A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs

Annals of Economics and Finance

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 231-263

  Faure Grimaud, Antoine ^a   Laffont, Jean Jacques ^b   Martimort, David ^c  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

^c TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Collusion; Endogenous transaction costs; Soft information; Supervision

Indexed keywords

EID: 84994225606     PISSN: 15297373     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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