The theory of implementation of social choice rules

SIAM Review

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 377-414

  Serrano, Roberto ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Complete and incomplete information; Decentralization; Dominance; Game theory; Implementation theory; Mechanism design; Monotonicity; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; DECENTRALIZATION; DOMINANCE; IMPLEMENTATION THEORY; MECHANISM DESIGN; MONOTONICITY; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

BENCHMARKING; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION RETRIEVAL; PROBLEM SOLVING; STRUCTURAL DESIGN;

SOCIAL ASPECTS;

EID: 4944234036     PISSN: 00361445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/S0036144503435945     Document Type: Review

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