Direct reciprocity on graphs

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 247, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 462-470

  Ohtsuki, Hisashi ^a,b   Nowak, Martin A ^b,c  

^a KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Direct reciprocity; Evolution of cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary graph theory; Network reciprocity

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; GRAPHICAL METHOD; RECIPROCITY; SOCIAL NETWORK;

ANALYTICAL ERROR; ARTICLE; BIRTH; COOPERATION; DEATH; EVOLUTION; EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY; GAME; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; SOCIAL NETWORK;

ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; CULTURAL EVOLUTION; HUMANS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; STATISTICS;

EID: 34250637549     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.018     Document Type: Article

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