Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 420-427

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational social choice; Preference elicitation; Single peaked preferences; Voting

Indexed keywords

AGGREGATE RANKINGS; COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE; GENERAL METHODS; MULTIPLE AGENTS; PREFERENCE ELICITATION; SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES; SUBLINEAR; VOTING;

AGENTS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; FUZZY CLUSTERING;

DECISION THEORY;

EID: 60349102716     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1329125.1329204     Document Type: Conference Paper

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