Optimality and robustness of the English auction

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 219-240

  Lopomo, Giuseppe ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035180687     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0817     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. "Equilibria in Open Common Value Auctions"
2. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions"
3. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions"
4. Auctions and Auctioneering
5. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem"
6. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and All-Pay Auction"
7. "The English Auction Is Optimal among Simple Sequential Auctions"
8. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers"
9. "Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes"
10. "Auctions and Bidding"
11. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design"
12. "The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey"
13. "Auction Theory"
14. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding"
15. "Optimal Auction Design"
16. "Ex Post information in Auctions"
17. "Optimal Auctions"