Interactive Implementation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 38-63

  Baliga, Sandeep ^a   Sjöström, Tomas ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346498265     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0671     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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2. Baliga, S. 1993, Uncertainty in Implementation and Bargaining, Harvard.
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4. Baliga, S. Sjöström, T. 1996, Interactive Implementation, Harvard Institute of Economic Research.
5. Chakravorty B., Corchon L., Wilkie S. Credible Implementation. Games Econ. Behav. 1997.
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9. Moore J. Implementation, Contracts and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information. Laffont J.-J. Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. 1992;Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
10. Moore J., Repullo R. Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization. Econometrica. 58:1990;1083-1100.
11. Palfrey T. Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium. Laffont J.-J. Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. 1992;Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
12. Palfrey T., Srivastava S. Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies. Econometrica. 57:1989;115-134.
13. Posner, R. A. 1993, What do Judges and Justices Maximize?, University of Chicago Law School.
14. Postlewaite A., Schmeidler D. Implementation in Differential Information Economies. J. Econ. Theory. 39:1986;14-33.
15. Schwartz A. Legal Contract Theories and Incomplete Contracts. Werin L., Wijkander H. Contract Economics. 1992;Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
16. Sjöström T. On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation. Social Choice Welfare. 8:1991;333-340.