Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3828 LNCS, Issue , 2005, Pages 698-707

  Angel, Eric ^a   Bampis, Evripidis ^a   Pascual, Fanny ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ D EVRY VAL D ESSONNE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADAPTIVE ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; SCHEDULING;

APPROXIMATION FACTORS; PARALLEL MACHINES; SELFISH TASKS; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

PARALLEL PROCESSING SYSTEMS;

EID: 33744911357     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11600930_70     Document Type: Conference Paper

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