On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 132, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 95-118

  de Vries, Sven ^a   Schummer, James ^b   Vohra, Rakesh V ^b  

^a TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Duality; Primal dual algorithm; Subgradient algorithm; Vickrey auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845569852     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010     Document Type: Article

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