Repeated games: A state space approach

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 184, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 471-498

  Leimar, Olof ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL DOMINANCE; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

EID: 0031581810     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.1996.0286     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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