The value of information and optimal organization

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 238-265

  Severinov, Sergei ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44249091168     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00012.x     Document Type: Article

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