Auctions with shill bidding

Economic Theory

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 271-287

  Chakraborty, Indranil ^a   Kosmopoulou, Georgia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Seller participation; Shill bidding

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142781948     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0423-y     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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