnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review," International Affairs 74, no. 4 (Winter, 1998): 832.
430. Miskimmon, "Continuity in the Face of Upheaval," 95.
431. Thornton, "A Welcome Revolution?" 57.
432. Kier's focus on organizational culture and civil-military relations would lead us to the conclusion that the smooth response to changing threats and opportunities at the international level is more a reflection of British civil-military relations and political consensus on the domestic role of the armed forces than of the broader national security culture. Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," 65-93
433. Kier, Imagining War.
434. Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization," 375.
435. Andrew Dorman, "Britain and Its Armed Forces Today," The Political Quarterly 78, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 320.
436. See McInnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review," 824.
437. See also Kaldor, "Rethinking British Defence Policy," 49.
438. Conservative opposition to Labour's reform proposals was mitigated by the Tory legacy of cuts to the defense budget and the internal disarray within the Conservative Party following its emphatic defeat in 1997. Labour's large parliamentary majority strengthened the competencies of the core executive in defense policy vis-à-vis the House of Commons Parliamentary Select Committee on Defense. Rob Dover, "The Prime Minister and the Core Executive: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Reading of UK Defence Policy Formulation 1997-2000," British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 516.
439. Labour Government Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review White Paper, 8 July 1998, essay 1, par. 19.
440. Malcolm Chalmers, "Bombs Away? Britain and Nuclear Weapons under New Labour," Security Dialogue 30, no. 1 (1999): 62
441. McInnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review," 827-28.
442. Dyson, "German Military Reform 1998-2004," 374.
443. The Strategic Defence Review, essay 1.
444. Dover, "The Prime Minister and the Core Executive," 515-16.
445. Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium," 195.
446. Ibid., 187-202
447. Dover, ""The Prime Minister and the Core Executive," 508-21
448. Tim Dunne, "When the Shooting Starts: Atlanticism in British Security Policy," International Affairs 80, no. 5 (Autumn, 2004): 908
449. Smith, "Britain: Balancing Instinctive Atlanticism," 447-69.
450. Edwards, "Is There a Security Culture in an Enlarged European Union?" 12.
451. Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium," 187-88
452. Dover, "The Prime Minister and the Core Executive," 508-21
453. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 55.
454. Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium," 195
455. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 53
456. Rynning, NATO Renewed, 91
457. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, 56.
458. Miskimmon, "Continuity in the Face of Upheaval,"90;
459. Smith "Balancing Instinctive Atlanticism," 447-69
460. William Wallace, "British Foreign Policy after the Cold War," International Affairs 68, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 423-42.
461. Miskimmon, "Continuity in the Face of Upheaval," 90
462. Michael Quinlan, European Defence Cooperation: Asset or Threat to NATO? (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 36.
463. Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium," 195-96
464. Rynning, NATO Renewed, 91.
465. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 53.
466. Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium," 194-95
467. Dover, "The Prime Minister and the Core Executive," 511-12.
468. Press-Barnathan, "Managing The Hegemon," 271-309
469. Stuart Croft, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, and Matthew Uttley, Britain and Defence 1945-2000: A Policy Re-Evaluation (Essex: Pearson, 2001), 63
470. Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium," 194
471. Dover, "The Prime Minister and the Core Executive," 513.
472. As Dover highlights, the pace (six months) of the incremental changes to the settings of British policy on institutional venues in 1998 was facilitated by a high level of executive autonomy through a concentration of power in the core executive (notably Blair but also Robertson) and a lack of domestic opposition from within the Defense Ministry or from other actors within the broader defense and security policy subsystem. First-order change to the settings of policy did not require the bipartisan brokerage that had accompanied the third-order change of the SDR. Dover, "The Prime Minister and the Core Executive," 511-15.
473. Blair and Robertson originally intended the reform process to last only six months. McInnes, Labour's Strategic Defence Review," 829.
474. It is also important to note that whilst broadly similar in material capabilities and external vulnerability, British, French, and German external vulnerability have nuances deriving from geographical location, to which attention must be paid. Hence, as the analysis demonstrates, French preoccupation with relative power vis-à-vis Germany impacts upon the scope and pace of change to the institutional forums of French defense policy. This helps to explain why, despite high levels of executive autonomy in both the United Kingdom and France, changes to the institutional forums of each state's defense policies took place at divergent temporal locations (1994 and 1998, respectively).
475. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 161.
476. Taliaferro, "State Building For Future Wars," 487-91.
477. Taliaferro also highlights the roles of nationalism and ideology as important intervening variables in determining state power. However, the inclusion of such variables within neoclassical realism runs the risk of violating the material core of realist thought, in addition to further compromising parsimony. Instead, the analysis presented in this article suggests that it is perhaps more accurate to view culture, nationalism, and ideology not so much as constraints on policy makers and as intervening variables but as tools (albeit tools difficult to master at times) and resources in the hands of statesmen. Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 81. Further empirical research is required, however, in order to understand the precise role played by the variables of nationalism and ideology. On reductionism and the material core of realist thought,
478. see Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 155-56
479. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security 24, no. 2 (Autumn 1999): 28-29, 35-36
480. John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programmes: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 899-912.
481. Rynning, "Shaping Military Doctrine in France," 114.
482. It would be erroneous to factor out the role of individual leaders in determining state power, not least as the core executive and statesmen emerge as important actors within neoclassical realist theory. However, assessing the influence of first image variables on international politics and the impact of individuals and personality on the course of history is a process fraught with difficulty and intangibility and is beyond the scope of this article. On the role of first-image variables in realist theory and the difficulties of measuring the impact of individuals
483. see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 107-46
484. Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," American Political Science Review 61, no. 3 (Autumn 1967): 629-41
485. Daniel L. Byman, Kenneth M. Pollack, and Andrew Parasiliti, "Correspondence: The First Image Reversed," International Security 26, no. 2 (Autumn 2001): 166-69. Resende-Santos also notes how competitive effectiveness "may also comprise intangible factors such as skill and leadership.
486. "Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army, 63.