ICE: An expressive iterative combinatorial exchange

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 33, Issue , 2008, Pages 33-77

  Lubin, Benjamin ^a   Juda, Adam I ^a   Cavallo, Ruggiero ^a   Lahaie, Sébastien ^a   Shneidman, Jeffrey ^a   Parkes, David C ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING;

BIDDING LANGUAGES; BIDDING STRATEGY; DESIGN AND ANALYSIS; LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS; PARTIAL INFORMATION; PREFERENCE ELICITATION; PRICE DISCOVERY; REVEALED PREFERENCE;

COMMERCE;

EID: 55349132741     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2440     Document Type: Article

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