Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 102, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 421-436

  Benoît, Jean Pierre ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Gibbard; Lotteries; Satterthwaite; Social choice; Strategyproofness; Ties

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036190387     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2794     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Strategy-proofness and pivotal voters: A direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
2. The manipulation of social choice mechanisms that do not leave too much to chance
3. Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
4. Strategyproof social choice correspondences
5. Voting by committees
6. Social choice in a representative democracy
7. Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
8. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
9. "Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem"
10. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
11. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance
12. "Strategy and Group Choice"
13. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions