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Volumn 67, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 305-349

Executive rank, pay and project selection

Author keywords

Agency theory; Executive compensation; Incentive pay

Indexed keywords


EID: 0037292710     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00254-4     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (56)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.