Strategy-proof social choice correspondences

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 101, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 374-394

  Barberà, Salvador ^a   Dutta, Bhaskar ^b   Sen, Arunava ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035700561     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2782     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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4. Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
5. Voting by committees
6. "Strategy-proofness for Correspondences and Lotteries"
7. "Multi-Valued Strategy-Proof Social Choice Rules"
8. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
9. Nonmanipulable multi-valued social decision functions
10. Manipulation and the Pareto rule
11. Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules, KYKLOS
12. On definitions of manipulation of social choice functions
13. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result
14. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance
15. "Three Simple Proofs of Arrow's Theorem"
16. Strategy-proofness and social choice functions without single-valuedness
17. "Replacement-Domination for the Provision of Multiple Public Goods as Options"
18. On the stability of sincere voting situations
19. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions