All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 114, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 170-177

  Blume, Andreas ^a   Heidhues, Paul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

Reserve price; Second price sealed bid auction; Uniqueness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347031432     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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