Let us now praise great men: Bringing the statesman back in

International Security

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 107-146

  Byman, Daniel L ^a   Pollack, Kenneth M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035634512     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/01622880151091916     Document Type: Article

References (271)

1. Christopher Duffy, Frederick the Great: A Military Life (New York: Routledge, 1985), pp. 226-243; and Dennis E. Showalter, The Wars of Frederick the Great (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 309-320.
2. Christopher Duffy, Frederick the Great: A Military Life (New York: Routledge, 1985), pp. 226-243; and Dennis E. Showalter, The Wars of Frederick the Great (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 309-320.
3. Duffy, Frederick the Great, p. 233.
4. A background talk with reporters in January 1975, as quoted in Walter Isaacson, Kissinger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 13.
5. Other useful work for understanding the role of individuals in international relations comes from historians and area studies experts. Fred I. Greenstein has published an exemplary work demonstrating how the personality traits of postwar presidents have shaped U.S. foreign policy. See Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (New York: Free Press, 2000). See also James M. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and David Shambaugh, ed., Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Daniel Markey has written an interesting study of how individuals' desire for prestige affects international relations. Markey, "The Prestige Motive in International Relations," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2000.
6. Other useful work for understanding the role of individuals in international relations comes from historians and area studies experts. Fred I. Greenstein has published an exemplary work demonstrating how the personality traits of postwar presidents have shaped U.S. foreign policy. See Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (New York: Free Press, 2000). See also James M. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and David Shambaugh, ed., Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Daniel Markey has written an interesting study of how individuals' desire for prestige affects international relations. Markey, "The Prestige Motive in International Relations," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2000.
7. Other useful work for understanding the role of individuals in international relations comes from historians and area studies experts. Fred I. Greenstein has published an exemplary work demonstrating how the personality traits of postwar presidents have shaped U.S. foreign policy. See Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (New York: Free Press, 2000). See also James M. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and David Shambaugh, ed., Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Daniel Markey has written an interesting study of how individuals' desire for prestige affects international relations. Markey, "The Prestige Motive in International Relations," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2000.
8. Other useful work for understanding the role of individuals in international relations comes from historians and area studies experts. Fred I. Greenstein has published an exemplary work demonstrating how the personality traits of postwar presidents have shaped U.S. foreign policy. See Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (New York: Free Press, 2000). See also James M. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and David Shambaugh, ed., Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Daniel Markey has written an interesting study of how individuals' desire for prestige affects international relations. Markey, "The Prestige Motive in International Relations," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2000.
9. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
10. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
11. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
12. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
13. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
14. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
15. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
16. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
17. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
18. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
19. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
20. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
21. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
22. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
23. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
24. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, "Leadership: Some Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions," in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw, eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1-84. Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decision-making, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, 65d., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629-641; Margaret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; and Margaret Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77-94.
25. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), especially pp. 16, 80-81, 159-165.
26. In his words, only a theory drawn from the third image can offer a "a final explanation because it does not hinge on accidental causes - irrationalities in men, defects in states." Ibid., pp. 231-232. See also pp. 224-238; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 60-68.
27. In his words, only a theory drawn from the third image can offer a "a final explanation because it does not hinge on accidental causes - irrationalities in men, defects in states." Ibid., pp. 231-232. See also pp. 224-238; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 60-68.
28. For example, the world system, domestic politics ("second image"), and other mainstream approaches also slight the importance of individuals. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I (New York: Academic Press, 1974); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For an example of the second image as related to democracies, see Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.
29. For example, the world system, domestic politics ("second image"), and other mainstream approaches also slight the importance of individuals. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I (New York: Academic Press, 1974); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For an example of the second image as related to democracies, see Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.
30. For example, the world system, domestic politics ("second image"), and other mainstream approaches also slight the importance of individuals. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I (New York: Academic Press, 1974); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For an example of the second image as related to democracies, see Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.
31. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, pp. 27-30. As an example, on page 28, he claims that human nature cannot explain the outbreak of war in 1914 because the same human nature that conceived World War I must have caused peace in, for example, 1910.
32. We recognize a likely selection bias in this claim: It may be that there were leaders who did possess these traits but did not go to war, and therefore the fact that they did possess these traits was not well known beyond their intimates, and perhaps their biographers. We believe that a more rigorous analysis of this claim is warranted.
33. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, especially pp. 19-20. We note that Waltz has retreated from his earlier defense of parsimony in his more recent work. For instance, in 1997 he observed that "the explanatory power of a theory, not its parsimony, is the criterion of a theory's success." Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), p. 57.
34. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, especially pp. 19-20. We note that Waltz has retreated from his earlier defense of parsimony in his more recent work. For instance, in 1997 he observed that "the explanatory power of a theory, not its parsimony, is the criterion of a theory's success." Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), p. 57.
35. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 19-20, 61-68.
36. This is not to suggest that parsimony is not desirable. Undoubtedly, a parsimonious theory is better than a complicated theory, all other things being equal. When all other things are not equal, as is usually the case, we prefer an accurate complexity over an inaccurate parsimony.
37. In his defense, Waltz himself recognizes this. See, for example, Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. 218.
38. Again, the best statement of these views is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 91-101; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 915.
39. Again, the best statement of these views is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 91-101; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 915.
40. The definitive expression of this is Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 168. Joseph M. Grieco argues that cooperation will fail as a result of these dynamics. See Grieco, Cooperation among Nations (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 45.
41. The definitive expression of this is Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 168. Joseph M. Grieco argues that cooperation will fail as a result of these dynamics. See Grieco, Cooperation among Nations (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 45.
42. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
43. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; and Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), especially p. 124.
44. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; and Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), especially p. 124.
45. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; and Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), especially p. 124.
46. A caveat is in order regarding our case selection. This article does not seek to test first-image theories of international relations. Instead it seeks to generate testable hypotheses to demonstrate that the first image is a valid line of inquiry for international relations scholars. Consequently, we have chosen "easy" cases - cases in which the individual's influence is self-evident, even to the point of obviousness - rather than "hard"
47. Most Germans had accepted the loss of Alsace-Lorraine because they recognized that these territories could not be recovered without righting a major war with France. Gordon A. Craig, Germany: 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 674; Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, trans. Anthony Fothergill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 29-37; and Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), pp. 309-310.
48. Most Germans had accepted the loss of Alsace-Lorraine because they recognized that these territories could not be recovered without righting a major war with France. Gordon A. Craig, Germany: 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 674; Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, trans. Anthony Fothergill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 29-37; and Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), pp. 309-310.
49. Most Germans had accepted the loss of Alsace-Lorraine because they recognized that these territories could not be recovered without righting a major war with France. Gordon A. Craig, Germany: 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 674; Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, trans. Anthony Fothergill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 29-37; and Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), pp. 309-310.
50. Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 328, 403; Kenneth Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal Flaws of German Generalship from Moltke to Guderian (London: Greenhill, 1996), pp. 72-75; Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 15-110; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 9-10, 298-305; Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, rev. and updated ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 41; A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), pp. 58-59; Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 30, 33, 38-39, 105; and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 7. We have purposely included citations from Taylor not despite, but because of, his apologies for Hitler to demonstrate the strength of our arguments.
51. Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 328, 403; Kenneth Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal Flaws of German Generalship from Moltke to Guderian (London: Greenhill, 1996), pp. 72-75; Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 15-110; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 9-10, 298-305; Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, rev. and updated ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 41; A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), pp. 58-59; Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 30, 33, 38-39, 105; and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 7. We have purposely included citations from Taylor not despite, but because of, his apologies for Hitler to demonstrate the strength of our arguments.
52. Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 328, 403; Kenneth Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal Flaws of German Generalship from Moltke to Guderian (London: Greenhill, 1996), pp. 72-75; Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 15-110; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 9-10, 298-305; Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, rev. and updated ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 41; A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), pp. 58-59; Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 30, 33, 38-39, 105; and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 7. We have purposely included citations from Taylor not despite, but because of, his apologies for Hitler to demonstrate the strength of our arguments.
53. Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 328, 403; Kenneth Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal Flaws of German Generalship from Moltke to Guderian (London: Greenhill, 1996), pp. 72-75; Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 15-110; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 9-10, 298-305; Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, rev. and updated ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 41; A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), pp. 58-59; Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 30, 33, 38-39, 105; and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 7. We have purposely included citations from Taylor not despite, but because of, his apologies for Hitler to demonstrate the strength of our arguments.
54. Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 328, 403; Kenneth Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal Flaws of German Generalship from Moltke to Guderian (London: Greenhill, 1996), pp. 72-75; Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 15-110; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 9-10, 298-305; Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, rev. and updated ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 41; A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), pp. 58-59; Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 30, 33, 38-39, 105; and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 7. We have purposely included citations from Taylor not despite, but because of, his apologies for Hitler to demonstrate the strength of our arguments.
55. Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 328, 403; Kenneth Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal Flaws of German Generalship from Moltke to Guderian (London: Greenhill, 1996), pp. 72-75; Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 15-110; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 9-10, 298-305; Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, rev. and updated ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 41; A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), pp. 58-59; Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 30, 33, 38-39, 105; and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 7. We have purposely included citations from Taylor not despite, but because of, his apologies for Hitler to demonstrate the strength of our arguments.
56. Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 328, 403; Kenneth Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal Flaws of German Generalship from Moltke to Guderian (London: Greenhill, 1996), pp. 72-75; Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 15-110; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 9-10, 298-305; Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, rev. and updated ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 41; A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), pp. 58-59; Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 30, 33, 38-39, 105; and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 7. We have purposely included citations from Taylor not despite, but because of, his apologies for Hitler to demonstrate the strength of our arguments.
57. Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 328, 403; Kenneth Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal Flaws of German Generalship from Moltke to Guderian (London: Greenhill, 1996), pp. 72-75; Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 15-110; Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 9-10, 298-305; Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, rev. and updated ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 41; A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), pp. 58-59; Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 30, 33, 38-39, 105; and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 7. We have purposely included citations from Taylor not despite, but because of, his apologies for Hitler to demonstrate the strength of our arguments.
58. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, abridged ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), p. 268.
59. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
60. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
61. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
62. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
63. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
64. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
65. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
66. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
67. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
68. Ian Kershaw provides the definitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler's foreign policy diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 'Programme' or 'Expansion without Object'?" reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129-135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 176, 233-240, 258-259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697-699; Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24-37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-110, 215-232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40-41, 48-49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104-105; and Corelli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
69. Craig, Germany, p. 543. Craig's view is the consensus among contemporary historians. Both the Taylor/Fischer revisionist school (Hitler was no different from other German statesmen) and the functionalist school (Nazi foreign policy stemmed from domestic pressures) have been effectively discredited. See Patrick Finney, "Introduction: History Writing and the Origins of the Second World War," and "Commentary," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 4-7, 41-42; the response by Richard Overy to Tim Mason, reprinted in "Debate: Germany, 'Domestic Crisis,' and War in 1939," in ibid., pp. 99-109; and especially Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144.
70. Craig, Germany, p. 543. Craig's view is the consensus among contemporary historians. Both the Taylor/Fischer revisionist school (Hitler was no different from other German statesmen) and the functionalist school (Nazi foreign policy stemmed from domestic pressures) have been effectively discredited. See Patrick Finney, "Introduction: History Writing and the Origins of the Second World War," and "Commentary," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 4-7, 41-42; the response by Richard Overy to Tim Mason, reprinted in "Debate: Germany, 'Domestic Crisis,' and War in 1939," in ibid., pp. 99-109; and especially Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144.
71. Craig, Germany, p. 543. Craig's view is the consensus among contemporary historians. Both the Taylor/Fischer revisionist school (Hitler was no different from other German statesmen) and the functionalist school (Nazi foreign policy stemmed from domestic pressures) have been effectively discredited. See Patrick Finney, "Introduction: History Writing and the Origins of the Second World War," and "Commentary," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 4-7, 41-42; the response by Richard Overy to Tim Mason, reprinted in "Debate: Germany, 'Domestic Crisis,' and War in 1939," in ibid., pp. 99-109; and especially Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144.
72. Craig, Germany, p. 543. Craig's view is the consensus among contemporary historians. Both the Taylor/Fischer revisionist school (Hitler was no different from other German statesmen) and the functionalist school (Nazi foreign policy stemmed from domestic pressures) have been effectively discredited. See Patrick Finney, "Introduction: History Writing and the Origins of the Second World War," and "Commentary," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 4-7, 41-42; the response by Richard Overy to Tim Mason, reprinted in "Debate: Germany, 'Domestic Crisis,' and War in 1939," in ibid., pp. 99-109; and especially Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144.
73. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
74. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
75. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
76. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
77. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
78. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
79. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
80. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
81. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
82. Sidney Aster, "'Guilty Men': The Case of Neville Chamberlain," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 62-64, 66-70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1939," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52-53; Finney, "Introduction," pp. 13-16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290-307, 340-342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73-120; R.A.C. Parker, "Alternatives to Appeasement," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211-220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. xi-xii, 34, 45-46, 58, 68, 74-77, 94-95, 99-100, 135-136, 160, 165, 189, 227-228; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 27-29, 83-84, 168, 385-386.
83. Anthony Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 78-90; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 296-298; May, Strange Victory, pp. 6, 113-160; Stephen A. Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 224-227, 238-239; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 73-76, 91, 98-100, 155, 188; and Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 8. Taylor concludes that ultimately "the French were therefore willing to surrender everything [to Germany] except their own security." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 188. See also Finney, "Introduction," pp. 17-20.
84. Anthony Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 78-90; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 296-298; May, Strange Victory, pp. 6, 113-160; Stephen A. Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 224-227, 238-239; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 73-76, 91, 98-100, 155, 188; and Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 8. Taylor concludes that ultimately "the French were therefore willing to surrender everything [to Germany] except their own security." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 188. See also Finney, "Introduction," pp. 17-20.
85. Anthony Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 78-90; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 296-298; May, Strange Victory, pp. 6, 113-160; Stephen A. Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 224-227, 238-239; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 73-76, 91, 98-100, 155, 188; and Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 8. Taylor concludes that ultimately "the French were therefore willing to surrender everything [to Germany] except their own security." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 188. See also Finney, "Introduction," pp. 17-20.
86. Anthony Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 78-90; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 296-298; May, Strange Victory, pp. 6, 113-160; Stephen A. Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 224-227, 238-239; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 73-76, 91, 98-100, 155, 188; and Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 8. Taylor concludes that ultimately "the French were therefore willing to surrender everything [to Germany] except their own security." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 188. See also Finney, "Introduction," pp. 17-20.
87. Anthony Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 78-90; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 296-298; May, Strange Victory, pp. 6, 113-160; Stephen A. Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 224-227, 238-239; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 73-76, 91, 98-100, 155, 188; and Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 8. Taylor concludes that ultimately "the French were therefore willing to surrender everything [to Germany] except their own security." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 188. See also Finney, "Introduction," pp. 17-20.
88. Anthony Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 78-90; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 296-298; May, Strange Victory, pp. 6, 113-160; Stephen A. Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 224-227, 238-239; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 73-76, 91, 98-100, 155, 188; and Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 8. Taylor concludes that ultimately "the French were therefore willing to surrender everything [to Germany] except their own security." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 188. See also Finney, "Introduction," pp. 17-20.
89. Anthony Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 78-90; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 296-298; May, Strange Victory, pp. 6, 113-160; Stephen A. Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 224-227, 238-239; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 73-76, 91, 98-100, 155, 188; and Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 8. Taylor concludes that ultimately "the French were therefore willing to surrender everything [to Germany] except their own security." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 188. See also Finney, "Introduction," pp. 17-20.
90. Anthony Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 78-90; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 296-298; May, Strange Victory, pp. 6, 113-160; Stephen A. Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 224-227, 238-239; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 73-76, 91, 98-100, 155, 188; and Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 8. Taylor concludes that ultimately "the French were therefore willing to surrender everything [to Germany] except their own security." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 188. See also Finney, "Introduction," pp. 17-20.
91. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued to believe that the "question of Danzig" should not be a casus belli - and encouraged Polish concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to fight for Polish independence, but neither London nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, specifically meaning Danzig. Their decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany's invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy, 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414-415, 417-426, 428-429; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 14-17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59-60,194-199, 207-212, 213-221, 238, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320-321. In Taylor's words, during the August 1939 crisis, "[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards for Polish trade." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
92. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued to believe that the "question of Danzig" should not be a casus belli - and encouraged Polish concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to fight for Polish independence, but neither London nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, specifically meaning Danzig. Their decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany's invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy, 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414-415, 417-426, 428-429; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 14-17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59-60,194-199, 207-212, 213-221, 238, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320-321. In Taylor's words, during the August 1939 crisis, "[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards for Polish trade." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
93. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued to believe that the "question of Danzig" should not be a casus belli - and encouraged Polish concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to fight for Polish independence, but neither London nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, specifically meaning Danzig. Their decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany's invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy, 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414-415, 417-426, 428-429; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 14-17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59-60,194-199, 207-212, 213-221, 238, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320-321. In Taylor's words, during the August 1939 crisis, "[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards for Polish trade." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
94. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued to believe that the "question of Danzig" should not be a casus belli - and encouraged Polish concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to fight for Polish independence, but neither London nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, specifically meaning Danzig. Their decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany's invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy, 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414-415, 417-426, 428-429; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 14-17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59-60,194-199, 207-212, 213-221, 238, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320-321. In Taylor's words, during the August 1939 crisis, "[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards for Polish trade." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
95. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued to believe that the "question of Danzig" should not be a casus belli - and encouraged Polish concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to fight for Polish independence, but neither London nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, specifically meaning Danzig. Their decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany's invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy, 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414-415, 417-426, 428-429; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 14-17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59-60,194-199, 207-212, 213-221, 238, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320-321. In Taylor's words, during the August 1939 crisis, "[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards for Polish trade." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
96. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued to believe that the "question of Danzig" should not be a casus belli - and encouraged Polish concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to fight for Polish independence, but neither London nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, specifically meaning Danzig. Their decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany's invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy, 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414-415, 417-426, 428-429; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 14-17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59-60,194-199, 207-212, 213-221, 238, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320-321. In Taylor's words, during the August 1939 crisis, "[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards for Polish trade." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
97. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued to believe that the "question of Danzig" should not be a casus belli - and encouraged Polish concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to fight for Polish independence, but neither London nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, specifically meaning Danzig. Their decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany's invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy, 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414-415, 417-426, 428-429; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 14-17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59-60,194-199, 207-212, 213-221, 238, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320-321. In Taylor's words, during the August 1939 crisis, "[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards for Polish trade." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
98. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued to believe that the "question of Danzig" should not be a casus belli - and encouraged Polish concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to fight for Polish independence, but neither London nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, specifically meaning Danzig. Their decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany's invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy, 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414-415, 417-426, 428-429; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 14-17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59-60,194-199, 207-212, 213-221, 238, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320-321. In Taylor's words, during the August 1939 crisis, "[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards for Polish trade." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
99. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued to believe that the "question of Danzig" should not be a casus belli - and encouraged Polish concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to fight for Polish independence, but neither London nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, specifically meaning Danzig. Their decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany's invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy, 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414-415, 417-426, 428-429; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198-212; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 14-17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59-60,194-199, 207-212, 213-221, 238, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320-321. In Taylor's words, during the August 1939 crisis, "[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards for Polish trade." Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
100. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
101. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
102. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
103. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
104. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
105. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
106. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
107. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
108. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
109. Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," pp. 84-87; Aster, "'Guilty Men,'" pp. 64-65, 72-73; Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy," pp. 418-421; Dilks, "'We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,'" p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory, pp. 291-308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15-17; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205-214, 249-252, 264-265, 270-273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 168-169, 186, 385-386, 509-510.
110. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233-240, 258-259, 268, 321-325; Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 20-21, 24-25, 255, 441. In particular, on the army's efforts to oppose Hitler's foreign policies and his ultimately successful efforts to subvert he officer corps, see Barnett, Hitler's Generals; Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945 (Lanham, Md.: Scarborough House, 1990); Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster pp 65, 79-80, 132-134; and Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 23-24.
111. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233-240, 258-259, 268, 321-325; Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 20-21, 24-25, 255, 441. In particular, on the army's efforts to oppose Hitler's foreign policies and his ultimately successful efforts to subvert he officer corps, see Barnett, Hitler's Generals; Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945 (Lanham, Md.: Scarborough House, 1990); Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster pp 65, 79-80, 132-134; and Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 23-24.
112. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233-240, 258-259, 268, 321-325; Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 20-21, 24-25, 255, 441. In particular, on the army's efforts to oppose Hitler's foreign policies and his ultimately successful efforts to subvert he officer corps, see Barnett, Hitler's Generals; Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945 (Lanham, Md.: Scarborough House, 1990); Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster pp 65, 79-80, 132-134; and Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 23-24.
113. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233-240, 258-259, 268, 321-325; Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 20-21, 24-25, 255, 441. In particular, on the army's efforts to oppose Hitler's foreign policies and his ultimately successful efforts to subvert he officer corps, see Barnett, Hitler's Generals; Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945 (Lanham, Md.: Scarborough House, 1990); Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster pp 65, 79-80, 132-134; and Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 23-24.
114. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233-240, 258-259, 268, 321-325; Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 20-21, 24-25, 255, 441. In particular, on the army's efforts to oppose Hitler's foreign policies and his ultimately successful efforts to subvert he officer corps, see Barnett, Hitler's Generals; Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945 (Lanham, Md.: Scarborough House, 1990); Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster pp 65, 79-80, 132-134; and Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 23-24.
115. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233-240, 258-259, 268, 321-325; Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 20-21, 24-25, 255, 441. In particular, on the army's efforts to oppose Hitler's foreign policies and his ultimately successful efforts to subvert he officer corps, see Barnett, Hitler's Generals; Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945 (Lanham, Md.: Scarborough House, 1990); Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster pp 65, 79-80, 132-134; and Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 23-24.
116. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233-240, 258-259, 268, 321-325; Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy," pp. 121-144; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 20-21, 24-25, 255, 441. In particular, on the army's efforts to oppose Hitler's foreign policies and his ultimately successful efforts to subvert he officer corps, see Barnett, Hitler's Generals; Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945 (Lanham, Md.: Scarborough House, 1990); Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster pp 65, 79-80, 132-134; and Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 23-24.
117. Even after declaring war in September 1939, there was no discussion in Paris of an offensive against Germany. Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, p. 15; May, Strange Victory pp 271-336; A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 264-266; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 330-332. The German general staff was also convinced that the French and British would not take the offensive and would eventually accede to the German conquests
118. Even after declaring war in September 1939, there was no discussion in Paris of an offensive against Germany. Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, p. 15; May, Strange Victory pp 271-336; A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 264-266; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 330-332. The German general staff was also convinced that the French and British would not take the offensive and would eventually accede to the German conquests if Berlin retrained from attacking France. See Cooper, The German Army, p. 180.
119. Even after declaring war in September 1939, there was no discussion in Paris of an offensive against Germany. Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, p. 15; May, Strange Victory pp 271-336; A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 264-266; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 330-332. The German general staff was also convinced that the French and British would not take the offensive and would eventually accede to the German conquests if Berlin retrained from attacking France. See Cooper, The German Army, p. 180.
120. Even after declaring war in September 1939, there was no discussion in Paris of an offensive against Germany. Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, p. 15; May, Strange Victory pp 271-336; A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 264-266; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 330-332. The German general staff was also convinced that the French and British would not take the offensive and would eventually accede to the German conquests if Berlin retrained from attacking France. See Cooper, The German Army, p. 180.
121. Even after declaring war in September 1939, there was no discussion in Paris of an offensive against Germany. Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, p. 15; May, Strange Victory pp 271-336; A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 264-266; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 330-332. The German general staff was also convinced that the French and British would not take the offensive and would eventually accede to the German conquests if Berlin retrained from attacking France. See Cooper, The German Army, p. 180.
122. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 204, 296, 319; Craig, Germany, p. 677; Hildebrand "The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich," p. 88; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 37-38; Taylor, Bismarck, pp. 131-132; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 6; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 42-43.
123. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 204, 296, 319; Craig, Germany, p. 677; Hildebrand "The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich," p. 88; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 37-38; Taylor, Bismarck, pp. 131-132; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 6; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 42-43.
124. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 204, 296, 319; Craig, Germany, p. 677; Hildebrand "The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich," p. 88; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 37-38; Taylor, Bismarck, pp. 131-132; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 6; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 42-43.
125. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 204, 296, 319; Craig, Germany, p. 677; Hildebrand "The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich," p. 88; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 37-38; Taylor, Bismarck, pp. 131-132; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 6; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 42-43.
126. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 204, 296, 319; Craig, Germany, p. 677; Hildebrand "The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich," p. 88; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 37-38; Taylor, Bismarck, pp. 131-132; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 6; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 42-43.
127. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 204, 296, 319; Craig, Germany, p. 677; Hildebrand "The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich," p. 88; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 37-38; Taylor, Bismarck, pp. 131-132; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 6; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 42-43.
128. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 204, 296, 319; Craig, Germany, p. 677; Hildebrand "The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich," p. 88; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 37-38; Taylor, Bismarck, pp. 131-132; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 6; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 42-43.
129. On German army opposition to the invasion of France, see Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233, 321-325; Cooper, The German Army, pp. 178-182; Craig, Germany, pp. 716-717; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 79-80; and May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-27. Indeed Cooper notes that even Keitel - Hitler's worst lackey among the generals - objected to the attack on France.
130. On German army opposition to the invasion of France, see Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233, 321-325; Cooper, The German Army, pp. 178-182; Craig, Germany, pp. 716-717; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 79-80; and May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-27. Indeed Cooper notes that even Keitel - Hitler's worst lackey among the generals - objected to the attack on France.
131. On German army opposition to the invasion of France, see Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233, 321-325; Cooper, The German Army, pp. 178-182; Craig, Germany, pp. 716-717; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 79-80; and May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-27. Indeed Cooper notes that even Keitel - Hitler's worst lackey among the generals - objected to the attack on France.
132. On German army opposition to the invasion of France, see Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233, 321-325; Cooper, The German Army, pp. 178-182; Craig, Germany, pp. 716-717; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 79-80; and May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-27. Indeed Cooper notes that even Keitel - Hitler's worst lackey among the generals - objected to the attack on France.
133. On German army opposition to the invasion of France, see Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233, 321-325; Cooper, The German Army, pp. 178-182; Craig, Germany, pp. 716-717; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 79-80; and May, Strange Victory, pp. 15-27. Indeed Cooper notes that even Keitel - Hitler's worst lackey among the generals - objected to the attack on France.
134. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 246-258, 286; Kenneth Macksey, "Guderian," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 451-452; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 132-134; and Bernd Wegner "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941-1943," in John Gooch, ed., Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 107-108. There were some German generals, including the chief of staff, who were not opposed to the idea of attacking Russia in the abstract, but only after the war with Britain had been won. See Cooper, The German Army, pp. 252-256.
135. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 246-258, 286; Kenneth Macksey, "Guderian," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 451-452; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 132-134; and Bernd Wegner "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941-1943," in John Gooch, ed., Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 107-108. There were some German generals, including the chief of staff, who were not opposed to the idea of attacking Russia in the abstract, but only after the war with Britain had been won. See Cooper, The German Army, pp. 252-256.
136. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 246-258, 286; Kenneth Macksey, "Guderian," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 451-452; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 132-134; and Bernd Wegner "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941-1943," in John Gooch, ed., Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 107-108. There were some German generals, including the chief of staff, who were not opposed to the idea of attacking Russia in the abstract, but only after the war with Britain had been won. See Cooper, The German Army, pp. 252-256.
137. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 246-258, 286; Kenneth Macksey, "Guderian," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 451-452; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 132-134; and Bernd Wegner "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941-1943," in John Gooch, ed., Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 107-108. There were some German generals, including the chief of staff, who were not opposed to the idea of attacking Russia in the abstract, but only after the war with Britain had been won. See Cooper, The German Army, pp. 252-256.
138. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 246-258, 286; Kenneth Macksey, "Guderian," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 451-452; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 132-134; and Bernd Wegner "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941-1943," in John Gooch, ed., Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 107-108. There were some German generals, including the chief of staff, who were not opposed to the idea of attacking Russia in the abstract, but only after the war with Britain had been won. See Cooper, The German Army, pp. 252-256.
139. Accounts of the Normandy invasion, such as Overy's superb analysis, make clear just how dicey an operation it was, and how much harder it would have been if the Wehrmacht had been able to concentrate its forces in France. See Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 134-179.
140. In October 1941, Stalin put out diplomatic feelers to see what surrender terms he might get from Germany. Hitler brushed these entreaties aside because nothing short of the destruction of the Soviet state and the enslavement of the Russian people would satisfy his objectives. We do not know what concessions Stalin might have been willing to make, but given the military balance at the time and the German advances up to that point, the two sides might have agreed on a settlement similar to the 1917 Brest-Litovsk treaty, in which Lenin conceded the Ukraine, Belarussia, and the Baltic states to Germany. If Germany had accepted such terms from Stalin, it would have "won" the war. Only Hitler could have considered such a victory inadequate. See Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 14, 19.
141. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 260-287, 316-325, 340, 423-428, 437-441, 456-460; Macksey, "Guderian," pp. 452-456; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 135-136; Martin Middlebrook, "Paulus," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 366-367; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 2-7, 67, 98-100; R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 82-89; and Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," especially pp. 111-123.
142. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 260-287, 316-325, 340, 423-428, 437-441, 456-460; Macksey, "Guderian," pp. 452-456; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 135-136; Martin Middlebrook, "Paulus," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 366-367; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 2-7, 67, 98-100; R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 82-89; and Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," especially pp. 111-123.
143. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 260-287, 316-325, 340, 423-428, 437-441, 456-460; Macksey, "Guderian," pp. 452-456; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 135-136; Martin Middlebrook, "Paulus," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 366-367; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 2-7, 67, 98-100; R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 82-89; and Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," especially pp. 111-123.
144. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 260-287, 316-325, 340, 423-428, 437-441, 456-460; Macksey, "Guderian," pp. 452-456; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 135-136; Martin Middlebrook, "Paulus," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 366-367; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 2-7, 67, 98-100; R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 82-89; and Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," especially pp. 111-123.
145. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 260-287, 316-325, 340, 423-428, 437-441, 456-460; Macksey, "Guderian," pp. 452-456; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 135-136; Martin Middlebrook, "Paulus," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 366-367; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 2-7, 67, 98-100; R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 82-89; and Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," especially pp. 111-123.
146. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 260-287, 316-325, 340, 423-428, 437-441, 456-460; Macksey, "Guderian," pp. 452-456; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 135-136; Martin Middlebrook, "Paulus," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 366-367; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 2-7, 67, 98-100; R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 82-89; and Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," especially pp. 111-123.
147. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 260-287, 316-325, 340, 423-428, 437-441, 456-460; Macksey, "Guderian," pp. 452-456; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 135-136; Martin Middlebrook, "Paulus," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 366-367; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 2-7, 67, 98-100; R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 82-89; and Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," especially pp. 111-123.
148. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler's leadership was the most important of a range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23, 66-67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, "Introduction," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 2-7; Cooper, The German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316-325, 400, 406, 423-428, 437-441, 456-484, 491, 510-511, 518, 528-531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87-88, 175, 198-207, 274-281; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529-535; Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, especially pp. 72-73; Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," pp. 105-127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 16-22.
149. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler's leadership was the most important of a range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23, 66-67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, "Introduction," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 2-7; Cooper, The German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316-325, 400, 406, 423-428, 437-441, 456-484, 491, 510-511, 518, 528-531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87-88, 175, 198-207, 274-281; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529-535; Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, especially pp. 72-73; Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," pp. 105-127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 16-22.
150. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler's leadership was the most important of a range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23, 66-67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, "Introduction," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 2-7; Cooper, The German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316-325, 400, 406, 423-428, 437-441, 456-484, 491, 510-511, 518, 528-531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87-88, 175, 198-207, 274-281; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529-535; Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, especially pp. 72-73; Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," pp. 105-127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 16-22.
151. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler's leadership was the most important of a range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23, 66-67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, "Introduction," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 2-7; Cooper, The German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316-325, 400, 406, 423-428, 437-441, 456-484, 491, 510-511, 518, 528-531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87-88, 175, 198-207, 274-281; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529-535; Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, especially pp. 72-73; Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," pp. 105-127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 16-22.
152. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler's leadership was the most important of a range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23, 66-67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, "Introduction," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 2-7; Cooper, The German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316-325, 400, 406, 423-428, 437-441, 456-484, 491, 510-511, 518, 528-531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87-88, 175, 198-207, 274-281; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529-535; Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, especially pp. 72-73; Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," pp. 105-127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 16-22.
153. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler's leadership was the most important of a range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23, 66-67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, "Introduction," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 2-7; Cooper, The German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316-325, 400, 406, 423-428, 437-441, 456-484, 491, 510-511, 518, 528-531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87-88, 175, 198-207, 274-281; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529-535; Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, especially pp. 72-73; Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," pp. 105-127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 16-22.
154. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler's leadership was the most important of a range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23, 66-67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, "Introduction," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 2-7; Cooper, The German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316-325, 400, 406, 423-428, 437-441, 456-484, 491, 510-511, 518, 528-531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87-88, 175, 198-207, 274-281; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529-535; Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, especially pp. 72-73; Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," pp. 105-127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 16-22.
155. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler's leadership was the most important of a range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23, 66-67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, "Introduction," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 2-7; Cooper, The German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316-325, 400, 406, 423-428, 437-441, 456-484, 491, 510-511, 518, 528-531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87-88, 175, 198-207, 274-281; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529-535; Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, especially pp. 72-73; Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," pp. 105-127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 16-22.
156. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler's leadership was the most important of a range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23, 66-67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, "Introduction," in Barnett, Hitler's Generals, pp. 2-7; Cooper, The German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316-325, 400, 406, 423-428, 437-441, 456-484, 491, 510-511, 518, 528-531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87-88, 175, 198-207, 274-281; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529-535; Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, especially pp. 72-73; Wegner, "The Road to Defeat," pp. 105-127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 16-22.
157. Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 101.
158. For example, in the 1887 Reinsurance treaty, Germany and Russia promised neutrality if the other engaged in a war against a third country unless Germany attacked France or Russia attacked Austria. In other words, as long as the countries had defensive goals they would be allied. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 165. Bismarck also used their alliance to rein in Austria. He repeatedly reminded Vienna of the alliance's defensive character and refused to support it in its Balkan ambitions. In 1882 Bismarck brought Italy into its alliance with Austria. Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 108.
159. For example, in the 1887 Reinsurance treaty, Germany and Russia promised neutrality if the other engaged in a war against a third country unless Germany attacked France or Russia attacked Austria. In other words, as long as the countries had defensive goals they would be allied. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 165. Bismarck also used their alliance to rein in Austria. He repeatedly reminded Vienna of the alliance's defensive character and refused to support it in its Balkan ambitions. In 1882 Bismarck brought Italy into its alliance with Austria. Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 108.
160. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 160. To distract Paris, Bismarck urged the French to engage in colonial adventures. Bismarck also pushed the British and the Austrians to work together to preserve the status quo in the Mediterranean. The result, the "Mediterranean agreement" of 1887, led Britain to become associated with the Triple Alliance and thus deter Russian and French adventurism. Craig, Germany, p. 131.
161. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 160. To distract Paris, Bismarck urged the French to engage in colonial adventures. Bismarck also pushed the British and the Austrians to work together to preserve the status quo in the Mediterranean. The result, the "Mediterranean agreement" of 1887, led Britain to become associated with the Triple Alliance and thus deter Russian and French adventurism. Craig, Germany, p. 131.
162. Craig, Germany, p. 116.
163. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 171.
164. Taylor, Bismarck, p. 53.
165. Friedrich von Holstein, as quoted in Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 115. At the time Holstein worked in the German Foreign Office.
166. Taylor, Bismarck, p. 210. During the Congress of Berlin, the German parliament urged Bismarck to take a stronger stand vis-à-vis the Eastern question. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 156. Moreover, in 1887 some leading German military figures urged a preemptive war on Russia - an idea Bismarck rejected out of hand. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 138.
167. Taylor, Bismarck, p. 210. During the Congress of Berlin, the German parliament urged Bismarck to take a stronger stand vis-à-vis the Eastern question. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 156. Moreover, in 1887 some leading German military figures urged a preemptive war on Russia - an idea Bismarck rejected out of hand. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 138.
168. Taylor, Bismarck, p. 210. During the Congress of Berlin, the German parliament urged Bismarck to take a stronger stand vis-à-vis the Eastern question. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 156. Moreover, in 1887 some leading German military figures urged a preemptive war on Russia - an idea Bismarck rejected out of hand. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 138.
169. Kissinger notes that the removal of Bismarck's genius did not by necessity usher in a policy of idiocy. Ibid., p. 169. Similarly, Craig notes that even when the Germans had solid grounds for their actions, their interventions were often menacing, insulting, and violent. Craig, Germany, p. 243.
170. Kissinger notes that the removal of Bismarck's genius did not by necessity usher in a policy of idiocy. Ibid., p. 169. Similarly, Craig notes that even when the Germans had solid grounds for their actions, their interventions were often menacing, insulting, and violent. Craig, Germany, p. 243.
171. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 179; and Paul M. Kennedy, "The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: Reflections on Wilhelm II's Place in the Making of German Foreign Policy," in John C.G. Rohl and Nicolaus Sombart, eds., Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 164. Bismarck's successor as chancellor, Leopold von Caprivi, confessed that he wanted to simplify foreign policy because he lacked Bismarck's ability to keep eight balls in the air at once. Russia, to preserve the alliance, offered several concessions with regard to Germany's position with Austria, but Caprivi still refused to renew the alliance. Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 122.
172. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 179; and Paul M. Kennedy, "The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: Reflections on Wilhelm II's Place in the Making of German Foreign Policy," in John C.G. Rohl and Nicolaus Sombart, eds., Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 164. Bismarck's successor as chancellor, Leopold von Caprivi, confessed that he wanted to simplify foreign policy because he lacked Bismarck's ability to keep eight balls in the air at once. Russia, to preserve the alliance, offered several concessions with regard to Germany's position with Austria, but Caprivi still refused to renew the alliance. Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 122.
173. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 179; and Paul M. Kennedy, "The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: Reflections on Wilhelm II's Place in the Making of German Foreign Policy," in John C.G. Rohl and Nicolaus Sombart, eds., Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 164. Bismarck's successor as chancellor, Leopold von Caprivi, confessed that he wanted to simplify foreign policy because he lacked Bismarck's ability to keep eight balls in the air at once. Russia, to preserve the alliance, offered several concessions with regard to Germany's position with Austria, but Caprivi still refused to renew the alliance. Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 122.
174. Kennedy, "The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik," p. 151. See also Robert G.L. Waite, "Leadership Pathologies: The Kaiser and the Führer and the Decision for War in 1914 and 1939," in Betty Glad, ed., Psychological Dimensions of War (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage, 1990), pp. 143-168.
175. Kennedy, "The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik," p. 151. See also Robert G.L. Waite, "Leadership Pathologies: The Kaiser and the Führer and the Decision for War in 1914 and 1939," in Betty Glad, ed., Psychological Dimensions of War (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage, 1990), pp. 143-168.
176. Kennedy, "The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik," p. 162.
177. Blaming German industry, as some scholars do, does not explain the German decision to build a large fleet. As Kennedy notes, it cannot have mattered to Krupp whether the government spent millions on infantry divisions or on battleships, as the giant arms manufacturer would have supplied the guns for either. Ibid., p. 152.
178. Ibid., p. 160.
179. Kurt Riezler, Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente, ed. Karl Dietrich Erdman (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1972), p. 188, as quoted in Craig, Germany, p. 337.
180. Kurt Riezler, Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente, ed. Karl Dietrich Erdman (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1972), p. 188, as quoted in Craig, Germany, p. 337.
181. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Scribner, 1966), pp. xxix-xxx.
182. Such expansionary behavior is typical of revolutionary states. Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
183. Alistair Horne, How far from Austerlitz? Napoleon, 1805-1815 (Armonk, N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1996), p. 69; and Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 400.
184. Alistair Horne, How far from Austerlitz? Napoleon, 1805-1815 (Armonk, N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1996), p. 69; and Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 400.
185. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, p. xxix.
186. Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? pp. 296-297; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 305, 434, 478, 482-495.
187. Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? pp. 296-297; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 305, 434, 478, 482-495.
188. Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, p. 400.
189. Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? p. 235.
190. See also Felix Markham, Napoleon (New York: Signet New American Library, 1963), pp. 55-56.
191. Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? pp. 237-240; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 248-250, 417-418, 478. Schom also notes that Napoleon's secret police chief, Joseph Fouché, perhaps the third most powerful man in the empire, also constantly sought peace despite the emperor's compulsive war making. See Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 271-272.
192. Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? pp. 237-240; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 248-250, 417-418, 478. Schom also notes that Napoleon's secret police chief, Joseph Fouché, perhaps the third most powerful man in the empire, also constantly sought peace despite the emperor's compulsive war making. See Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 271-272.
193. Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? pp. 237-240; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 248-250, 417-418, 478. Schom also notes that Napoleon's secret police chief, Joseph Fouché, perhaps the third most powerful man in the empire, also constantly sought peace despite the emperor's compulsive war making. See Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 271-272.
194. Perhaps the best examples were the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. By then, Napoleon had lost the advantage of superior military effectiveness because most of his best-trained combat veterans had been slaughtered in Spain and Russia, while his enemies had reformed their own militaries along French lines. Likewise his adversaries had adopted their own versions of the levée en masse, and so the French were badly outnumbered as well. Nevertheless Napoleon nearly won each of these campaigns, and his conduct of the 1814 campaign in defense of France was nothing short of astonishing. See Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 865-1004.
195. Markham, Napoleon, p. 141. This in an era when 100,000 men was considered a large field army.
196. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 899, 947, 994, 1001; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, p. 414. Schom contends that the allies recognized that Napoleon had to be removed because of his bellicosity and martial skills as early as 1805 after the Battle of Austerlitz. Chandler argues that the Austrians were convinced of the necessity of this course only after the Battle of Leipzig in 1813.
197. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 899, 947, 994, 1001; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, p. 414. Schom contends that the allies recognized that Napoleon had to be removed because of his bellicosity and martial skills as early as 1805 after the Battle of Austerlitz. Chandler argues that the Austrians were convinced of the necessity of this course only after the Battle of Leipzig in 1813.
198. See, for example, Ofra Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1992), pp. 14-17.
199. F. Gregory Cause III, "Gulf Regional Politics: Revolution, War, and Rivalry," in W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 52; and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985), p. 245.
200. F. Gregory Cause III, "Gulf Regional Politics: Revolution, War, and Rivalry," in W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 52; and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985), p. 245.
201. For an interesting analysis of Saddam's decisionmaking, see Jerrold M. Post, "The Defining Moment of Saddam's Life: A Political Psychology Perspective on the Leadership and Decision-Making of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf Crisis," in Stanley A. Renshon, ed., The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 49-66.
202. Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984), pp. 45-46, 149-150; Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1978), pp. 68, 161-164; and Marr, Modern History of Iraq, pp. 230-231.
203. Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984), pp. 45-46, 149-150; Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1978), pp. 68, 161-164; and Marr, Modern History of Iraq, pp. 230-231.
204. Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984), pp. 45-46, 149-150; Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1978), pp. 68, 161-164; and Marr, Modern History of Iraq, pp. 230-231.
205. Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World, pp. 151-162; Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 25-39; and Marr, Modern History of Iraq, pp. 292-294.
206. Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World, pp. 151-162; Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 25-39; and Marr, Modern History of Iraq, pp. 292-294.
207. Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World, pp. 151-162; Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 25-39; and Marr, Modern History of Iraq, pp. 292-294.
208. Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad," in Baram and Barry Rubin, eds., Iraq's Road to War (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), pp. 6-9; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 38-41, 45-47; and F. Gregory Gause III, "Prospect Theory and Iraqi War Decisions," paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1997.
209. Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad," in Baram and Barry Rubin, eds., Iraq's Road to War (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), pp. 6-9; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 38-41, 45-47; and F. Gregory Gause III, "Prospect Theory and Iraqi War Decisions," paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1997.
210. Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad," in Baram and Barry Rubin, eds., Iraq's Road to War (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), pp. 6-9; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 38-41, 45-47; and F. Gregory Gause III, "Prospect Theory and Iraqi War Decisions," paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1997.
211. On Saddam's aggressive grand strategy beginning in early 1990, see Baram, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," pp. 5-28; and Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis, pp. 11-34.
212. On Saddam's aggressive grand strategy beginning in early 1990, see Baram, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," pp. 5-28; and Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis, pp. 11-34.
213. Neville Brown, "Jordanian Civil War," Military Review, September 1971, p. 45; Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 68-69; Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-1986: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 51-52; Fred H. Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 68; Moshe Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," in Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), p. 26; and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Stuggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961-1978 (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), pp. 84-88.
214. Neville Brown, "Jordanian Civil War," Military Review, September 1971, p. 45; Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 68-69; Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-1986: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 51-52; Fred H. Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 68; Moshe Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," in Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), p. 26; and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Stuggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961-1978 (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), pp. 84-88.
215. Neville Brown, "Jordanian Civil War," Military Review, September 1971, p. 45; Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 68-69; Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-1986: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 51-52; Fred H. Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 68; Moshe Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," in Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), p. 26; and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Stuggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961-1978 (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), pp. 84-88.
216. Neville Brown, "Jordanian Civil War," Military Review, September 1971, p. 45; Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 68-69; Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-1986: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 51-52; Fred H. Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 68; Moshe Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," in Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), p. 26; and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Stuggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961-1978 (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), pp. 84-88.
217. Neville Brown, "Jordanian Civil War," Military Review, September 1971, p. 45; Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 68-69; Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-1986: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 51-52; Fred H. Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 68; Moshe Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," in Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), p. 26; and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Stuggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961-1978 (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), pp. 84-88.
218. Neville Brown, "Jordanian Civil War," Military Review, September 1971, p. 45; Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 68-69; Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-1986: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 51-52; Fred H. Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 68; Moshe Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," in Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), p. 26; and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Stuggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961-1978 (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), pp. 84-88.
219. Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," p. 28; Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), p. 171; and Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, pp. 87-92.
220. Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," p. 28; Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), p. 171; and Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, pp. 87-92.
221. Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," p. 28; Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), p. 171; and Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, pp. 87-92.
222. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 3-22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 80-91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33-44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60-62; Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 160-165; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179-184; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36-37, 47-56, 85-88, 201-236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267-289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95-213.
223. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 3-22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 80-91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33-44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60-62; Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 160-165; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179-184; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36-37, 47-56, 85-88, 201-236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267-289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95-213.
224. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 3-22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 80-91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33-44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60-62; Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 160-165; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179-184; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36-37, 47-56, 85-88, 201-236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267-289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95-213.
225. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 3-22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 80-91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33-44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60-62; Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 160-165; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179-184; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36-37, 47-56, 85-88, 201-236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267-289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95-213.
226. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 3-22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 80-91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33-44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60-62; Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 160-165; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179-184; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36-37, 47-56, 85-88, 201-236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267-289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95-213.
227. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 3-22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 80-91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33-44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60-62; Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 160-165; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179-184; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36-37, 47-56, 85-88, 201-236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267-289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95-213.
228. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 3-22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 80-91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33-44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60-62; Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 160-165; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179-184; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36-37, 47-56, 85-88, 201-236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267-289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95-213.
229. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 3-22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 80-91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33-44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60-62; Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 160-165; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179-184; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36-37, 47-56, 85-88, 201-236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267-289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95-213.
230. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 3-22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 80-91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33-44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60-62; Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 160-165; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179-184; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36-37, 47-56, 85-88, 201-236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267-289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95-213.
231. Joseph Nevo, "Syria and Jordan: The Politics of Subversion," in Ma'oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, p. 145.
232. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp. 132-136; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 1, The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 83; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 174-175; Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, ed. and trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 117-118, 155-156; and Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 380.
233. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp. 132-136; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 1, The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 83; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 174-175; Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, ed. and trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 117-118, 155-156; and Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 380.
234. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp. 132-136; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 1, The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 83; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 174-175; Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, ed. and trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 117-118, 155-156; and Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 380.
235. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp. 132-136; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 1, The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 83; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 174-175; Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, ed. and trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 117-118, 155-156; and Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 380.
236. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp. 132-136; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 1, The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 83; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 174-175; Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, ed. and trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 117-118, 155-156; and Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 380.
237. The best account of Rif'at al-Asad's fall is Michael Eisenstadt, "Syria's Defense Companies: Profile of a Praetorian Unit," unpublished manuscript, Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1989, pp. 8-12.
238. For Saddam's analysis of the new world order and aggressive prescriptions for Iraq and the other Arab states, see his address to the Fourth Summit of the Arab Cooperation Council, Amman, February 24, 1990, reprinted in Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis, pp. 37-49.
239. Baram, "Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," pp. 10-11; Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis, p. 15; and Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 31.
240. Baram, "Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," pp. 10-11; Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis, p. 15; and Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 31.
241. Baram, "Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," pp. 10-11; Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis, p. 15; and Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 31.
242. The best known of Saddam's statements implying that he understood the risk that the United States might intervene if Iraq attacked Kuwait was his warning to U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie that American society "cannot accept 10,000 fatalities in one battle," in their infamous meeting on July 25, 1990. See Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader:
243. The best known of Saddam's statements implying that he understood the risk that the United States might intervene if Iraq attacked Kuwait was his warning to U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie that American society "cannot accept 10,000 fatalities in one battle," in their infamous meeting on July 25, 1990. See Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 125. However, Iraqi officials restated this after the war. See, for example, "Aziz Interviewed on Outbreak of Gulf War," Milliyet, May 30, 1991, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East-South Asia-91-107, June 4, 1991, pp. 13-14; and Milton Viorst, "Report from Baghdad," New Yorker, June 24, 1991, pp. 66-67.
244. The best known of Saddam's statements implying that he understood the risk that the United States might intervene if Iraq attacked Kuwait was his warning to U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie that American society "cannot accept 10,000 fatalities in one battle," in their infamous meeting on July 25, 1990. See Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 125. However, Iraqi officials restated this after the war. See, for example, "Aziz Interviewed on Outbreak of Gulf War," Milliyet, May 30, 1991, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East-South Asia-91-107, June 4, 1991, pp. 13-14; and Milton Viorst, "Report from Baghdad," New Yorker, June 24, 1991, pp. 66-67.
245. See Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1996), pp. 322-328, for statements on Khomeini's ideology as it relates to the war's continuation. A good overview of Khomeini's theology can be found in Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 409-484.
246. See Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1996), pp. 322-328, for statements on Khomeini's ideology as it relates to the war's continuation. A good overview of Khomeini's theology can be found in Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 409-484.
247. William Quandt, "The Middle East on the Brink: Prospects for Change," Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 13. See also R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), p. 74.
248. William Quandt, "The Middle East on the Brink: Prospects for Change," Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 13. See also R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), p. 74.
249. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 259-260. On the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, see David Priess, "Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the GCC," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996), pp. 143-171; Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from Within (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 24-27; and Emile A. Nakleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems, and Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1986).
250. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 259-260. On the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, see David Priess, "Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the GCC," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996), pp. 143-171; Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from Within (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 24-27; and Emile A. Nakleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems, and Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1986).
251. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 259-260. On the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, see David Priess, "Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the GCC," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996), pp. 143-171; Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from Within (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 24-27; and Emile A. Nakleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems, and Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1986).
252. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 259-260. On the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, see David Priess, "Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the GCC," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996), pp. 143-171; Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from Within (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 24-27; and Emile A. Nakleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems, and Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1986).
253. Indeed Henry Kissinger - one of the premier realists-devotes much of his early work to examining how such a balance was created in nineteenth-century Europe. See Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), for a superb example.
254. We recognize that there is a selection bias in the cases from which we generated several of these hypotheses. For example, we note the correlation between risk tolerance and war, but our cases focus largely on instances of war. Additional testing of these hypotheses using cases of peace is necessary, as are tests using leaders who are not risk tolerant, egotistical, and so on.
255. See Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, pp. 192-198.
256. Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 3d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 201.
257. Jack Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1997), p. 93; and Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict," International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1996), p. 189. A leader's proneness toward risk could be measured by examining how he or she responded to similar circumstances before assuming power.
258. Jack Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1997), p. 93; and Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict," International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1996), p. 189. A leader's proneness toward risk could be measured by examining how he or she responded to similar circumstances before assuming power.
259. Friedrich von Gentz, "Considerations on the Political System in Europe" (1818), in Mack Walker, ed., Metternich's Europe (New York: Walker and Co., 1968), p. 80. Quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 140.
260. Friedrich von Gentz, "Considerations on the Political System in Europe" (1818), in Mack Walker, ed., Metternich's Europe (New York: Walker and Co., 1968), p. 80. Quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 140.
261. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 243 (ellipsis in the original).
262. Quoted in Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 189.
263. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), p. 66. Throughout the conflict, key cabinet officials, such as Foreign Secretary Francis Pym and Home Secretary William Whitelaw, urged compromise over confrontation. The Sunday Times of London Insight Team, War in the Falklands: The Full Story (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), pp. 177-178.
264. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), p. 66. Throughout the conflict, key cabinet officials, such as Foreign Secretary Francis Pym and Home Secretary William Whitelaw, urged compromise over confrontation. The Sunday Times of London Insight Team, War in the Falklands: The Full Story (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), pp. 177-178.
265. The military contingency file for an invasion of the Falklands stressed the logistical problems of operations so far from British shores. It also noted that Britain might not be able to meet its NATO commitments if it were engaged in a conflict in the Falklands. Most ominously, it argued that not even the largest task force could retake the islands after an Argentine invasion. Hastings and Jenkins, Battle for the Falklands, p. 56.
266. Ibid., pp. 335-336.
267. For a similar study of interacting images, see Philip Gourevitch, "Second Image Reversed: International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881-911.
268. Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, for example, created a national security structure that has lasted for decades after their terms ended. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 195.
269. Ibid., pp. 195-196.
270. Favoring one level of analysis at the expense of the others is perhaps the most pernicious form of "reductionism." See Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 7. Likewise, we echo Fareed Zakaria's plea for scholars to "develop a tolerance for more limited - but more accurate - generalizations," by developing theories of international affairs that draw on both internal and external factors to explain state behavior. See Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 178-179.
271. Favoring one level of analysis at the expense of the others is perhaps the most pernicious form of "reductionism." See Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 7. Likewise, we echo Fareed Zakaria's plea for scholars to "develop a tolerance for more limited - but more accurate - generalizations," by developing theories of international affairs that draw on both internal and external factors to explain state behavior. See Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 178-179.