Labour's strategic defence review

International Affairs

Volumn 74, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 823-845

  McInnes, Colin ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0042779936     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00047     Document Type: Review

References (67)

1. The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999 (London: TSO, 1998), hereafter referred to as SDR. The White Paper was accompanied by a separate volume of eleven more detailed essays on specific aspects of the Review: The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays (London:TSO, 1998), hereafter referred to as Essays. The purpose of these essays was described by Jon Day, Director of Defence Policy, as 'a new development reflecting the trend towards increasing openness in defence. The 11 essays are intended to provide detailed background on how and why we came to the conclusions presented in the White Paper . . . They are, however, much more than just long versions of chapters in the White Paper and have been written as self-standing essays.' Letter from Jon Day to author, 8 July 1998. Details of the SDR were leaked in advance, embarrassing the Defence Secretary into apologizing to the House of Commons: Hansard (Commons), 8 July 1998, cols 1073ff.
2. The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999 (London: TSO, 1998), hereafter referred to as SDR. The White Paper was accompanied by a separate volume of eleven more detailed essays on specific aspects of the Review: The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays (London:TSO, 1998), hereafter referred to as Essays. The purpose of these essays was described by Jon Day, Director of Defence Policy, as 'a new development reflecting the trend towards increasing openness in defence. The 11 essays are intended to provide detailed background on how and why we came to the conclusions presented in the White Paper . . . They are, however, much more than just long versions of chapters in the White Paper and have been written as self-standing essays.' Letter from Jon Day to author, 8 July 1998. Details of the SDR were leaked in advance, embarrassing the Defence Secretary into apologizing to the House of Commons: Hansard (Commons), 8 July 1998, cols 1073ff.
3. The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999 (London: TSO, 1998), hereafter referred to as SDR. The White Paper was accompanied by a separate volume of eleven more detailed essays on specific aspects of the Review: The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays (London:TSO, 1998), hereafter referred to as Essays. The purpose of these essays was described by Jon Day, Director of Defence Policy, as 'a new development reflecting the trend towards increasing openness in defence. The 11 essays are intended to provide detailed background on how and why we came to the conclusions presented in the White Paper . . . They are, however, much more than just long versions of chapters in the White Paper and have been written as self-standing essays.' Letter from Jon Day to author, 8 July 1998. Details of the SDR were leaked in advance, embarrassing the Defence Secretary into apologizing to the House of Commons: Hansard (Commons), 8 July 1998, cols 1073ff.
4. SDR, pp. 1-2.
5. SDR, p. 6.
6. The United Kingdom defence programme: the way forward, Cmnd 8288 (London: HMSO, 1981). The most controversial feature of the 1981 review was the cuts to the surface fleet, which led to considerable discontent in the services (particularly the Royal Navy) and on the Conservative back benches. The objections of the Navy minister, Keith Speed, led to his dismissal (according to Dwin Bramall, CGS at the time, and Bill Jackson, Speed was the 'one man [who] emerged with honour' from the review, revealing perhaps more about service attitudes than about the realities of defence planning at the time). The Falklands conflict of the following year, which involved a number of ships due to be cut under the Nott review, was interpreted by many as proving Nott wrong and led to a wariness of defence reviews among subsequent Conservative governments. See e.g. Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The chiefs: the story of the United Kingdom chiefs of staff (London: Brassey's, 1992), pp. 394ff; Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British naval policy since World War II (London: Bodley Head, 1987), pp. 3428; Lawrence Freedman, 'British defence policy after the Falklands', in John Baylis, ed., Alternative approaches to British defence policy (London: Macmillan, 1983).
7. The United Kingdom defence programme: the way forward, Cmnd 8288 (London: HMSO, 1981). The most controversial feature of the 1981 review was the cuts to the surface fleet, which led to considerable discontent in the services (particularly the Royal Navy) and on the Conservative back benches. The objections of the Navy minister, Keith Speed, led to his dismissal (according to Dwin Bramall, CGS at the time, and Bill Jackson, Speed was the 'one man [who] emerged with honour' from the review, revealing perhaps more about service attitudes than about the realities of defence planning at the time). The Falklands conflict of the following year, which involved a number of ships due to be cut under the Nott review, was interpreted by many as proving Nott wrong and led to a wariness of defence reviews among subsequent Conservative governments. See e.g. Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The chiefs: the story of the United Kingdom chiefs of staff (London: Brassey's, 1992), pp. 394ff; Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British naval policy since World War II (London: Bodley Head, 1987), pp. 3428; Lawrence Freedman, 'British defence policy after the Falklands', in John Baylis, ed., Alternative approaches to British defence policy (London: Macmillan, 1983).
8. The United Kingdom defence programme: the way forward, Cmnd 8288 (London: HMSO, 1981). The most controversial feature of the 1981 review was the cuts to the surface fleet, which led to considerable discontent in the services (particularly the Royal Navy) and on the Conservative back benches. The objections of the Navy minister, Keith Speed, led to his dismissal (according to Dwin Bramall, CGS at the time, and Bill Jackson, Speed was the 'one man [who] emerged with honour' from the review, revealing perhaps more about service attitudes than about the realities of defence planning at the time). The Falklands conflict of the following year, which involved a number of ships due to be cut under the Nott review, was interpreted by many as proving Nott wrong and led to a wariness of defence reviews among subsequent Conservative governments. See e.g. Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The chiefs: the story of the United Kingdom chiefs of staff (London: Brassey's, 1992), pp. 394ff; Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British naval policy since World War II (London: Bodley Head, 1987), pp. 3428; Lawrence Freedman, 'British defence policy after the Falklands', in John Baylis, ed., Alternative approaches to British defence policy (London: Macmillan, 1983).
9. The United Kingdom defence programme: the way forward, Cmnd 8288 (London: HMSO, 1981). The most controversial feature of the 1981 review was the cuts to the surface fleet, which led to considerable discontent in the services (particularly the Royal Navy) and on the Conservative back benches. The objections of the Navy minister, Keith Speed, led to his dismissal (according to Dwin Bramall, CGS at the time, and Bill Jackson, Speed was the 'one man [who] emerged with honour' from the review, revealing perhaps more about service attitudes than about the realities of defence planning at the time). The Falklands conflict of the following year, which involved a number of ships due to be cut under the Nott review, was interpreted by many as proving Nott wrong and led to a wariness of defence reviews among subsequent Conservative governments. See e.g. Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The chiefs: the story of the United Kingdom chiefs of staff (London: Brassey's, 1992), pp. 394ff; Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British naval policy since World War II (London: Bodley Head, 1987), pp. 3428; Lawrence Freedman, 'British defence policy after the Falklands', in John Baylis, ed., Alternative approaches to British defence policy (London: Macmillan, 1983).
10. Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study (London: Ministry of Defence, 1994). See also Eighth Report of the Defence Committee, The Defence Costs Study (London: HMSO, 1994). No similarly comprehensive official document exists detailing 'Options for Change'. The existence of the exercise was announced in the House of Commons on 6 February 1990. Initial results were presented to the House of Commons on 23 July 1990 and subsequent decisions on 23 July 1991. A number of details were presented in annual versions of the Statement on the Defence Estimates throughout the early 19905, while a White Paper on the future of the Army was published in 1991: Cm 1595, Britain's Army for the 90s (London: HMSO, 1991). The civil servant at the heart of the exercise, Richard Mottram, discussed the process involved and some of the key issues in a presentation to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), subsequently published as Richard Mottram, 'Options for Change: process and prospects', Journal of the RUSI 136: 1, 1991, pp. 22-6. See also Michael Clarke, 'Introduction', in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds, British defence choices in the twenty-first century (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. xiii-xxv.
11. Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study (London: Ministry of Defence, 1994). See also Eighth Report of the Defence Committee, The Defence Costs Study (London: HMSO, 1994). No similarly comprehensive official document exists detailing 'Options for Change'. The existence of the exercise was announced in the House of Commons on 6 February 1990. Initial results were presented to the House of Commons on 23 July 1990 and subsequent decisions on 23 July 1991. A number of details were presented in annual versions of the Statement on the Defence Estimates throughout the early 19905, while a White Paper on the future of the Army was published in 1991: Cm 1595, Britain's Army for the 90s (London: HMSO, 1991). The civil servant at the heart of the exercise, Richard Mottram, discussed the process involved and some of the key issues in a presentation to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), subsequently published as Richard Mottram, 'Options for Change: process and prospects', Journal of the RUSI 136: 1, 1991, pp. 22-6. See also Michael Clarke, 'Introduction', in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds, British defence choices in the twenty-first century (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. xiii-xxv.
12. Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study (London: Ministry of Defence, 1994). See also Eighth Report of the Defence Committee, The Defence Costs Study (London: HMSO, 1994). No similarly comprehensive official document exists detailing 'Options for Change'. The existence of the exercise was announced in the House of Commons on 6 February 1990. Initial results were presented to the House of Commons on 23 July 1990 and subsequent decisions on 23 July 1991. A number of details were presented in annual versions of the Statement on the Defence Estimates throughout the early 19905, while a White Paper on the future of the Army was published in 1991: Cm 1595, Britain's Army for the 90s (London: HMSO, 1991). The civil servant at the heart of the exercise, Richard Mottram, discussed the process involved and some of the key issues in a presentation to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), subsequently published as Richard Mottram, 'Options for Change: process and prospects', Journal of the RUSI 136: 1, 1991, pp. 22-6. See also Michael Clarke, 'Introduction', in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds, British defence choices in the twenty-first century (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. xiii-xxv.
13. Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study (London: Ministry of Defence, 1994). See also Eighth Report of the Defence Committee, The Defence Costs Study (London: HMSO, 1994). No similarly comprehensive official document exists detailing 'Options for Change'. The existence of the exercise was announced in the House of Commons on 6 February 1990. Initial results were presented to the House of Commons on 23 July 1990 and subsequent decisions on 23 July 1991. A number of details were presented in annual versions of the Statement on the Defence Estimates throughout the early 19905, while a White Paper on the future of the Army was published in 1991: Cm 1595, Britain's Army for the 90s (London: HMSO, 1991). The civil servant at the heart of the exercise, Richard Mottram, discussed the process involved and some of the key issues in a presentation to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), subsequently published as Richard Mottram, 'Options for Change: process and prospects', Journal of the RUSI 136: 1, 1991, pp. 22-6. See also Michael Clarke, 'Introduction', in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds, British defence choices in the twenty-first century (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. xiii-xxv.
14. Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study (London: Ministry of Defence, 1994). See also Eighth Report of the Defence Committee, The Defence Costs Study (London: HMSO, 1994). No similarly comprehensive official document exists detailing 'Options for Change'. The existence of the exercise was announced in the House of Commons on 6 February 1990. Initial results were presented to the House of Commons on 23 July 1990 and subsequent decisions on 23 July 1991. A number of details were presented in annual versions of the Statement on the Defence Estimates throughout the early 19905, while a White Paper on the future of the Army was published in 1991: Cm 1595, Britain's Army for the 90s (London: HMSO, 1991). The civil servant at the heart of the exercise, Richard Mottram, discussed the process involved and some of the key issues in a presentation to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), subsequently published as Richard Mottram, 'Options for Change: process and prospects', Journal of the RUSI 136: 1, 1991, pp. 22-6. See also Michael Clarke, 'Introduction', in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds, British defence choices in the twenty-first century (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. xiii-xxv.
15. John Baylis was among the first to argue for a regular review process formalizing an evolutionary approach to defence planning. See John Baylis, British defence policy: striking the right balance (London: Macmillan, 1989).
16. John Reid, 'The armed forces and society', Journal of the RUSI 142: 2, 1997, p. 34.
17. Michael Portillo, 'Conservative Party defence policy', Journal of the RUSI 142: 3, 1997, p. 29.
18. Menzies Campbell, 'British security and defence policy', Journal of the RUSI 142: 2, 1997, p. 35. Menzies Campbell was a member of the Commons Defence Committee which produced the report as well as Liberal Democrat spokesman on foreign and defence affairs.
19. Speech by the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr George Robertson, on the Strategic Defence Review, Chatham House, 12 March 1998. Available at: http://www.mod.uk/speeches/sofs3.98.html, April 1998.
20. Speech by the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Portillo, Falkland Islands, 2 January 1997, 'Britain's continuing global responsibilities', p. 2. Available at: http://www.mod.uk/speeches/sofs7.htm, December 1997. See also Malcolm Rifkind, 'Peace and stability - the British military contribution', in The framework of United Kingdom defence policy, London Defence Studies 30/1 (London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, 1995), pp. 109-10.
21. Speech by the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Portillo, Falkland Islands, 2 January 1997, 'Britain's continuing global responsibilities', p. 2. Available at: http://www.mod.uk/speeches/sofs7.htm, December 1997. See also Malcolm Rifkind, 'Peace and stability - the British military contribution', in The framework of United Kingdom defence policy, London Defence Studies 30/1 (London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, 1995), pp. 109-10.
22. Portillo, 'Britain's continuing global responsibilities', p. 3 ; speech by Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Portillo: Australian Defence Force Academy, 9 September 1996, 'A British view of security in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region', esp. pp. 1-2. Available at http://www.mod.uk/speeches/sofs3.htm, December 1997.
23. Portillo, 'Britain's continuing global responsibilities', p. 3 ; speech by Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Portillo: Australian Defence Force Academy, 9 September 1996, 'A British view of security in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region', esp. pp. 1-2. Available at http://www.mod.uk/speeches/sofs3.htm, December 1997.
24. For an analysis of the limits of British military capabilities, see 'Britain's stretched military and the price of influence', RUSI Newsbrief, 16: 2, 1996, pp. 89-90.
25. See e.g. Rifkind, 'Peace and stability'; Michael Clarke, 'Commentary', in The framework of United Kingdom defence policy, pp. 131-3.
26. See e.g. Rifkind, 'Peace and stability'; Michael Clarke, 'Commentary', in The framework of United Kingdom defence policy, pp. 131-3.
27. See e.g. Malcolm Rifkind, 'Nato', in The framework of United Kingdom defence policy, pp. 43-58; Portillo, 'A British view', p. 3.
28. See e.g. Malcolm Rifkind, 'Nato', in The framework of United Kingdom defence policy, pp. 43-58; Portillo, 'A British view', p. 3.
29. David Clark, 'Labour's defence and security policy', Journal of the RUSI 142: 3, 1997, p. 34.
30. On the Labour party and defence policy in the 19805, see Bruce George, The British Labour party and defense (New York: Praeger/Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1991); Dan Keohane, Labour party defence policy since 1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993).
31. On the Labour party and defence policy in the 19805, see Bruce George, The British Labour party and defense (New York: Praeger/Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1991); Dan Keohane, Labour party defence policy since 1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993).
32. See esp. Road to the manifesto: a fresh start for Britain-Labour's strategy for Britain in the modern world (London: Labour party, 1996), pp. 11-15.
33. Ministry of Defence press release 055/97, 'Britain's defence: securing our future together', 28 May 1997 (hereafter referred to as MoD). Available at http://wvvw.coi.gov.uk/coi/depts/GMD/coi9091c.uk, December 1997. It is worth noting that Robertson had been shadow Scottish Secretary and had not expected to become Defence Secretary.
34. Rumours persist that the delay between the SDR crossing Whitehall from the MoD to the Cabinet Office in March and its eventual approval by the Cabinet in July was due to Treasury problems in Cabinet committees.
35. Clark, 'Labour's defence and security policy', p. 33; MoD, p. 1.
36. MoD, pp. 2-3. Membership of the expert group was published in Essays, 1-11 to 1-12. Summaries of the seminars and details of those involved were made available on the MoD's web page. See http:// www.mod.uk/seminar-july 1997.htm#3, December 1997.
37. Essays, 1-5.
38. In his address to the March 1998 Königswinter Conference, for example, George Robertson spent considerable time endorsing and enthusing about NATO in a manner which echoed his Conservative predecessors, even to the extent of using the Conservative formula of its being 'the most successful military alliance' in (European) history. Speech by Rt Hon. George Robertson MP, Secretary of State for Defence, Königswinter Conference, 27-29 March 1998. Available at: http://www.mod.uk/speeches/ sof54-98.html, April 1998.
39. The option is discussed in 'Make do or mend?', RUSI Newsbrief 17: 4, 1997, p. 27.
40. Essays, 1-3.
41. For more details on the process, see Essays, 1-2 to 1-8.
42. George Robertson, 'The Strategic Defence Review', Journal of the RUSI 142: 5, 1997, p. 40.
43. SDR, pp. 5, 8-9.
44. SDR, p. 5.
45. Lawrence Freedman, 'The defence review-international policy options', Journal of the RUSI 142: 4, 1997, p. 40.
46. SDR, p. 2.
47. Robertson, 'The Strategic Defence Review', p. 5.
48. SDR, p. 7.
49. Malcolm Chalmers, 'The Strategic Defence Review - British policy options'Journal of the RUSI 142: 4, 1997, p. 37.
50. George Robertson, 'Building European security and the role of defence diplomacy', Speech to the English Speaking Union, 4 September 1997. Available at:http:/www.mod.uk/speeches/sofs4-9.html.
51. SDR, p. 8.
52. Keohane, Labour party defence policy, pp. 111-31.
53. Michael MccGwire, 'Is there a future for nuclear weapons?', International Affairs 70: 2, 1994, pp. 211-28; Michael Quinlan, 'The future of nuclear weapons', International Affairs 69: 3, 1993, pp. 485-96 and Thinking about nuclear weapons (London: RUSI, 1997).
54. Michael MccGwire, 'Is there a future for nuclear weapons?', International Affairs 70: 2, 1994, pp. 211-28; Michael Quinlan, 'The future of nuclear weapons', International Affairs 69: 3, 1993, pp. 485-96 and Thinking about nuclear weapons (London: RUSI, 1997).
55. Michael MccGwire, 'Is there a future for nuclear weapons?', International Affairs 70: 2, 1994, pp. 211-28; Michael Quinlan, 'The future of nuclear weapons', International Affairs 69: 3, 1993, pp. 485-96 and Thinking about nuclear weapons (London: RUSI, 1997).
56. SDR, pp. 17-18.
57. Essays, 5-7.
58. Essays, 5-1; Clark, 'Labour's defence and security policy', p. 35.
59. Essays, 5-1; Clark, 'Labour's defence and security policy', p. 35.
60. Clark, 'Labour's defence and security policy', p. 35; Robertson, 'The Strategic Defence Review', p. 2.
61. Clark, 'Labour's defence and security policy', p. 35; Robertson, 'The Strategic Defence Review', p. 2.
62. Essays, 10-1.
63. MoD press release 096/97, 'Strategic defence review seeks "smart procurement"', 30 July 1997. Available at http://www.coi.gov.uk/coi/depts/GMD/coi1281d.ok, December 1997. See also Robertson, 'The Strategic Defence Review', p. 5. One report stated that officials believed up to 10 per cent of the equipment budget (£900 million p.a.) could be saved through smart procurement. George Parker, 'Defence procurement review aims to save £M a year', Financial Times, 31 July 1997.
64. MoD press release 096/97, 'Strategic defence review seeks "smart procurement"', 30 July 1997. Available at http://www.coi.gov.uk/coi/depts/GMD/coi1281d.ok, December 1997. See also Robertson, 'The Strategic Defence Review', p. 5. One report stated that officials believed up to 10 per cent of the equipment budget (£900 million p.a.) could be saved through smart procurement. George Parker, 'Defence procurement review aims to save £M a year', Financial Times, 31 July 1997.
65. MoD press release 096/97, 'Strategic defence review seeks "smart procurement"', 30 July 1997. Available at http://www.coi.gov.uk/coi/depts/GMD/coi1281d.ok, December 1997. See also Robertson, 'The Strategic Defence Review', p. 5. One report stated that officials believed up to 10 per cent of the equipment budget (£900 million p.a.) could be saved through smart procurement. George Parker, 'Defence procurement review aims to save £M a year', Financial Times, 31 July 1997.
66. Essays, 10-2.
67. Clark, 'Labour's defence and security policy', p. 33.