Social and individual learning of helping in humans and other species

Trends in Ecology and Evolution

Volumn 23, Issue 12, 2008, Pages 664-671

  Lehmann, Laurent ^a   Foster, Kevin R ^b   Borenstein, Elhanan ^a   Feldman, Marcus W ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EUSOCIALITY; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; HUMAN EVOLUTION; LEARNING;

ANIMAL; ARTICLE; COOPERATION; HEREDITY; HUMAN; LEARNING;

ANIMALS; HELPING BEHAVIOR; HEREDITY; HUMANS; LEARNING;

EID: 55249099971     PISSN: 01695347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tree.2008.07.012     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. Smith A. The Wealth of Nations (1776), Penguin Classics
2. Darwin C.R. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: Or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859), John Murray
3. Haldane J.B.S. The Causes of Evolution (1932), Princeton University Press
4. Hamilton W.D. The genetical evolution of social behaviour, I. J. Theor. Biol. 7 (1964) 1-16
5. Dixon T. The Invention of Altruism: Making Moral Meanings in Victorian Britain (2008), Oxford University Press
6. Hamilton W.D. Selfish and spiteful behavior in an evolutionary model. Nature 228 (1970) 1218-1220
7. Hamilton W.D. Selection of selfish and altruistic behaviour in some extreme models. In: Eisenberg J., and Dillon W. (Eds). Man and Beast: Comparative Social Behavior (1971), Smithsonian Institution Press 59-91
8. Grafen A. A geometric view of relatedness. In: Dawkins R., and Ridley M. (Eds). Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology (1985), Oxford University Press 28-90
9. Rousset F. Genetic Structure and Selection in Subdivided Populations (2004), Princeton University Press
10. Bshary R., and Bergmüller R. Distinguishing four fundamental approaches to the evolution of helping. J. Evol. Biol. 21 (2007) 405-420
11. Alcock J. Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach (2005), Sinauer Associates
12. Dugatkin L.A. Principles of Animal Behavior (2004), W.W. Norton
13. Enquist M., and Ghirlanda S. Neural Networks and Animal Behavior (2005), Princeton University Press
14. Selten R. Evolution, learning, and economic behavior. Games Econ. Behav. 3 (1991) 3-24
15. Binmore K. Why do people cooperate?. Polit. Philos. Econ. 5 (2006) 81-96
16. Binmore K. Natural Justice (2005), Oxford University Press
17. Frank S.A. Foundations of Social Evolution (1998), Princeton University Press
18. In: Keller L. (Ed). Levels of Selection (1999), Princeton University Press
19. Bourke A., and Franks N. Social Evolution in Ants (1995), Princeton University Press
20. Crespi B.J. The evolution of social behavior in microorganisms. Trends Ecol. Evol. 16 (2001) 178-183
21. Michod R.E. The theory of kin selection. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 13 (1982) 23-55
22. West S.A., et al. Evolutionary explanations for cooperation. Curr. Biol. 17 (2007) 661-672
23. Lion S., and van Baalen M. Self-structuring in spatial evolutionary ecology. Ecol. Lett. 11 (2007) 277-295
24. Trivers R.L. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46 (1971) 35-57
25. Axelrod R., and Hamilton W.D. The evolution of cooperation. Science 211 (1981) 1390-1396
26. Luce R.D., and Raiffa H. Games and Decisions (1957), John Wiley and Sons
27. Friedman M. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Rev. Econ. Stud. 38 (1971) 1-12
28. Fudenberg D., and Tirole J. Game Theory (1996), MIT Press
29. Axelrod R. Effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. J. Conflict Resolut. 24 (1980) 3-25
30. McElreath R., and Boyd R. Mathematical Models of Social Evolution: A Guide for the Perplexed (2007), University of Chicago Press
31. Fudenberg D., and Maskin E. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54 (1986) 533-554
32. Osborne J.M., and Rubinstein A. A Course in Game Theory (1994), MIT Press
33. Leimar O. Repeated games: a state space approach. J. Theor. Biol. 184 (1997) 471-498
34. Binmore K., et al. Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games. J. Econ. Theory 80 (1997) 257-291
35. Roberts G., and Sherrat T.N. Development of cooperative relationship through increasing investment. Nature 9 (1998) 175-179
36. McNamara J. Incorporating rules for responding into evolutionary games. Nature 401 (1999) 368-371
37. Ohtsuki H., and Iwasa Y. How should we define goodness? Reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 231 (2004) 107-120
38. Nowak M.A., and Sigmund K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature 437 (2005) 1291-1298
39. Cavalli-Sforza L.L. Similarities and dissimilarities of sociocultural and biological evolution. In: Hodson F.R., et al. (Ed). Mathematics in the Archeological and Historical Sciences (1971), Edinburgh University Press 535-541
40. Cavalli-Sforza L., and Feldman M.W. Cultural Transmission and Evolution (1981), Princeton University Press
41. Lumsden C.J., and Wilson E.O. Genes, Mind and Culture (1981), Harvard University Press
42. Boyd R., and Richerson P.J. Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1985), University of Chicago Press
43. Hofbauer J., and Sigmund K. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (1998), Cambridge University Press
44. Boyd R., et al. The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 100 (2003) 3531-3535
45. Hauert C., and Doebeli M. Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game. Nature 428 (2004) 643-646
46. Henrich J. Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 53 (2004) 3-35
47. Ellison G., and Fudenberg D. Rules of thumb for social learning. J. Polit. Econ. 110 (1993) 612-643
48. Bergin J. Microeconomics Theory: A Concise Course (2005), Oxford University Press
49. Kandori M., et al. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61 (1993) 29-56
50. Young H.P. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61 (1993) 57-84
51. Binmore K., et al. Musical chairs: modeling noisy evolution. Games Econ. Behav. 11 (1995) 1-35
52. Nowak M., et al. Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game. Science 289 (2000) 1773-1775
53. Hofbauer J., and Sigmund K. Evolutionary game dynamics. Bull. Am. Math. Soc. 40 (2003) 479-519
54. Boyd R., and Richerson P.J. Cultural transmission and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Hum. Ecol. 10 (1982) 325-351
55. Allison P.D. Cultural relatedness under oblique and horizontal transmission. Ethol. Sociobiol. 13 (1991) 153-169
56. Henrich J., and Boyd R. The evolution of conformist transmission and the emergence of between-group differences. Evol. Hum. Behav. 19 (1998) 215-241
57. Boyd R., and Richerson P.J. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures (2005), Oxford University Press
58. Fehr E., and Fischbacher U. The nature of human altruism. Nature 425 (2003) 785-791
59. Gintis H. A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences. Behav. Brain Sci. 30 (2007) 1-61
60. Lehmann L., et al. Cultural transmission can inhibit the evolution of altruistic helping. Am. Nat. 172 (2008) 12-24
61. Lehmann L., and Feldman M.W. The co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping and cultural transmission under random group formation. Theor. Popul. Biol. 73 (2008) 506-516
62. Harley C.B. Learning the evolutionary stable strategy. J. Theor. Biol. 89 (1981) 611-633
63. McNamara J.M., and Houston A.I. Optimal foraging and learning. J. Theor. Biol. 117 (1985) 231-249
64. Camerer C., and Ho T. Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form game. Econometrica 67 (1999) 827-874
65. Giraldeau L., and Caraco T. Social Foraging Theory (2000), Princeton University Press
66. Börger T., and Rajiv S. Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics. J. Econ. Theory 77 (1997) 1-14
67. Binmore K. Modeling rational players: part 1. Econ. Philos. 3 (1987) 179-214
68. Binmore K. Modeling rational players: part 2. Econ. Philos. 4 (1988) 9-55
69. Hanaki N., et al. Learning strategies. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 56 (2005) 523-542
70. Rubinstein A. Modeling Bounded Rationality (1998), MIT Press
71. Mailath G. Do people play Nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game theory. J. Econ. Lit. 36 (1998) 1347-1374
72. Maynard-Smith J. Evolution and the Theory of Games (1982), Cambridge University Press
73. Borenstein E., et al. Evolution of learning in fluctuating environments: when selection favors both social and exploratory individuals. Evolution Int. J. Org. Evolution 62 (2008) 586-602
74. Kolb B., and Whishaw I.Q. An Introduction to Brain and Behavior (2005), Worth Publishers
75. Binmore K., and Swierzbinski J. A little behavioralism can go a long way. In: Binmore K. (Ed). Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge (2006), MIT Press 257-276
76. Ledyard J. Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel J., and Roth A. (Eds). The Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995), Princeton University Press 111-181
77. Sally D. Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: a meta-analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality Soc. 7 (1995) 58-92
78. Andreoni J. Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. J. Public Econ. 37 (1988) 291-304
79. Henrich J., et al. 'Economic man' in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behav. Brain Sci. 28 (2005) 795-855
80. Gintis H. Solving the puzzle of prosociality. Rationality Soc. 15 (2003) 155-187
81. Gintis H., et al. Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. Evol. Hum. Behav. 24 (2003) 153-172
82. Fehr E., et al. Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Hum. Nat. 13 (2002) 1-25
83. Hagen E.H., and Hammerstein P. Game theory and human evolution: a critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games. Theor. Popul. Biol. 69 (2006) 339-348
84. Gale J., et al. Learning to be imperfect: the ultimatum game. Games Econ. Behav. 8 (1995) 56-90
85. Crockett M.J., et al. Serotonin modulates behavioral reactions to unfairness. Science 320 (2008) 1739
86. Getty T. In evolutionary games, enlightened self-interests are still ultimately self-interests. Behav. Brain Sci. 30 (2007) 25-26
87. Leimar O. Evolutionary change and darwinian demons. Selection 2 (2001) 65-72
88. Richerson P.J., and Boyd R. Not by Genes Alone (2005), University of Chicago Press
89. McFarland D., and Houston A. Quantitative Ethology: The State Space Approach (1981), Pitman