Exit option in hierarchical agency

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 8-9, 2004, Pages 1265-1287

  Kim, Doyoung ^a   Lawarrée, Jacques ^b,c   Shin, Dongsoo ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^c ECARES   (Belgium)

^d SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication; Contract; Exit option

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; CONTRACTS; HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS; MANAGERS; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

CONTRACT THEORY; EXIT OPTION; HIERARCHIAL AGENCY;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 9944232518     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.06.005     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Aghion, P., Tirole, J., 1997. Formal and real authority in organizations. Journal of Political Economy 105, 1-29.
2. Almazan, A., Suarez, J., 2003. Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal governance structures. Journal of Finance 58, 519-547.
3. American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 1992. Withdrawal when a lawyer's services will otherwise be used to perpetrate a fraud. Opinion 92-366, August 8, 1992.
4. Baron, D., Besanko, D., 1992. Information, control, and organizational structure. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1, 237-275.
5. Bebchuk, L., Fried, J., 2003. Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 71-92.
6. Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M., 1994. The firm as a communication network. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 809-839.
7. Cooper, R., Ross, T., 1985. Product warranties and double moral hazard. Rand Journal of Economics 16, 103-113.
8. Dewatripont, M., Legros, P., Matthews, S., 2003. Moral hazard and capital structure dynamics. Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 890-930.
9. Friebel, G., Raith, M., 2004. Abuse of authority and hierarchical communication. Rand Journal of Economics 35, 224-244.
10. Hirschman, A., 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
11. Innes, R., 1990. Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices. Journal of Economic Theory 52, 45-67.
12. Jovanovic, B., 1979. Job matching and the theory of turnover. Journal of Political Economy 87, 972-990.
13. Kim, S., 1997. Limited liability and bonus contracts. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 6, 899-913.
14. Kofman, A., Lawarrée, J., 1993. Collusion in hierarchical agency. Econometrica 61, 629-656.
15. Laffont, J.-J., Martimort, D., 1997. Collusion under asymmetric information. Econometrica 65, 875-911.
16. Laffont, J.-J., Martimort, D., 1998. Collusion and delegation. Rand Journal of Economics 29, 280-305.
17. Laffont, J.-J., Meleu, M., 1997. Reciprocal supervision, collusion and organizational design. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 99, 519-540.
18. Laux, C., 2001. Limited liability and incentive contracting with multiple projects. Rand Journal of Economics 32, 514-526.
19. Lawarrée, J., Van Audenrode, M., 1996. Optimal contract imperfect output observation, and limited liability. Journal of Economic Theory 71, 514-531.
20. Mann, D., Wissink, J., 1990. Money-back warranties vs. replacement warranties. American Economic Review 80, 432-436.
21. Mintzberg, H., 1979. The Structuring of Organizations. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
22. Moorthy, S., Srinivasan, K., 1995. Signaling quality with a money-back guarantee: the role of transaction costs. Marketing Science 14, 442-466.
23. Polinsky, M., Shavell, S., 1979. The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines. American Economic Review 69, 880-891.
24. Radner, R., 1993. The organization of decentralized information processing. Econometrica 61, 1109-1146.
25. Tirole, J., 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2, 181-214.
26. Sappington, D., 1983. Limited liability contracts between the principal and agent Journal of Economic Theory 29, 1-21.
27. Wood, S., 2001. Remote purchase environments: the influence of return policy leniency on two-stage decision processes. Journal of Marketing Research 38, 157-169.