Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players

Computational Statistics and Data Analysis

Volumn 50, Issue 9, 2006, Pages 2495-2507

  Lehtinen, Aki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Beliefs; Heterogenous players; Signal extraction; Simulated games

Indexed keywords

ANIMATION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; FEATURE EXTRACTION; PROBLEM SOLVING;

BELIEFS; HETEROGENOUS PLAYERS; SIGNAL EXTRACTION; SIMULATED GAMES;

SIGNAL PROCESSING;

EID: 33644642313     PISSN: 01679473     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.csda.2005.07.004     Document Type: Article

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