Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 89-103

  Barberà, Salvador ^a   Bogomolnaia, Anna ^a   Van Der Stel, Hans ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Lotteries; Smoothness; Social choice rules; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003192620     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00043-7     Document Type: Article

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