Bribery and favoritism by auctioneers in sealed-bid auctions

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2007, Pages

  Burguet, Roberto ^a   Perry, Martin K ^b  

^a Barcelona)   (Spain)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Bribery; Favoritism

Indexed keywords

EID: 35648971207     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351704     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1219     Document Type: Article

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