Managing the hegemon: NATO under unipolarity

Security Studies

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 271-309

  Press Barnathan, Galia ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33747175088     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410600829554     Document Type: Article

References (134)

1. Although there are scholars who doubt the observation that we are living in a unipolar system, there is greater consensus that this is indeed the case. William Wohlforth has argued that the United States clearly crossed the "unipolar threshold": It possesses an impressive and wide portfolio of material capabilities and has an edge over others in every important dimension of power. See William C. Wohlforth, "U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 103-4
2. and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 54.
3. For a dissenting and interesting view regarding polarity, see Randall L. Schweller, "Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict over Scarce Resources," in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 37-42.
4. For a review of the various arguments for alliance persistence, see Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 156-79.
5. For the institutional perspective, see, for example, Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
6. For examples of the European scholarly approach, see Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence," European Foreign Affairs Review 7 (2002): 423-52
7. and Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
8. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "America as a European Hegemon," The National Interest 72 (Summer 2003): 17-29.
9. Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 10.
10. See also T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 58-59.
11. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 76-78.
12. Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 461-95
13. and Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
14. For a good review of the various approaches to intra-alliance relations, see Charles A. Kupchan, "NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior," International Organization 42, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 317-46
15. and Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).
16. For an application in Asia, see Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea," International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 261-91
17. and Victor D. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
18. The concept of a pact of restraint as a function of alliances appears in Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976): 259-77.
19. The most elaborate recent development of this concept is in Patricia A. Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 156-92
20. see also Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). Weitsman develops the concept of a "tethering alliance." Her focus, however, is on restraining relations between relatively equal states, which is not the case here. In discussions of pacts of restraint in asymmetric alliances, though, little attention has been given to the second strategy of a division of labor that is also important for restraining purposes.
21. I am not examining wartime behavior of the alliance as such, but rather how the pressures stemming from these crises influenced European strategies. On the distinction between alliance behavior during wartime and during peacetime, see Patricia A. Weitsman, "Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and Triple Entente," Security Studies 12, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 79-113.
22. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "System Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War," in Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project, ed. J. David Singer et al. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), 117.
23. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
24. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), chap. 1.
25. This logic has been challenged in the context of the Third World. Steven R. David argues that Third World leaders balance against both external and domestic threats (omnibalancing) and will therefore often align with the external power that can best help them deal with domestic threats. See Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
26. There have been several recent attempts to unbundle Walt's different sources of threat perceptions. See David Priess, "Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study," Security Studies 5, no. 4 (Summer 1996): 143-71
27. Scott Cooper, "State-Centric Balance of Threat Theory: Explaining the Misunderstood Gulf Cooperation Council," Security Studies 13, no. 2 (Winter 2003-4): 306-49
28. and F. Gregory Gause III, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf," Security Studies 13, no. 2 (Winter 2003-4): 273-305.
29. See the impressive work of Kirchner and Sperling, "The New Security Threats in Europe," 434-35.
30. Part of the gap in threat perceptions does stem from very different worldviews held by Americans and Europeans. Still, I find Robert Kagan's basic argument more convincing. European worldviews should be seen as stemming, at least partially, from European weakness. See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003). This being said, these differences still follow directly not from the unipolar structure, but rather from the particularities of the Western European unique experience.
31. Sven Biscop, "In Search of a Strategic Concept for the ESDP," European Foreign Affairs Review 7 (2002): 480-87.
32. Alfred van Staden, Kees Homan, Bert Kreemers, Alfred Pijpers, and Rob de Wijk, "Towards a European Strategic Concept," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, November 2000, 28-30.
33. For example, in 2002, 65 percent of Europeans viewed international terrorism as an extremely important threat, compared to 91 percent of Americans. Similarly, the threat of Iraq's developing WMDs was seen as extremely important by 58 percent of Europeans, as opposed to 86 percent of Americans. Conversely, more Europeans (50 percent) viewed global warming as an extremely important threat than did Americans (46 percent). See Worldviews 2002 Survey of American and European Attitudes and Public Opinion, available at http://www.worldviews.org/keyfindings/ transatlantic report.htm, accessed July 2005.
34. For the official policy perspective, see "A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy," Brussels, 12 December 2003, available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, accessed 8 August 2005.
35. These differences are clearly expressed in the comparison of the American National Security Strategy (NSS) and the European Security Strategy (ESS). See also James Sperling, "Capabilities Traps and Gaps: Symptom or Cause of a Troubled Transatlantic Relationship?" Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 3 (December 2004): 465.
36. To clarify this point, consider the fact that during the cold war, any ideological differences between Western Europe and the United States appeared minor in contrast to the communist, totalitarian ideology of the common enemy. With the demise of the Soviet Union, attention was given to what now are portrayed as the major differences in European and American liberal democratic traditions (again, Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, is a good example).
37. See James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," International Organization 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 207-33.
38. An alternative approach suggests that decisions to enter alliances are driven not by threat concerns but rather by learning from past experience. See Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Reiter discusses the choice of small states between alliance and neutrality. This is a different choice than that facing a state already within an alliance, especially in a unipolar system.
39. Biscop, "In Search of a Strategic Concept," 480.
40. Alpo M. Rusi, "Europe's Changing Security Role," in Europe's New Security Challenges, ed. Heinz Gärtner, Adrian Hyde-Price, and Erich Reiter (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 118.
41. Mearsheimer has argued that the second most common strategy other than balancing is buck-passing (and not bandwagoning). Buck-passing refers to the attempt to get another state to bear the burden of deterring or possibly fighting an aggressor. Mearsheimer examines the allure of buck-passing only in a bipolar and a multipolar system (balanced and unbalanced), and ignores the scenario of a unipolar system. Logically, if one refers only to the great powers (that is, the poles in the system), then under unipolarity only one great power exists (the hegemon), and naturally it has no one to whom to pass the buck. Once we broaden our discussion to examine the other, nonhegemonic powers in the system, however, we can reach interesting conclusions regarding buck-passing. On threats that are of interest to the hegemon, the smaller powers are likely to try to buck-pass. Yet at the same time, the hegemon may also have an incentive to encourage regional security cooperation among its allies so that, in cases of regional threats to stability, it will also have the option of buck-passing to those regional states. The hegemon's perspective, however, is not discussed in this essay. On buck-passing see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), chaps. 5 and 8.
42. Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," in Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, Imperfect Unions, 21-47.
43. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 180-82.
44. On the political dimension see Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 486-89.
45. On the political manipulation of abandonment concerns under bipolarity see also Kupchan, "NATO and the Persian Gulf," 325.
46. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 483-84
47. and Kupchan, "NATO and the Persian Gulf," 325.
48. For a dissenting view see Avery Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World," International Organization 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 47-48.
49. It is true that even under bipolarity we often heard about a European concern regarding the "de-coupling" of America's security guarantees. One can argue, however, that this was all part of the political game, whereas if a true military crisis had arrived, the structure would have driven the United States to uphold its military commitments. Snyder refers to this game under bipolarity as a truncated form of the dilemma and a concern for "pseudo-abandonment." See Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 486.
50. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"
51. and Snyder, Alliance Politics, esp. 315.
52. On the greater complexity of interaction under multipolarity, see also Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 168-70,
53. and for the more positive interpretation, see Karl Deutch and David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," World Politics 16, no. 3 (April 1964): 390-406
54. and Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137-68.
55. On the likelihood of abandonment under unipolarity, see Peter Liberman, "Ties That Blind: Will Germany and Japan Rely Too Much on the United States?"Security Studies 10, no. 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 98-138.
56. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945."
57. see also Christopher Gelpi, "Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control," in Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, Imperfect Unions, 107-39.
58. Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies" and Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances.
59. and Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances.
60. Joseph Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European and Monetary Union," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 261-308
61. Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 331.
62. For the notion of binding among more equal elements, see Daniel Deudney, "Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 213-14.
63. John Ikenberry examines the binding strategy from the perspective of the powerful state, as opposed to Grieco's and my own focus here on the smaller states' perspective, in G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
64. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 320-26.
65. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," 286-89.
66. On the hegemon's interest in developing regional cooperation for burden-sharing purposes, see Galia Press-Barnathan, Organizing theWorld: The US and Regional Cooperation in Asia and Europe (New York: Routledge, 2003).
67. For a broader framework looking at both the hegemon's and regional partners' interest in regional institution building, see Galia Press-Barnathan, "The Changing Incentives for Security Regionalization: From 11/9 to 9/11" Cooperation and Conflict 40, no. 3 (September 2005): 281-304.
68. On regional security complexes, see David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997)
69. and Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). The concept originally was developed by Buzan.
70. Joseph Lepgold, "Britain in Desert Storm: The Most Enthusiastic Junior Partner," in Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, Friends in Need, 74-75.
71. Ibid., 77-80.
72. Isabelle Grunberg, "Still a Reluctant Ally? France's Participation in the Gulf War Coalition," in Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, Friends in Need, 118, 124.
73. Ibid., 123.
74. This was the treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and the four former occupying powers (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) that was signed in September 1990 and led to the creation of a sovereign unified Germany in March 1991.
75. Gunther Hellmann, "Absorbing Shocks and Mounting Checks: Germany and Alliance Burden Sharing in the Gulf War," in Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, Friends in Need, 166-78.
76. The same argument holds for Japan, a state not discussed in this article. In both cases, however, we can see how, over time, these domestic constraints gradually lose their overwhelming power as a legitimate excuse not to share the burden. I return to this later in the German context.
77. Andrew Bennett, "Sheriff of the Posse: American Leadership in the Desert Storm Coalition," in Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, Friends in Need, 42.
78. Ibid., 42, 48, 53-54.
79. Hellman, "Absorbing Shocks and Mounting Checks," 175-76.
80. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 113, 349-50.
81. Grunberg, "Still a Reluctant Ally?" 118.
82. Ilan Greilsammer, "European Reactions to the Gulf Challenge," in The Gulf Crisis and Its Global Aftermath, ed. Gad Barzilai, Aharon Klieman, and Gil Shidlo (London: Routledge, 1993), 210-13.
83. On developments in the WEU, see Willem Fredrick van Eekelen, Debating European Security 1948-1998 (The Hague: SDU, 1998).
84. Trevor C. Salmon, "Europeans, the EC and the Gulf," in Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community, ed. James Gow (London: Centre for Defense Studies/Brassey's, 1993), 97-101
85. and Greilsammer, "European Reactions," 217-18, 225.
86. Kjell A. Eliassen, "Introduction: The New European Foreign and Security Agenda," in Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, ed. Kjell A. Eliassen (London: Sage, 1998), 5
87. and Kevin Featherstone and Roy H. Ginsberg, The United States and the European Union in the 1990s, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), 7-8.
88. Data cited in Jonathan G. Clarke, "Silver Lining: Renewed Interest in European-Run Security Institutions," in NATO's Empty War: A Postmortem on the Balkan War, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter (Washington: Cato Institute, 2000), 155.
89. Anne Deighton, "The European Union and NATO's War over Kosovo,"
90. and Alex Macleod, "France: Kosovo and the Emergence of a New European Security," in Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies? ed. Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 66, 61, 117.
91. Henry Kissinger, "U.S. Intervention in Kosovo Is a Mistake," Boston Globe, 1 March 1999, A15
92. Charles A. Kupchan, "Kosovo and the Future of U.S. Engagement in Europe: Continued Hegemony or Impending Retrenchment?" in Martin and Brawley, Alliance Politics, 77
93. and Sabrina P. Ramet, "The USA: To War in Europe Again," in The Kosovo Crisis: The Last AmericanWar in Europe? ed. Anthony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (London: Reuters, 2001), 165-72.
94. Robert P. Grant, "France's New Relations with NATO," Survival, 38 no. 1 (Spring 1996): 63-64
95. and Nicole Gnesotto, "Common European Defence and Transatlantic Relations," Survival 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 23.
96. Macleod, "France: Kosovo and the Emergence of a New European Security."
97. Louise Richardson, "A Force for Good in the World? Britain's Role in the Kosovo Crisis," in Martin and Brawley, Alliance Politics, 145-64.
98. Joylon Howorth, "Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics," European Foreign Affairs Review 5 (2000): 382-83.
99. Richard G. Whitman, "NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labor?" Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 3 (December 2004): 436.
100. Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, "Will Form Lead to Function? Institutional Enlargement and the Creation of a European Security and Defence Identity," Contemporary Security Policy 21, no. 1 (April 2000): 42.
101. The 1992 Petersburg Declaration discussed the strengthening of the Western European Union's operational role, focusing on humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making.
102. See Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: Separable but Not Separate?" NATO Review 48 (Spring-Summer 2000): 12.
103. Wesley Clark, "An Army of One?" Washington Monthly, September 2002, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/ 0209.clark.html, accessed 10 August 2005.
104. Heinz Gärtner, "European Security, the Transatlantic Links and Crisis Management," in Gärtner, Hyde-Price, and Reiter, Europe's New Security Challenges, 140. Gärtner argues that a division-of-labor strategy must be used.
105. "Our Security in a New Era," issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on 28 June 2004, commonly known as the Istanbul Declaration, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-097e.htm, accessed 30 March 2006.
106. "September 11 - One Year On: NATO's Contribution to the Fight against Terrorism," available at http://www.nato.int/terrorism/index.htm, accessed 1 April 2006.
107. Javier Solana was quoted saying, "NATO invoked its most sacred covenant...and it was useless! Absolutely useless!"
108. Cited in Martin A. Smith, "Conclusions: Where Is NATO Going?" in Where Is NATO Going? ed. Martin A. Smith, special issue, Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 3 (December 2004): 550.
109. In March 2004, serious violent clashes erupted again in Kosovo, leading to a re-enforcement of NATO's peacekeeping force (K-FOR) with 1,000 troops to control the rising tensions. Those troops were European (750 from the United Kingdom), not American.
110. On the specifics of each state's contribution see Congressional Research Service, "Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military and Intelligence Support," 17 October 2001, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6207.pdf, accessed 2 April 2006.
111. BBC News, "Germany Approves Afghan Force," 23 December 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1724276.stm, accessed 2 April 2006.
112. See http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/about/about history.htm, accessed 2 April 2006.
113. This move also exemplified the unique advantages of using NATO's pre-existing institutional arrangements to facilitate international cooperation, as well as the organization's accumulated experience in peacekeeping and crisis-response operations. This is a good example of an argument made earlier in this article: That once the alliance exists, it can provide various benefits. On ISAF see "NATO and the ISAF Mission: NATO Takes the Helm: Why NATO Now?" available at http://afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/structure_NATOISAF.htm, accessed 7 October 2003.
114. "NATO in Afghanistan (ISAF 4)," available at http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.htm, accessed 2 April 2006.
115. Liz Sly, "Rumsfeld: Bigger NATO Role Needed," Chicago Tribune, 8 September 2003, cited at http://www.twincities.com/mld/twincities/news/ world/6717006.htm, accessed 7 October 2003.
116. Gerhard Schröder, "Germany-U.S.: We Can Do More, but Only All Together," International Herald Tribune, 20 September 2003, available at http://www.iht.com/cgi-bin/ generic.cgi?template=articleprint.temlh&ArticleId=110563, accessed 13 October 2003.
117. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: U.S.-EU Summit: Afghanistan Security and Reconstruction, The Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group," 2 May 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/ U.S._EU_Lead_Afghanistan_Security_and_Reconstruction_Group.html, accessed 2 April 2006.
118. The EU is also contributing a substantial amount of money for reconstruction; it pledged $2 billion for 2002-6. For details, see "EU Aid to Afghanistan" European Union Fact sheet, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/us/sum06_03/afghan.pdf, accessed 3 August 2005.
119. See, for example, Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence,"European Foreign Affairs Review 7 (2002): 423-52
120. and Ivo H. Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism," Survival 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 147-66.
121. Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 83-91.
122. Consider the counterfactual, in which the French, for example, would have received information according to which if they did not send forces to Iraq the American campaign would actually fail, hundreds of soldiers would die during the attack, and Saddam would regain control over his country. In such a situation the decision to refuse to send forces would have been much more difficult, and the potential political cost associated with it would have been dramatically higher.
123. Stephen Castle, "Italy Brokers Deal to End EU Defence Rift," The Independent, 3 October 2003, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/story.jsp?story=449367, accessed 7 October 2003.
124. Several scholars suggested that one strategy that allies could use to influence the hegemon is to withhold cooperation. This, however, would be helpful only if the withheld cooperation can actually make a difference. See, for example, Judith Kelley, "Strategic Non-Cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq Was Not Just about Iraq" International Politics 42, no. 2 (June 2005): 153-73
125. and Jeremy Pressman, "Strategies of Resistance and the Road to Balancing," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2-5 September 2004.
126. David Calleo argued that the new Bush Doctrine would create an extremely heavy economic load on the United States. See David P. Calleo, "Power, Wealth and Wisdom: The United States and Europe after Iraq," The National Interest 72 (Summer 2003): 515.
127. Biden is cited in Douglas Jehl, "High Cost of Occupation: U.S. Weighs a U.N. Role," New York Times, Friday, 29 August 2003, A10.
128. For other examples of public congressional criticism of the mounting costs, see Felicity Barringer with Steven R. Weisman, "U.S. Will Ask U.N. to Back Control by Allies in Iraq," New York Times, 9 May 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/09/international/ worldspecial/09DIPL.html, accessed 12 May 2003
129. Eric Schmitt, "Senators Sharply Criticize Iraq Rebuilding Efforts," New York Times, 22 May 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/23/international/worldspecial/23PENT.html, accessed 24 May 2003
130. "Fuzzy Math on Iraq," editorial, New York Times, 27 April 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/27/opinion/27SUNI.html, accessed 27 April 2003
131. and David E. Sanger and David Firestone, "Bush Looks to U.N. to Share Burden on Troops in Iraq," New York Times, 2 September 2003, available at http://nytimes.com/2003/09/03/international/middleeast/ 03PREX.html, accessed 6 September 2003.
132. Felicity Barringer, "Unanimous Vote by U.N.'s Council Adopts Iraq Plan," New York Times, 17 October 2003, available at http://nytimes.com/2003/10/17/international/middleeast/17NATI.html, accessed 19 October 2003.
133. On the congressional vote, see David Firestone, "Lawmakers Back Request by Bush on Funds for Iraq." New York Times, 18 October 2003, available at http://nytimes.com/2003/10/18/international/ middleeast/18COST.html, accessed 19 October 2003.
134. Elaine Sciolino, "NATO Agrees on Modest Plan for Training Iraqi Forces," New York Times, 23 February 2005, A7.