Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 222-256

  Bergin, James ^a   Sen, Arunava ^b  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039498607     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2388     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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