Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 257-291

  Binmore, Ken ^a   Piccione, Michele ^b   Samuelson, Larry ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002631398     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2387     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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