Deterministic Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Related Machines

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2996, Issue , 2004, Pages 608-619

  Auletta, Vincenzo ^a   De Prisco, Roberto ^a   Penna, Paolo ^a   Persiano, Giuseppe ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALERNO   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; POLYNOMIALS; SCHEDULING;

DETERMINISTIC MECHANISM; DOMINANT STRATEGY; NON-TRIVIAL POLYNOMIAL; PAYMENT FUNCTIONS; RELATED MACHINES; SCHEDULING RELATED MACHINES; TRUTHFUL APPROXIMATION; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EID: 35048830423     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-24749-4_53     Document Type: Article

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