Effectiveness of query types and policies for preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004

Volumn 1, Issue , 2004, Pages 386-393

  Hudson, Benoît ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BIDDING LANGUAGES; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; OPTIMAL ALLOCATION;

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 4544233394     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (22)

1. A. Andersson, M. Tenhunen, and F. Ygge. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination. ICMAS, 2000.
2. A. Blum, J. Jackson, T. Sandholm, and M. Zinkevich. Preference elicitation and query learning. COLT, 2003.
3. W. Conen and T. Sandholm. Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions: Extended abstract. ACM-EC, 2001.
4. W. Conen and T. Sandholm. Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions. AIAA, 2002.
5. V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and P. Santi. Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations. Draft, Oct. 2003.
6. Y. Fujishima, K. Leyton-Brown, and Y. Shoham. Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches. IJCAI, 1999.
7. H. Hoos and C. Boutilier. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. IJCAI, 2001.
8. S. Lahaie and D. Parkes. Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation. ACM-EC, 2004.
9. K. Larson and T. Sandholm. Costly valuation computation in auctions. TARK VIII, 2001.
10. K. Leyton-Brown, M. Pearson, and Y. Shoham. Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms. ACM-EC, 2000.
11. N. Nisan. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. ACM-EC, 2000.
12. N. Nisan and I. Segal. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting Lindahl prices, 2003. Working Paper (version: March 2003).
13. D. C. Parkes. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce Workshop at IJCAI, 1999.
14. D. C. Parkes and L. Ungar. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. AAAI, 2000.
15. M. H. Rothkopf, T. J. Teisberg, and E. P. Kahn. Why are Vickrey auctions rare? Journal of Political Economy, 98(1):94-109, 1990.
16. T. Sandholm. An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal cost calculations. AAAI, 1993.
17. T. Sandholm. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 135:1-54, Jan. 2002.
18. T. Sandholm. eMediator: A next generation electronic commerce server. Computational Intelligence, 18(4):656-676, 2002. Special issue on Agent Technology for Electronic Commerce.
19. P. Santi, V. Conitzer, and T. Sandholm. Towards a characterization of polynomial preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions. COLT, 2004.
20. T. Smith, T. Sandholm, and R. Simmons. Constructing and clearing combinatorial exchanges using preference elicitation. AAAI-02 workshop on Preferences in AI and CP: Symbolic Approaches, 2002.
21. P. R. Wurman and M. P. Wellman. AkBA: A progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction. ACM-EC, 2000.
22. M. Zinkevich, A. Blum, and T. Sandholm. On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries. ACM-EC, 2003.