The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men

Public Choice

Volumn 133, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 73-90

  Lehtinen, Aki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Borda rule; Simulation; Strategic voting; Welfare

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548553479     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9178-5     Document Type: Article

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