Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 247-282

  Cabrales, Antonio ^a,b   Ponti, Giovanni ^b,c  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Implementation theory; evolutionary dynamics; bounded rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001111577     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/redy.1999.0082     Document Type: Article

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