The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in high R&D firms

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 313-336

  Cui, Huimin ^a   Mak, Y T ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Firm performance; High tech firms; Managerial ownership; Tobin's Q, R D

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036346607     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00047-5     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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25. Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia
26. Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings