Multiple systems in decision making

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

Volumn 1128, Issue , 2008, Pages 53-62

  Sanfey, Alan G ^a   Chang, Luke J ^a  

^a University of Arizona   (United States)

Author keywords

Brain; Decision making; Dual processing; Multiple systems; Neural; Neuroeconomics

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIOR; COGNITION; CONFERENCE PAPER; CONSCIOUSNESS; DECISION MAKING; EVIDENCE BASED MEDICINE; HEALTH ECONOMICS; LEARNING; NERVE CELL; NEUROECONOMICS; UNCONSCIOUSNESS;

EID: 43249129570     PISSN: 00778923     EISSN: 17496632     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1196/annals.1399.007     Document Type: Conference Paper

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