On some agency costs of intermediated contracting

Economics Letters

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 75-82

  Faure Grimaud, Antoine ^a   Martimort, David ^b  

^a Interdisc Inst Mgmt FMG London S   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE PAU ET DES PAYS DE L'ADOUR   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; D23; D82; Delegation; Intermediation; Transaction cost

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035580884     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00398-0     Document Type: Article

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