Culture clash: Assessing the importance of ideas in security studies

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 141-170

  Desch, Michael C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032398923     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.1.141     Document Type: Article

References (272)

1. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
2. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
3. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
4. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
5. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
6. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
7. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
8. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
9. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
10. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
11. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
12. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
13. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
14. In addition to Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), the main pieces in this literature are Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Resistant during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 23, 24, and his Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-26, explicitly contrast his domestic structural approach with a cultural approach. I include him within the post-Cold War culturist wave, however, because the domestic social structure he is most interested in, the Indian caste system, has largely ideational roots.
15. Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 1.
16. Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 187; and Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," p. 84.
17. Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 187; and Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," p. 84.
18. Katzenstein and Okawara, "Japan's National Security," pp. 84-118; Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; and Berger," From Sword to Chrysanthemum," pp. 119-150.
19. Katzenstein and Okawara, "Japan's National Security," pp. 84-118; Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; and Berger," From Sword to Chrysanthemum," pp. 119-150.
20. Katzenstein and Okawara, "Japan's National Security," pp. 84-118; Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; and Berger," From Sword to Chrysanthemum," pp. 119-150.
21. Rosen, "Military Effectiveness," pp. 5-32; and Rosen, Societies and Military Power, pp. viii-xi.
22. Rosen, "Military Effectiveness," pp. 5-32; and Rosen, Societies and Military Power, pp. viii-xi.
23. Johston, Cultural Realism, pp. x, 247, 262-266; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," p. 63; and Alistair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Moist China," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 257.
24. Johston, Cultural Realism, pp. x, 247, 262-266; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," p. 63; and Alistair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Moist China," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 257.
25. Johston, Cultural Realism, pp. x, 247, 262-266; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," p. 63; and Alistair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Moist China," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 257.
26. Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 156.
27. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear Weapons Taboo," in ibid., pp. 114-153.
28. Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in ibid., pp. 271-316.
29. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in ibid., pp. 357-399.
30. Michael N. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East," in ibid., pp. 400-450.
31. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," in ibid., pp. 79-113.
32. Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," p. 41. All the essays in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, explicitly target realism.
33. Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," p. 41. All the essays in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, explicitly target realism.
34. The authors in the Katzenstein volume differ widely on this. See Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 37, 68; Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro's, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in ibid., p. 496; and Katzenstein, "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World," in ibid., pp. 507-508.
35. The authors in the Katzenstein volume differ widely on this. See Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 37, 68; Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro's, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in ibid., p. 496; and Katzenstein, "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World," in ibid., pp. 507-508.
36. The authors in the Katzenstein volume differ widely on this. See Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 37, 68; Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro's, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in ibid., p. 496; and Katzenstein, "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World," in ibid., pp. 507-508.
37. Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 1.
38. Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 221.
39. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; and Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture," p. 34.
40. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; and Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture," p. 34.
41. Some of the best critiques of realism have come from within the paradigm itself. See, for example, Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-108.
42. The classic examples are Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1932); and Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, [1946] 1989). Other works on World War II in the strategic culture genre include Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); and Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).
43. The classic examples are Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1932); and Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, [1946] 1989). Other works on World War II in the strategic culture genre include Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); and Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).
44. The classic examples are Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1932); and Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, [1946] 1989). Other works on World War II in the strategic culture genre include Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); and Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).
45. The classic examples are Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1932); and Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, [1946] 1989). Other works on World War II in the strategic culture genre include Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); and Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).
46. For discussion of their specific theories and impact, see John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), pp. 118-146.
47. For a useful overview, see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 12-15.
48. Colin S. Gray, "What RAND Hath Wrought," Foreign Policy, No. 4 (Fall 1971), pp. 111-129.
49. Ibid., p. 126.
50. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1 (July 1977), pp. 21-34; Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47; Jean-François Revel, How Democracies Perish (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984); and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (November 1979), pp. 34-45; Carnes Lord," American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269-294; and Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 34-42.
51. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1 (July 1977), pp. 21-34; Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47; Jean-François Revel, How Democracies Perish (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984); and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (November 1979), pp. 34-45; Carnes Lord," American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269-294; and Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 34-42.
52. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1 (July 1977), pp. 21-34; Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47; Jean-François Revel, How Democracies Perish (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984); and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (November 1979), pp. 34-45; Carnes Lord," American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269-294; and Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 34-42.
53. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1 (July 1977), pp. 21-34; Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47; Jean-François Revel, How Democracies Perish (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984); and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (November 1979), pp. 34-45; Carnes Lord," American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269-294; and Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 34-42.
54. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1 (July 1977), pp. 21-34; Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47; Jean-François Revel, How Democracies Perish (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984); and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (November 1979), pp. 34-45; Carnes Lord," American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269-294; and Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 34-42.
55. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1 (July 1977), pp. 21-34; Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47; Jean-François Revel, How Democracies Perish (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984); and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (November 1979), pp. 34-45; Carnes Lord," American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269-294; and Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 34-42.
56. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1 (July 1977), pp. 21-34; Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47; Jean-François Revel, How Democracies Perish (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984); and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (November 1979), pp. 34-45; Carnes Lord," American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269-294; and Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 34-42.
57. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1 (July 1977), pp. 21-34; Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47; Jean-François Revel, How Democracies Perish (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984); and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (November 1979), pp. 34-45; Carnes Lord," American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269-294; and Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 34-42.
58. Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," pp. 24, 26. See also Lord, "American Strategic Culture," p. 280; and Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 24.
59. Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," pp. 24, 26. See also Lord, "American Strategic Culture," p. 280; and Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 24.
60. Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," pp. 24, 26. See also Lord, "American Strategic Culture," p. 280; and Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 24.
61. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," p. 155; and Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," pp. 25-26.
62. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," p. 155; and Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," pp. 25-26.
63. Revel, How Democracies Perish.
64. Gray, "What RAND Hath Wrought," p. 122. For a later expression of similar sentiments, see Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 83-113.
65. Gray, "What RAND Hath Wrought," p. 122. For a later expression of similar sentiments, see Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 83-113.
66. Leslie Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979).
67. On the nature of the task facing the United States in Vietnam, see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983); and Neil Sheehan, A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988).
68. On the nature of the task facing the United States in Vietnam, see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983); and Neil Sheehan, A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988).
69. Sarah Mendelson, "Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 327-360.
70. See Raymond L. Garthoff, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); and Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
71. See Raymond L. Garthoff, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); and Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
72. See the dire warnings of increased likelihood of war in Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," pp. 139-140.
73. For a bold statement of this argument, see John Lewis Gaddis, "Hanging Tough Paid Off," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January/February 1989), pp. 11-14. For a more detailed discussion of realism and the end of the Cold War, see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 91-129.
74. For a bold statement of this argument, see John Lewis Gaddis, "Hanging Tough Paid Off," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January/February 1989), pp. 11-14. For a more detailed discussion of realism and the end of the Cold War, see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 91-129.
75. See Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993);
76. and Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
77. See Nicolai Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 1.
78. Katzenstein, "Conclusion," p. 499; see also the various essays in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
79. Katzenstein, "Conclusion," p. 499; see also the various essays in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
80. Katzenstein, "Preface," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. xi.
81. Valerie Bunce, "Domestic Reform and International Change: The Gorvachev Reforms in Historical Perspective," Inrernational Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 107-138.
82. See, for example, Bruce M. Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp, 126-129.
83. Emanuel Adler, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 367-390; and Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247.
84. Emanuel Adler, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 367-390; and Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247.
85. Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, The End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," In Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, pp. 23-56.
86. Evidence of growing popular interest in culture includes "Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Café," Economist, November 9, 1996, pp. 23-26; and David Berreby, "Arrogance, Order, Amity, and Other National Traits," New York Times, May 26, 1996, Week in Review Section, pp. 1, 6.
87. Evidence of growing popular interest in culture includes "Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Café," Economist, November 9, 1996, pp. 23-26; and David Berreby, "Arrogance, Order, Amity, and Other National Traits," New York Times, May 26, 1996, Week in Review Section, pp. 1, 6.
88. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). For an example of a glowing review, see "Pro Bono Publico," Economist, February 6, 1993, p. 96.
89. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). For an example of a glowing review, see "Pro Bono Publico," Economist, February 6, 1993, p. 96.
90. See the various essays in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). See also Mark M. Blyth, "'Any More Bright Ideas?' The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy," Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1997), pp. 229-250.
91. See the various essays in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). See also Mark M. Blyth, "'Any More Bright Ideas?' The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy," Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1997), pp. 229-250.
92. See the various essays in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). See also Mark M. Blyth, "'Any More Bright Ideas?' The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy,"
93. See Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 180-182; Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 513-517; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 324-329; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-459; and Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among States," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496. All cited in Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 8, fn. 16.
94. See Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 180-182; Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 513-517; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 324-329; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-459; and Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among States," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496. All cited in Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 8, fn. 16.
95. See Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 180-182; Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 513-517; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 324-329; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-459; and Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among States," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496. All cited in Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 8, fn. 16.
96. See Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 180-182; Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 513-517; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 324-329; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-459; and Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among States," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496. All cited in Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 8, fn. 16.
97. See Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 180-182; Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 513-517; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 324-329; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-459; and Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among States," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496. All cited in Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 8, fn. 16.
98. See Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 180-182; Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 513-517; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 324-329; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-459; and Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among States," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496. All cited in Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 8, fn. 16.
99. For arguments against theoretical generalization, see Isaiah Berlin, "On Political Judgment," New York Review of Books, Vol. 43, No. 15 (October 3, 1996), pp. 26-31; and Albert O. Hirshman, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970), pp. 329-343.
100. For arguments against theoretical generalization, see Isaiah Berlin, "On Political Judgment," New York Review of Books, Vol. 43, No. 15 (October 3, 1996), pp. 26-31; and Albert O. Hirshman, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970), pp. 329-343.
101. Ian Bullock, Oliver Stallybrass, and Stephen Trombley, eds., The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 669.
102. See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Robert W. Cox, "Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 135; Pauline Rosenau, "Once Again into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities," Millennium, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 83-110; and Josef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 235-254.
103. See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Robert W. Cox, "Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 135; Pauline Rosenau, "Once Again into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities," Millennium, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 83-110; and Josef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 235-254.
104. See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Robert W. Cox, "Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 135; Pauline Rosenau, "Once Again into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities," Millennium, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 83-110; and Josef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 235-254.
105. See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Robert W. Cox, "Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 135; Pauline Rosenau, "Once Again into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities," Millennium, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 83-110; and Josef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 235-254.
106. See Leo Strauss's critical discussion of social science in Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 36-78;
107. see also Hillail Gildin, "Introduction," in Gilden, ed., An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), pp. x-xvii.
108. Clyde Kluckhohn, "The study of Culture," in Daniel Lerner and Harold Lassswell, eds., The Policy Sciences: Recent Development in Scope and Method (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 86, calls culture the "master concept" of antropology.
109. Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses about Political Acts," World Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (October 1948), pp. 102-119. On the seminal influence of Leites's and also Gabriel Almond's work in bringing culture into political science, see Carole Pateman, "Political Structure, and Political Change," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, Pt. 3 (July 1971), p. 293; and Lucien Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1991), p. 489.
110. Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses about Political Acts," World Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (October 1948), pp. 102-119. On the seminal influence of Leites's and also Gabriel Almond's work in bringing culture into political science, see Carole Pateman, "Political Structure, and Political Change," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, Pt. 3 (July 1971), p. 293; and Lucien Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1991), p. 489.
111. Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses about Political Acts," World Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (October 1948), pp. 102-119. On the seminal influence of Leites's and also Gabriel Almond's work in bringing culture into political science, see Carole Pateman, "Political Structure, and Political Change," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, Pt. 3 (July 1971), p. 293; and Lucien Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1991), p. 489.
112. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
113. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
114. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
115. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
116. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
117. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
118. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
119. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
120. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
121. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
122. Key critical pieces are Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1950), pp. 587-600; Alex Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural System," in Gardner Lindsey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Special Fields and Applications (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020; Pateman, "Political Culture," pp. 291-306; Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Brian Berry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 289-301; and Robert Brightman, "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification," Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995), pp. 509-546. For more sympathetic discussion of the problems with culture, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 1-35; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds., Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 3-32; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," pp. 487-507.
123. Pateman, "Political Culture," p. 305; and David D. Laitin, "The Civic Culture at 30," American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 1995), p. 168.
124. Pateman, "Political Culture," p. 305; and David D. Laitin, "The Civic Culture at 30," American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 1995), p. 168.
125. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Harper, 1974), pp. 4-5, notes that this problem extends back to Clyde Kluckhohn's classic Mirror for Man (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949).
126. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Harper, 1974), pp. 4-5, notes that this problem extends back to Clyde Kluckhohn's classic Mirror for Man (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949).
127. Mary Douglas, "The Self-Completing Animal," Times Literary Supplement, August 8, 1975, p. 888.
128. Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy, p. 13.
129. Pateman, "Political Culture," p. 293, fn. 7.
130. This has been noted even by such sympathetic reviewers as Kowert and Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits," p. 483; and also by Daniel Philpott, "The Possibilities of Ideas," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996), p. 192.
131. This has been noted even by such sympathetic reviewers as Kowert and Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits," p. 483; and also by Daniel Philpott, "The Possibilities of Ideas," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996), p. 192.
132. Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 203.
133. Jack L. Synder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, RAND Report [R-2154-AF] (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, September 1977).
134. This might be because, as Peter Katzenstein told me, he is "not interested in theorizing per se but in solving puzzles." Personal correspondence, September 12, 1997. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," p. 27, notes that this can be a problem with cultural theories in general.
135. On this assuption, see Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 116.
136. Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 96-99; and Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 1980), p. 196.
137. Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 96-99; and Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 1980), p. 196.
138. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture," p. 44.
139. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 63; Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," p. 88; and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), memo no. 1.
140. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 63; Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," p. 88; and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), memo no. 1.
141. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 63; Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," p. 88; and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), memo no. 1.
142. Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68; and George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993).
143. Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68; and George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993).
144. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, p. 22.
145. For a similar debate in the field of history, see E.H. Carr, What Is History? (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 78-79.
146. David D. Laitin, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). See also Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences By Constructing Institutions," American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 1987), p. 5; and Otto Klineberg, "A Science of National Character," Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 1 (February 1944), p. 161.
147. David D. Laitin, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). See also Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences By Constructing Institutions," American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 1987), p. 5; and Otto Klineberg, "A Science of National Character," Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 1 (February 1944), p. 161.
148. David D. Laitin, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). See also Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences By Constructing Institutions," American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 1987), p. 5; and Otto Klineberg, "A Science of National Character," Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 1 (February 1944), p. 161.
149. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, p. 5. See also Clifford Geertz, "On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," American Scientist, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January/February 1975), p. 48 ; and David Berreby, "Clifford Geertz: Absolute Untruths," New York Times Magazine, April 9, 1995, pp. 44-45.
150. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, p. 5. See also Clifford Geertz, "On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," American Scientist, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January/February 1975), p. 48 ; and David Berreby, "Clifford Geertz: Absolute Untruths," New York Times Magazine, April 9, 1995, pp. 44-45.
151. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, p. 5. See also Clifford Geertz, "On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," American Scientist, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January/February 1975), p. 48 ; and David Berreby, "Clifford Geertz: Absolute Untruths," New York Times Magazine, April 9, 1995, pp. 44-45.
152. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, pp. 25-26.
153. Ibid., p. 29.
154. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," p. 23.
155. David Collier, "The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change," in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds., Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 7, notes Harold Lasswell's claim that scientific analysis is "unavoidably comparative."
156. Laitin, Hegemony and Culture, p. 172.
157. Legro, "Culture and Preferences," p. 118.
158. Prince and Tannewald, "Norms and Deterrence," pp. 147-148; see also Price, The Chemical Weapoms Taboo, p. 104
159. Prince and Tannewald, "Norms and Deterrence," pp. 147-148; see also Price, The Chemical Weapoms Taboo, p. 104
160. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
161. For discussion of this, see Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196. Colin Elman offers a useful discussion of the application of Lakatos to the new strategic culruralism in Elman, "Neocultural Progress? A Preliminary Discussion of Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1997.
162. For discussion of this, see Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196. Colin Elman offers a useful discussion of the application of Lakatos to the new strategic culruralism in Elman, "Neocultural Progress? A Preliminary Discussion of Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1997.
163. See, for example, Michael C. Desch, "Why Realists Disagree about the Third World (And Why They Shouldn't)," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 358-384.
164. The seminal statement of this is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
165. Important examples of such theorizing include Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decisionmaking and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in Steven E. Miller, ed., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 88-107.
166. Important examples of such theorizing include Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decisionmaking and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in Steven E. Miller, ed., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 88-107.
167. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
168. These debates are played out in Benjamin Frankel, ed., "Roots of Realism," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1995); and Frankel, ed. "Realism: Restatements and Renewal," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996).
169. These debates are played out in Benjamin Frankel, ed., "Roots of Realism," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1995); and Frankel, ed. "Realism: Restatements and Renewal," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996).
170. Johnston, "Cultural Realism in Maoist China," p. 228.
171. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 127-128, talks about "sameness" but appears to be referring to functional similarity. Most other realists endorse Waltz's basic argument that anarchy forces states to perform the same functions, but anticipate that they will do so in somewhat different ways as the result of variations in geographic position (land powers vs. sea powers) and the level of current technology. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 15-16, for an argument that great powers will perform the same general functions but may have different structures. Of realists, only Joào Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1914," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 193-260, predicts strict isomorphism.
172. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 127-128, talks about "sameness" but appears to be referring to functional similarity. Most other realists endorse Waltz's basic argument that anarchy forces states to perform the same functions, but anticipate that they will do so in somewhat different ways as the result of variations in geographic position (land powers vs. sea powers) and the level of current technology. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 15-16, for an argument that great powers will perform the same general functions but may have different structures. Of realists, only Joào Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1914," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 193-260, predicts strict isomorphism.
173. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 127-128, talks about "sameness" but appears to be referring to functional similarity. Most other realists endorse Waltz's basic argument that anarchy forces states to perform the same functions, but anticipate that they will do so in somewhat different ways as the result of variations in geographic position (land powers vs. sea powers) and the level of current technology. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 15-16, for an argument that great powers will perform the same general functions but may have different structures. Of realists, only Joào Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1914," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 193-260, predicts strict isomorphism.
174. Katzenstein, "Introduction," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 4. This perspective grew out of work done in sociology examples that can be found in John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan, eds., National Development and the World System: Educational, Economic, and Political Change, 1950-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Albert Bergesen, ed., Studies of the Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1980); and George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage, 1987).
175. Katzenstein, "Introduction," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 4. This perspective grew out of work done in sociology examples that can be found in John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan, eds., National Development and the World System: Educational, Economic, and Political Change, 1950-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Albert Bergesen, ed., Studies of the Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1980); and George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage, 1987).
176. Katzenstein, "Introduction," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 4. This perspective grew out of work done in sociology examples that can be found in John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan, eds., National Development and the World System: Educational, Economic, and Political Change, 1950-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Albert Bergesen, ed., Studies of the Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1980); and George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage, 1987).
177. Katzenstein, "Introduction," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 4. This perspective grew out of work done in sociology examples that can be found in John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan, eds., National Development and the World System: Educational, Economic, and Political Change, 1950-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Albert Bergesen, ed., Studies of the Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1980); and George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage, 1987).
178. Iain Johnston's comments on an earlier draft of this article played an important role in clarifying for me the relationship between culturalism and rationalism. Kowert and Legro, "Norms, Identify and Their Limits," also provide a useful discussion of rationalism and culturalism. See p. 457, fn. 11.
179. This is what Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," characterizes as a "three-cornered fight," p. 115.
180. On crucial tests, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968), pp. 24-28.
181. On "most likely" and "least likely" cases, see Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," pp. 118-119.
182. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, p. 20.
183. The classic statement of this argument, which realists frequently cite, is Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 178-221. The reason I think that India fraced a less challenging international security environment is that in one data set it had a yearly battle death average of 263 compared with a central actor like Prussia/Germany, which had 41,181. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War: 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), Table 11.2. Another source notes that India fought 95 wars, whereas the German states participated in 170. See George C. Kohn, Dictionary of Wars (New York: Facts on File, 1986), pp. 545-550.
184. The classic statement of this argument, which realists frequently cite, is Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 178-221. The reason I think that India fraced a less challenging international security environment is that in one data set it had a yearly battle death average of 263 compared with a central actor like Prussia/Germany, which had 41,181. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War: 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), Table 11.2. Another source notes that India fought 95 wars, whereas the German states participated in 170. See George C. Kohn, Dictionary of Wars (New York: Facts on File, 1986), pp. 545-550.
185. The classic statement of this argument, which realists frequently cite, is Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 178-221. The reason I think that India fraced a less challenging international security environment is that in one data set it had a yearly battle death average of 263 compared with a central actor like Prussia/Germany, which had 41,181. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War: 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), Table 11.2. Another source notes that India fought 95 wars, whereas the German states participated in 170. See George C. Kohn, Dictionary of Wars (New York: Facts on File, 1986), pp. 545-550.
186. For a discussion of realism's hierarchy of state interests, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p. 24.
187. Finnemore, "Constructing Norms," p. 168.
188. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 87-88; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 36, 61-62, 65-66; Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 39-40; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 97-99, 183-192. An extended discussion of this can be found in Colin Elman, "Responding to Military Practices: Convergence and Divergence in International Security," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 16-20, 1996.
189. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 87-88; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 36, 61-62, 65-66; Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 39-40; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 97-99, 183-192. An extended discussion of this can be found in Colin Elman, "Responding to Military Practices: Convergence and Divergence in International Security," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 16-20, 1996.
190. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 87-88; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 36, 61-62, 65-66; Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 39-40; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 97-99, 183-192. An extended discussion of this can be found in Colin Elman, "Responding to Military Practices: Convergence and Divergence in International Security," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 16-20, 1996.
191. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 87-88; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 36, 61-62, 65-66; Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 39-40; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 97-99, 183-192. An extended discussion of this can be found in Colin Elman, "Responding to Military Practices: Convergence and Divergence in International Security," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 16-20, 1996.
192. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 87-88; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 36, 61-62, 65-66; Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 39-40; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 97-99, 183-192. An extended discussion of this can be found in Colin Elman, "Responding to Military Practices: Convergence and Divergence in
193. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: Norton, 1995), p. 108.
194. For discussions of German blitzkrieg strategy, see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 29-30, 32-33, 35-43; and Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (New York: HarperPaperbacks, 1994).
195. For discussions of German blitzkrieg strategy, see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 29-30, 32-33, 35-43; and Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (New York: HarperPaperbacks, 1994).
196. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 70-71.
197. On the U-boat campaign, see Dan van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign: World War II's Great Struggle at Sea (New York: Harper and Row, 1988).
198. See Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Maoist China," p. 260.
199. Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 250.
200. Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Maoist China," p. 264, explicitly eschews "critical tests."
201. Kier, Imagining War, pp. 56-88. Other studies that emphasize the links between domestic political conflict and the French defeat include Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat: A Statement Written in 1940 (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), and Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York: Norton, 1994), chap. 10.
202. Kier, Imagining War, pp. 56-88. Other studies that emphasize the links between domestic political conflict and the French defeat include Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat: A Statement Written in 1940 (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), and Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York: Norton, 1994), chap. 10.
203. Kier, Imagining War, pp. 56-88. Other studies that emphasize the links between domestic political conflict and the French defeat include Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat: A Statement Written in 1940 (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), and Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York: Norton, 1994), chap. 10.
204. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 67-98; and Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 115, 122-130, 235-239.
205. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 67-98; and Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 115, 122-130, 235-239.
206. The Statesman's Yearbook (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1920), pp. 840, 908.
207. All of these comparisons are drawn from Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 200-202, 332.
208. The Statesman's Yearbook (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1940), p. 968.
209. Thomas Christensen and Jack Synder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.
210. For discussion of why France lost, see Robert J. Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933-1940 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); and Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1977).
211. For discussion of why France lost, see Robert J. Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933-1940 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); and Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1977).
212. On this, see Don M. Alexander, "Repercussions of the Breda Variant," French Historical Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 1974), p. 488; Deighton, Blitzkrieg, pp. 172-173; and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant Generals (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994), pp. 101-102, 126.
213. On this, see Don M. Alexander, "Repercussions of the Breda Variant," French Historical Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 1974), p. 488; Deighton, Blitzkrieg, pp. 172-173; and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant Generals (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994), pp. 101-102, 126.
214. On this, see Don M. Alexander, "Repercussions of the Breda Variant," French Historical Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 1974), p. 488; Deighton, Blitzkrieg, pp. 172-173; and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant Generals (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994), pp. 101-102, 126.
215. Eyre and Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons," pp. 97, 106-107.
216. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East," p. 410.
217. Price and Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," p. 120.
218. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, p. 100.
219. John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, "Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 3-35; Barton J. Bernstein, "Why We Didn't Use Poison Gas in World War II," American Heritage, Vol. 36, No. 5 (August/September 1995), pp. 40-45; and Frederic J. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraint (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968), p. 37.
220. John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, "Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 3-35; Barton J. Bernstein, "Why We Didn't Use Poison Gas in World War II," American Heritage, Vol. 36, No. 5 (August/September 1995), pp. 40-45; and Frederic J. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraint (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968), p. 37.
221. John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, "Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 3-35; Barton J. Bernstein, "Why We Didn't Use Poison Gas in World War II," American Heritage, Vol. 36, No. 5 (August/September 1995), pp. 40-45; and Frederic J. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraint (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968), p. 37.
222. Patrick E. Tyler, "Germ War, a Current World Threat, Is a Remembered Nightmare in China," New York Times, February 4, 1997, p. 6.
223. Atkinson, Crusade, p. 87
224. For a prescient geopolitical argument about the inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union, see Randall Collins, "Long-term Social Change and the Territorial Power of States," in Louis Kriesberg, ed., Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change, vol. 1 (Greeenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1978), pp. 1-34.
225. Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace?" in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, pp. 57-84; Gaddis, "Hanging Tough Paid Off," pp. 11-14; and Michael C. Desch, "Why the Soviet Military Supported Gorbachev and Why the Russian Military Might Only Support Yeltsin for a Price," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 455-489.
226. Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace?" in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, pp. 57-84; Gaddis, "Hanging Tough Paid Off," pp. 11-14; and Michael C. Desch, "Why the Soviet Military Supported Gorbachev and Why the Russian Military Might Only Support Yeltsin for a Price," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 455-489.
227. Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace?" in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, pp. 57-84; Gaddis, "Hanging Tough Paid Off," pp. 11-14; and Michael C. Desch, "Why the Soviet Military Supported Gorbachev and Why the Russian Military Might Only Support Yeltsin for a Price," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 455-489.
228. Alexei K. Pushkov, "Russia and America: The Honeymoon's Over," Foreign Policy, No. 93 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 77-90; and Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the 'Near Abroad,'" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 75-90.
229. Alexei K. Pushkov, "Russia and America: The Honeymoon's Over," Foreign Policy, No. 93 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 77-90; and Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the 'Near Abroad,'" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 75-90.
230. Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," pp. 357-399.
231. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," pp. 34-45.
232. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
233. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 318.
234. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum," quotation on p. 120; see also pp. 147-148.
235. See Jacob Heilbrun, "Germany's New Right," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/ December 1996), pp. 80-89; Alan Cowell, "Pro-Nazi Incidents in German Army Raise Alarm," New York Times, November 5, 1997, p. 4; "The Man Japan Wants to Forget," Economist, November 11, 1995, pp. 85-86; and Henry Scott Stokes, "Lost Samurai: The Withered Soul of Postwar Japan," Harper's, October 1985 pp. 5-63. A brilliant examination of the dark side of the Japanese postwar culture of pacifism is Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux 1994).
236. See Jacob Heilbrun, "Germany's New Right," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/ December 1996), pp. 80-89; Alan Cowell, "Pro-Nazi Incidents in German Army Raise Alarm," New York Times, November 5, 1997, p. 4; "The Man Japan Wants to Forget," Economist, November 11, 1995, pp. 85-86; and Henry Scott Stokes, "Lost Samurai: The Withered Soul of Postwar Japan," Harper's, October 1985 pp. 5-63. A brilliant examination of the dark side of the Japanese postwar culture of pacifism is Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux 1994).
237. See Jacob Heilbrun, "Germany's New Right," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/ December 1996), pp. 80-89; Alan Cowell, "Pro-Nazi Incidents in German Army Raise Alarm," New York Times, November 5, 1997, p. 4; "The Man Japan Wants to Forget," Economist, November 11, 1995, pp. 85-86; and Henry Scott Stokes, "Lost Samurai: The Withered Soul of Postwar Japan," Harper's, October 1985 pp. 5-63. A brilliant examination of the dark side of the Japanese postwar culture of pacifism is Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux 1994).
238. See Jacob Heilbrun, "Germany's New Right," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/ December 1996), pp. 80-89; Alan Cowell, "Pro-Nazi Incidents in German Army Raise Alarm," New York Times, November 5, 1997, p. 4; "The Man Japan Wants to Forget," Economist, November 11, 1995, pp. 85-86; and Henry Scott Stokes, "Lost Samurai: The Withered Soul of Postwar Japan," Harper's, October 1985 pp. 5-63. A brilliant examination of the dark side of the Japanese postwar culture of pacifism is Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux 1994).
239. See Jacob Heilbrun, "Germany's New Right," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/ December 1996), pp. 80-89; Alan Cowell, "Pro-Nazi Incidents in German Army Raise Alarm," New York Times, November 5, 1997, p. 4; "The Man Japan Wants to Forget," Economist, November 11, 1995, pp. 85-86; and Henry Scott Stokes, "Lost Samurai: The Withered Soul of Postwar Japan," Harper's, October 1985 pp. 5-63. A brilliant examination of the dark side of the Japanese postwar culture of pacifism is Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux 1994).
240. Katzenstein, "Introduction," and "Conclusion," pp. 11, 523.
241. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," p. 329, discusses how culture might cause lag effects. It is important to keep in mind that other noncultural factors might cause lag effects too.
242. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 194; Allan Millett, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, April 1979), p. 38; and Condoleeza Rice, "The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union," World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 80-81.
243. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 194; Allan Millett, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, April 1979), p. 38; and Condoleeza Rice, "The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union," World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 80-81.
244. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 194; Allan Millett, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, April 1979), p. 38; and Condoleeza Rice, "The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union," World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 80-81.
245. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
246. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
247. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
248. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
249. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
250. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
251. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
252. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
253. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
254. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
255. I make this argument in detail in Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). For further evidence of recent changes in civilian control of the military in the United States and Russia, see Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Special Issue, October 1993), pp. 27-58; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem - and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pp. 36-40; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Richard H. Kohn "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, April 10, 1994, p. 19; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29-33; Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 341-392; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 38-73; Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 33 (August 21, 1992), pp. 5-12; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia," Occasional Paper (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, March 1993).
256. Brian D. Taylor, "Culture and Coups: The Norm of Civilian Supremacy," unpublished manuscript, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, February 1996.
257. Brian D. Taylor, "The Russian Military in Politics: Civilian Supremacy in Comparative and Historical Perspective," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 1997, Table 1-5.
258. Kenneth Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), p. 54.
259. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 74-128. At different points Waltz appears to base his prediction of behavioral isomophism on three different, and perhaps mutually exclusive, types of argument. At various points he relies on an evolutionary selection mechanism, socialization to accepted international practice, and learning through rational assessment of structural constraints. Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neo-Realist Theories of Foreign Policy?" Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 7-53, argues that although most scholars accept the rational assessment model as the dominant reading, the other strands continue to draw adherents.
260. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 74-128. At different points Waltz appears to base his prediction of behavioral isomophism on three different, and perhaps mutually exclusive, types of argument. At various points he relies on an evolutionary selection mechanism, socialization to accepted international practice, and learning through rational assessment of structural constraints. Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neo-Realist Theories of Foreign Policy?" Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 7-53, argues that although most scholars accept the rational assessment model as the dominant reading, the other strands continue to draw adherents.
261. See Kevin Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachussetts Institute of Technology, February 1996.
262. Scott Sagan also makes this point in Sagan, "Culture, Strategy, and Selection in International Politics," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., August 28-31, 1997.
263. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 78.
264. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 23; Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 190; Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security," p. 279; and Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," p. 325. But elsewhere, Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 4-5, concedes that structure can sometimes be quite constraining.
265. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 23; Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 190; Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security," p. 279; and Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," p. 325. But elsewhere, Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 4-5, concedes that structure can sometimes be quite constraining.
266. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 23; Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 190; Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security," p. 279; and Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," p. 325. But elsewhere, Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 4-5, concedes that structure can sometimes be quite constraining.
267. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 23; Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 190; Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security," p. 279; and Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," p. 325. But elsewhere, Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 4-5, concedes that structure can sometimes be quite constraining.
268. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 23; Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 190; Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security," p. 279; and Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," p. 325. But elsewhere, Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 4-5, concedes that structure can sometimes be quite constraining.
269. See Elkins and Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect," p. 127.
270. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent in World War II," p. 116.
271. Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 231. Also cf. p. 25.
272. Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 187.