Games and mechanism design in machine scheduling-an introduction

Production and Operations Management

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 437-454

  Heydenreich, Birgit ^a   Müller, Rudolf ^a   Uetz, Marc ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Game theory; Incentive compatible pricing; Mechanism design; Production planning; Sequencing

Indexed keywords

EID: 34948816717     PISSN: 10591478     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00271.x     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. Ambrosio, P., V. Auletta. 2005. Deterministic monotone algorithms for scheduling on related machines. G. Persiano and R. SolisOba, eds. Approximation and Online Algorithms, Vol. 3351 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 267-280. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
2. Andelman, N., Y. Azar, M. Sorani. 2005. Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines. V. Diekert and B. Durand, eds. STACS 2005, 22nd Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Vol. 3404 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 69-82. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
3. Angel, E., E. Bampis, F. Pascual. 2005. Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines. X. Deng and Y. Ye, eds. Internet and Network Economics, Vol. 3828 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 698-707. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
4. Archer, A., E. Tardos. 2001. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 482-491. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA.
5. Aspnes, J., Y. Azar, A. Fiat, S. Plotkin, O. Waarts. 1997. On-line routing of virtual circuits with applications to load balancing and machine scheduling. Journal of the ACM 44 486-504.
6. Auletta, V., R. De Prisco, P. Penna, G. Persiano. 2004. Deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling related machines. V. Diekert and M. Habib, eds. STACS 2004, 21sf Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Vol. 2996 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 608-619. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
7. Ausubel, L., P. Milgrom. 2006. The lovely but lonely vickrey auction. P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, eds. Combinatorial Auctions, pp. 17-40. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
8. Baruah, S., G. Koren, D. Mao, B. Mishra, A. Raghunathan, L. Rosier, D. Shasha, F. Wang. 1992. On the competitiveness of on-line real-time task scheduling. Journal of Real-Time Systems 4(2) 125-144.
9. Bikhchandani, S., S. Chatterjee, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan, A. Sen. 2006. Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation. Econometrica 74 1109-1132.
10. Bikhchandani, S., S. Chatterji, A. Sen. 2004, September. Incentive compatibility in multiunit auctions. Working Paper, The Anderson School at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA.
11. Briest, P., P. Krysta, B. Vöcking. 2005. Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, New York, pp. 39-48. ACM, New York.
12. Christodoulou, G., E. Koutsoupias, A. Nanavati. 2004. Coordination mechanisms. Automata, Languages and Programming, Vol. 3142 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 345-357. Springer, Berlin.
13. Clarke, E. H. 1971. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11 17-33.
14. Cole, R., Y. Dodis, T. Roughgarden. 2006. How much can taxes help selfish routing? Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 444-467.
15. Correa, J. R., M. R. Wagner. 2005. LP-based online scheduling: from single to parallel machines. M. Jünger and V. Kaibel, eds. Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization, Vol. 3509 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 196-209. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
16. Cramton, P., Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, eds. 2006. Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
17. Czumaj, A. 2004. Selfish routing on the internet. J. Leung, ed. Handbook of Scheduling: Algorithms, Models, and Performance Analysis, Chap. 42. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
18. Czumaj, A., B. Vöcking. 2002. Tight bounds for the worst-case equilibria. Proceedings of the 13th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 413-420. ACM-SIAM, Philadelphia, PA.
19. Finn, G., E. Horowitz. 1979. A linear time approximation algorithm for multiprocessor scheduling. BIT Numerical Mathematics 19 312-320.
20. Graham, R. 1966. Bounds for certain multiprocessing anomalies. Bell System Technical Journal 45 1563-1581. (published 1969).
21. Groves, T. 1973. Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41 617-631.
22. Gui, H., R. Müller, R. Vohra. 2004, October. Dominant strategy mechanisms with multidimensional types. Discussion Paper 1392, The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics & Management Sciences, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
23. Heydenreich, B., R. Müller, M. Uetz. 2006. Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling. L. Arge and R. Freivalds, eds. Algorithm Theory-SWAT 2006, Vol. 4059 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 136-147. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
24. Ibarra, O., C. Kim. 1977. Heuristic algorithms for scheduling independent tasks on nonidentical processors. Journal of the ACM 24(2) 280-289.
25. Immorlica, N., L. Li, V. S. Mirrokni, A. Schulz. 2005. Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling. X. Deng and Y. Ye, eds. Internet and Network Economics, Vol. 3828 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 55-69. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
26. Kawaguchi, T., S. Kyan. 1986. Worst case bound of an LRF schedule for the mean weighted flow-time problem. SIAM Journal on Computing 15 1119-1129.
27. Kittsteiner, T., B. Moldovanu. 2005. Priority auctions and queue disciplines that depend on processing time. Management Science 51 236-248.
28. Koren, G., D. Shasha. 1995. D-over: An optimal on-line scheduling algorithm for overloaded real-time systems. SIAM Journal on Computing 24 318-339.
29. Koutsoupias, E., C. Papadimitriou. 1999. Worst-case equilibria. C. Meinel and S. Tison, eds. STACS 1999, 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Vol. 1563 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 404-413. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
30. Kovacs, A. 2005. Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines. G. S. Brodal and S. Leonardi, eds. Algorithms-ESA 2005, Vol. 3669 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 616-627. Springer, Berlin, Germany.
31. Kreipl, S., M. Pinedo. 2004. Planning and scheduling supply chains: An overview of issues in practice. Production and Operations Management 13 77-92.
32. Lavi, R., A. Mu′alem, N. Nisan. 2003. Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions. Proceedings of the 44th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 574-583. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA.
33. Lawler, E. L., J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, D. B. Shmoys. 1993. Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. Logistics of Production and Inventory, Vol. 4 of Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, pp. 445-522. NorthHolland, Amsterdam.
34. Megow, N., M. Uetz, T. Vredeveld. 2006. Models and algorithms for stochastic online scheduling. Mathematics of Operations Research 31 513-525.
35. Mitra, M. 2001. Mechanism design in queueing problems. Economic Theory 17 277-305.
36. Mitra, M. 2005. Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems. European Journal of Operational Research 165 251-266.
37. Monderer, D., L. S. Shapley. 1996. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior 14 124-143.
38. Nisan, N., A. Ronen. 2000. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 242-252. ACM, New York.
39. Nisan, N., A. Ronen. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior 35 166-196.
40. Owen, G. 1995. Game theory (third ed.). Academic Press, San Diego, CA.
41. Porter, R. 2004. Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling. J. S. Breese, J. Feigenbaum, and M. I. Seltzer, eds. Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 61-70. ACM, New York.
42. Pruhs, K., J. Sgall, E. Tomg. 2004. Online scheduling. J. Y.-T. Leung, ed. Handbook of Scheduling, Chap. 15. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
43. Roberts, K. 1979. The characterization of implementable choice rules. J.-J. Laffont, ed. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
44. Rochet, J.-C. 1987. A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context. Journal of Mathematical Economics 16 191-200.
45. Ronen, A. 2006. Incentive compatibility in computationally feasible combinatorial auctions. P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, eds. Combinatorial Auctions, pp. 369-394. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
46. Rosenthal, R. W. 1973. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory 2 65-67.
47. Roth, A., M. A. O. Sotomayor, A. Chesher, eds. 1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
48. Roughgarden, T. 2004. Stackelberg scheduling strategies. SIAM Journal on Computing 33 332-350.
49. Saks, M., L. Yu. 2005. Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains. Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce ACM, New York, pp. 286-293.
50. Schuurman, P., T. Vredeveld. 2006. Performance guarantees of local search for multiprocessor scheduling. INFORMS Journal on Computing, 2007, 19(1), 52-63.
51. Smith, W. 1956. Various optimizers for single stage production. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3 59-66.
52. Vestjens, A. P. A. 1997. On-line Machine Scheduling. Ph. D. thesis, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
53. Vickrey, W. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16 8-37.