Collusion in auctions with externalities

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 680-702

  Caillaud, Bernard ^a   Jéhiel, Philippe ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041193227     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2556089     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. CAILLAUD, B., GUESNERIE, R., REY, P., AND TIROLE, J. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19 (1988), pp. 1-26.
2. CRAMTON, P.C. AND PALFREY, T.R. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs." International Economic Review, Vol. 31 (1990), pp. 17-47.
3. _ AND _. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement." Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 10 (1995), pp. 255-283.
4. _, GIBBONS, R., AND KLEMPERER, P. "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently." Econometrica, Vol. 55 (1987), pp. 615-632.
5. FUDENBERG, D. AND TIROLE, J. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 53 (1991), pp. 236-260.
6. GRAHAM, D.A. AND MARSHALL, R.C. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95 (1987), pp. 1217-1239.
7. _, _, AND RICHARD, J.-F. "Differential Payments Within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value." American Economic Review, Vol. 80 (1990), pp. 493-510.
8. GUESNERIE, R. AND LAFFONT, J.-J. "A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm." Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 25 (1984), pp. 329-369.
9. JEHIEL, P. AND MOLDOVANU, B. "Strategic Nonparticipation." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27 (1996), pp. 84-98.
10. _, _, AND STACCHETTI, E. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons." American Economic Review, Vol. 86 (1996), pp. 814-829.
11. JULLIEN, B. "Adverse Selection with Type-Dependent Reservation Utilities." Mimeo, CREST, ENSAE, 1993.
12. KIHLSTROM, R. AND VIVES, X. "Collusion by Asymmetrically Informed Firms." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 1 (1992), pp. 371-396.
13. LAFFONT, J-J. AND MARTIMORT, D. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information." Econometrica, Vol. 65 (1997), pp. 875-912.
14. MAILATH, G.J. AND ZEMSKY, P. "Collusion in Second Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders." Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 3 (1991), pp. 467-486.
15. MCAFEE, R.P. AND MCMILLAN, J. "Bidding Rings." American Economic Review, Vol. 82 (1992), pp. 579-599.
16. MYERSON, R.B. "Optimal Auction Design." Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 6 (1981), pp. 58-73.
17. _ AND SATTERTHWAITE, M. A. "Efficient Mechanism for Bilateral Trading." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 29 (1983), pp. 265-281.
18. PALFREY, T.B. AND SRIVASTAVA, S. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97 (1989), pp. 668-691.
19. PORTER, R. AND ZONA, D. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101 (1993), pp. 518-538.
20. WORLD BANK. World Development Report 1994: An Infrastructure for Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.