A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 312-331

  Serrano, Roberto ^a   Vohra, Rajiv ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian monotonicity; Incentive compatibility; Maskin monotonicity; Type diversity; Virtual Bayesian implementation; Virtual monotonicity

Indexed keywords

EID: 11244271866     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.003     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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