Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 117, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 78-95

  Caillaud, Bernard ^a,b   Mezzetti, Claudio ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Participation; Ratchet effect; Repeated auctions; Reserve price

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142687491     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.002     Document Type: Article

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