Additional evidence on the association between director stock ownership and incentive compensation

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 21-44

  Chen, Chih Ying ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Agency cost; Corporate governance; Director ownership; Incentive compensation; Investment opportunities

Indexed keywords

EID: 39449120730     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1015726224797     Document Type: Article

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