Mechanism design with collusive supervision

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 69-95

  Celik, Gorkem ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Collusion; Delegation; Mechanism design; Supervision

Indexed keywords

EID: 57349152124     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.006     Document Type: Article

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