The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 390-413

  Lamy, Laurent ^a  

^a PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Auctions; Externalities; Linkage Principle; Shill bidding

Indexed keywords

EID: 57349155012     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.001     Document Type: Article

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